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ABSTRACT 
 
This research evaluates crime prevention effects/impact of open-street closed circuit 
television (CCTV) surveillance systems as installed in the selected areas (research 
sites) of the cities of Johannesburg and Tshwane in the Gauteng Province of South 
Africa on crimes occurring in these surveilled areas. Currently, CCTV surveillance 
systems are a common sight in many of the urban areas of South Africa.The principal 
aim of this study was to explore the evaluation of CCTV for crime prevention, reduction 
and control. The results show that, despite a lack of empirical evidence as to the value 
of CCTV surveillance systems in preventing or reducing crime, there is strong public 
support for these systems and that the foundation for much of this support lies in the 
perceptions/feelings of members of the public of greater safety generated in areas with 
CCTV coverage. The method of sampling used was a purposive non-probability 
sampling approach. Participants were selected for interviews based on their knowledge 
and experience of CCTV systems. The results show that, despite this lack of empirical 
evidence, CCTV appears to be a viable option for crime prevention and control when 
integrated with evidence-based strategies rather than as a stand-alone tactic in order 
to achieve crime control benefits.  
 
Keywords:  Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance Systems; public safety 
and security; deterrence; crime prevention; surveillance and privacy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL ORIENTATION OF STUDY, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
MOTIVATION/RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the problem statement, motivation/rationale, background, 
significance and purpose of the study, the context of why research on Closed-Circuit 
Television (CCTV) surveillance systems was deemed necessary. This is followed by 
a section outlining key concepts and definitions of terms used primarily in this research 
study. There are a variety of different approaches to crime prevention that differ in 
terms of the focus of the intervention, the types of activities that are delivered, the 
theory behind how those activities are designed to bring about the desired results and 
the mechanisms that are applied. In this research study project, attention/focus will be 
given to the use of closed-circuit television camera surveillance systems. 
 
The way in which CCTV influences a community is determined by a set of assumptions 
about CCTV and the way it works. It therefore falls upon research studies to test these 
assumptions by measuring levels of support, perceptions of how CCTV works, and the 
factors which may influence these. These assumptions about CCTV must be assessed 
within the framework of the characteristics and experiences of the individuals who live 
in these areas. Previous studies that have measured the level of victimisation, fear of 
crime and avoidance specifically in areas covered by CCTV have done so in non-
residential settings. Few studies have measured respondents’ actual knowledge of 
how CCTV works, and the link between people’s level of knowledge and support for 
CCTV. 
 
CCTV cameras are primarily used to monitor and record images of what takes place 
in specific locations in real time (Duncan, 2018a: 14). CCTV cameras and surveillance 
systems are today firmly entrenched in modern society, not just in terms of their 
widespread presence in public places, but also as a key part of community safety, 
policing and national public security policy (Gerrard & Thomson, 2011: 10-12). Public 
2 
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CCTV schemes are frequently installed to reassure the public that something 
(prevention/reduction) is being done about crime (McCahill & Norris, 2002: 23 & 56; Gill 
& Spriggs, 2005: 18-20; Ratcliffe, 2006: 45 & 65). CCTV has several potential 
applications for public safety, and has been deployed with the intention variously of 
preventing crime, detecting offences, improving the response to emergencies, 
assisting in the management of places and reducing public fear of crime (Ratcliffe, 
2011: 15).  
 
The images collected by CCTV cameras are usually sent to a control room where they 
are monitored by an operative there, and then also simultaneously recorded on video 
tape or stored as digital information. The cameras can be fixed or set to scan an area, 
or they can be remotely operated by controllers (e.g. instructed to either ‘pan, tilt or 
zoom’ as required). Monitors (system operators) can themselves be watched by 
controllers (supervisors or managers in the control room) or left unmonitored. The 
recorded information can be stored and/or reviewed by those who have access to the 
recordings at their convenience.  
 
The widespread introduction and diffusion of CCTV cameras and systems in public 
places across South Africa has not gone unnoticed (Minnaar, 2006: 4-5). CCTV cameras 
are now a common sight almost everywhere, such as on public highways and in 
shopping malls and arcades (Minnaar, 2006a: 35).  
 
Progressively, the use of public space CCTV has become a “normal feature of public 
life” with the daily blanket surveillance of the movement of persons in public spaces 
(Duncan, 2018b: np). In South Africa, where the police daily fight a deadly war against 
crime, surveillance technology is increasingly being used by local municipalities to 
augment an understaffed and under-resourced police force. Increasingly, these 
cameras are being loaded with ‘smart’ capabilities, such as Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition (ANPR) and facial recognition software. The addition of video analysis 
tools to CCTV surveillance systems has provided additional and refined analysis of 
collected video footage (Duncan, 2018b: np). Such analysis permits CCTV to be 
3 
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become ‘smart dataveillance devices’ that are able, via artificial intelligence analytics, 
to conduct ‘investigations’ through the gathering and processing of analysed data. This 
process makes peoples’ movements highly visible to the authorities. Such additional 
analytical surveillance measures are meant to assist in ‘smart’ policing, whereby 
police use information tools to enhance the effectiveness of policing.  
 
An example from 2017 illustrates the use of CCTV video as evidence in a court of law. 
In 2013 the internationally renowned artist, Zwelethu Mthethwa, was accused of 
beating 23-year-old sex worker, Nokuphila Kumalo, to death. In Mthethwa’s trial, 
Judge Patricia Goliath accepted crucial CCTV footage that captured Mthethwa kicking 
and beating Kumalo in a street of the Cape Town suburb, Woodstock. She 
subsequently died from her injuries. CCTV street video footage captured the assault 
and the police positively identified Mthethwa as both the driver of the Porsche seen 
pulling over in Ravenscraig Road and the person who proceeded to assault Kumalo. 
Substantiating the presence of the vehicle parked in Ravenscraig Road at the time of 
the assault was information provided by Tracker.1 Mthethwa’s defence team attacked 
the authenticity of the CCTV video footage, but the court found that they failed to prove 
that the images had either been manipulated or tampered with. Accordingly, Judge 
Goliath accepted the public street CCTV recording of the murder as “unimpeachable” 
and “conclusively accepted it as evidence”. Furthermore, Goliath stated in her pre-
sentencing judgement that such CCTV video images had become “crucial in collecting 
evidence and finding the truth in criminal cases” (Anon, 2017: np).  
 
A criminal investigation can be thought of as a series of questions: Who was involved 
in an incident? Where did it happen? What happened? When did it happen? Why did 
it happen? and How were any offences committed? These questions, are based on 
and known as the ‘5WH’ Investigation Model (Cook, Hill & Hibbit, 2016: 75; Stelfox, 
2009: 80). CCTV may be useful in answering at least two of these questions, namely: 
 
1 Tracker has been the leading vehicle tracking company in South Africa since 1996 and provides a 
vehicle tracking installed device, particularly to combat vehicle hijackings, which tracks via satellite 
tracking (see www.tracker.co.za). 
4 
© Unisa 2019 
What happened; and who was involved (La Vigne, Lowry, Markman & Dwyer, 2011: 
18).  
 
According to Duncan (2018a):  
 
“The need for human monitoring places a natural limit on the analysis of 
camera footage. But, with digital tools of analysis, this is changing. When 
linked to a computer loaded with software capable of algorithmic analysis, 
huge amounts of footage can be analysed. These camera-based surveillance 
systems can capture information about a person’s physical location. Some 
may only provide real time information, while others may record information 
for further analysis” (Duncan, 2018a: 32).  
 
But the danger of such surveillance systems is that governments of authoritarian bent 
can misuse this collected data of people’s movements, political activities and 
associations (Duncan, 2018a: 33).  
 
For public street police investigations of CCTV digital video images to remain 
admissible in courts of law, there needs to be “… a transparency of a process and a 
holistic approach [within] the management, application and use of public street [CCTV 
surveillance] systems” (Brooks & Corkill, 2014: 220-225). 
 
Invasive styles of information analysis, such as number plate recognition and 
biometric facial identification software, are being introduced in new hi-tech CCTV 
surveillance cameras to improve their capabilities. Few concerns, let alone from 
members of the public, are being raised about the surveillance analytical implications 
for the protection of privacy rights in public areas (Duncan, 2018a: 52). But CCTV 
surveillance system installations continue apace in public areas, with many of these 
installations being justified by municipal authorities that their installation is intended 
solely or largely for the purposes of reducing criminal activity in urban city centres 
(Lyon, 2011: 41). 
5 
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CCTV is often seen and mainly used as a panacea or technical solution to security 
problems in crime prevention and control. Surveillance equipment, especially cameras 
and access-controlled devices, continue to be increasingly introduced into public and 
private spaces. Residents use the equipment in their daily lives in places where they 
are both operators and targets of the systems. CCTV in Central Business Districts 
(CBD) in South Africa has largely been used for the purpose of crime prevention, 
deterrence and crime control (Minnaar, 2007: 174-175). Understanding the attitudes 
of members of the public towards the impact CCTV has on their privacy, crime 
deterrence, prevention and social disorder, is an essential, but complex, consideration 
for policy makers, where public trust plays a central role. The difficulties of assessing 
the impact of CCTV on crime is difficult given the fact that the authorities have not 
endeavoured to obtain private impact assessments (including on privacy). This 
suggests that the public is forced to depend upon the state’s version of whether CCTV 
systems are successful or not, and whether their version of events, normally for public 
relations (PR) purposes, emphasises only the positive impact of Closed-Circuit 
Television (CCTV), (Karakus, McGarrell & Basıbuyuk, 2010: 175-179). 
 
According to Minnaar (2006):  
 
“The ‘outsourcing by default’ has extended to the provision of CCTV surveillance 
in a number of Central Business Districts (CBDs) in South Africa. Such 
outsourcing and the funding of installation and running costs has been a boon to 
the SAPS in that while they do not impinge on policing functions on the ground, 
they provide an additional support service for them without requiring any 
financial outlay or expensive infrastructure. Accordingly, the police have 
encouraged such anti-crime surveillance and monitoring services without 
outsourcing or losing any policing functions” (Minnaar, 2006: 2). 
 
In the early days of surveillance studies, many academics and researchers ‘embraced’ 
Foucault’s (1977: 56) elaboration of ‘panoptic’ surveillance, “a metaphor for the 
6 
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dispersal into wider society of a disciplinary mode of power” (Kietzman & Angel, 2010: 
138). The term influenced, and continues to do so, a large portion of the resulting 
research publications on the subject:  
 
“… owing to the conceptualisation of power and governmentality that underpins 
it. Despite its appeal, many2 in the field of surveillance studies question the 
utility of the panopticon as a model of contemporary surveillance” (Chivers, 
2016: 71). 
 
According to Taylor (2010: 209), “some authors3 have made the argument that CCTV 
is simply a logical and straight forward policy response to tackle crime and disorder, 
whereas those who [highlight] the inconclusiveness of [research] findings …” about 
surveillance and the use of CCTV “or question [their] validity” are “often portrayed as 
enemies of the public interest” (Davies, 1996:153).  
 
When discussing national security and/or the protection of citizens, the relationship 
between privacy and security is often described as a “trade-off” or a “balancing act” 
particularly in relation to the introduction of new surveillance technologies or practices 
(Lyon, 2011: 12). For example, the European Security Research Advisory Board 
(ESRAB) (2006: 23) prioritises technology development, particularly surveillance 
technologies, in its efforts to increase security. This immediately raises questions 
about privacy and data protection. However, others have argued that the metaphor of 
a ‘trade-off’ or ‘balance’ between privacy and security misrepresents the primary 
issues, since “the erosion of privacy creates new insecurities and privacy is a social 
good in and of itself” (Goold, 2009: 6).  
 
In some instances, privacy may be seen to have eroded in relation to the increasing 
surveillance of individuals (e.g. communication-based surveillance) as highlighted by 
the 2013 United States (US) National Security Agency (NSA) scandal, which pointed 
 
2 For example: Haggerty and Gaszo (2005: 169-187); Lyon, (2003: 23); Dupont, (2008: 34). 
3 For example: Welsh and Farrington, (2009: 89). 
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towards the increased surveillance of civilians in the US. This was revealed by the 
release of confidential documents by Edward Snowden – a data and systems analyst 
contracted to the NSA with security clearance (Greenwald, 2014: 42).  
 
Furthermore, European policy commitments, such as the Stockholm Programme, 4 
argue that, in addition to security, privacy and data protection are fundamental rights 
that must be adequately protected while ensuring security. Therefore, some elements 
of the European policy framework seem to be moving away from a balanced metaphor 
(Barnard-Wills, 2013: 170-171).  
 
Given this tension within policy documents, there has been an examination of the ways 
in which previous public opinion surveys conceptualised and operationalised the terms 
privacy, trust, security and surveillance (i.e. the use of surveillance technologies to 
enhance security) to determine whether they cohesively and appropriately measure 
public attitudes in order to adequately inform policy-makers and other stakeholders. 
As a result, there have been Europe-wide surveys of citizens’ attitudes towards 
privacy, security, trust and surveillance (Hustinx, 2010: 15).  
 
The growth of CCTV in South African public and private spaces mirrors broader global 
trends as:  
 
“[r]ollouts [of CCTV] tend to ‘follow the money’. In other words, they tend to 
follow patterns of wealth in the major metropolitan cities in South Africa. This 
contributes to the enclosure of city spaces by private capital, and consequently 
to the privatisation of public spaces and the reproduction of inequalities” 
(Duncan, 2018a: 7).  
 
The widest dissemination of CCTV systems has occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) 
(Caplan & Kennedy, 2010: 51) and in South Africa the use and implementation of public 
 
4  See Cassarino, (2010: 50); and European Policy Centre, 2013; for more detail on the Stockholm 
Programme. 
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open street Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance systems in Central 
Business Districts (CBDs) solely for the purpose of crime control (reducing street 
crime) or crime prevention (deterrence) has been a relatively new (mid-1990s) 
intervention within the broader context of crime prevention programmes (Minnaar, 
2006: 3-5). One of the drawbacks to its implementation for this purpose has been its 
costs and the inability of the South African Police Service (SAPS) to fund such 
implementation in the light of other more pressing priorities and demands on its 
finances and resources (Minnaar 2006: 4-8). However, the initiative to start 
implementing and linking CCTV surveillance systems in CBDs in the major 
metropolitan cities of South Africa to local police services was taken in the mid-1990s 
by Business Against Crime of South Africa (BACSA) (Minnaar, 2006: 4-5). 
 
The extent of this proliferation has led some commentators and academics to argue 
that the UK is now the most surveilled country in the world. In 1999, Norris and 
Armstrong (1999: 45 & 62), estimated that 540 town councils had installed Home 
Office-funded CCTV surveillance programmes in their town centres. Although there are 
no specific numbers for the prevalence of CCTV cameras, estimates of installed 
numbers in the UK alone range from 1.9 million to 4.3 million (Gerrard & Thomson, 
2011: 10). As early as 2002 McCahill and Norris put the estimated number of publicly- 
and privately-operated cameras in the UK at 4.2 million (McCahill & Norris, 2002: 34).5 
Although the precise number of cameras can be debated the existence of the CCTV 
‘revolution’ cannot. Consequently, CCTV and the surveillance practices and 
relationships embedded in the technology are a key feature of modern society.  
 
While South Africa tracks, to a considerable degree, international trends in the 
development of CCTV, it is very important that, in local terms, the contextualisation of 
this worldwide trend be analysed critically. David Lyon, the internationally recognised 
scholar on surveillance studies and Director of the Surveillance Studies Centre at 
 
5 But in 2012 Norris had revised this estimate and had stated that the figure might only be about 1.85 
million operational cameras in the UK. This reduction being largely due to local town councils not 
continuing the funding of operational costs after the UK Home Office had funded the initial installation 
costs of such CCTV surveillance systems largely in city and town Central Business Districts. 
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Queens University in Kingston, Canada, noted that “… while surveillance techniques 
are increasingly globalised, local and regional cultural contexts mediate the 
experience of surveillance in different ways” (Lyon, 2011: 35)  
 
Criminological literature on public CCTV was initially concerned with the basic 
question of whether CCTV led to a reduction in offending. Nevertheless, overviews of 
CCTV evaluations (Philips, 1999: 16; Welsh & Farrington, 2002: 19) confirm that, 
irrespective of a large volume of research done on CCTV implementation around the 
world, “… results continue to be ambiguous” (Penberthy, 2001: 89). McCahill and 
Norris (2002: 16) points out that the “identification and exclusion of known or 
suspected” persons or the application of predictive policing is currently practiced in 
public spaces.  
 
CCTV can be used as a reactive mode of policing. In other words, suspects or criminal 
offenders can be identified, tracked and/or subsequently traced. Laura, (2001: 11) 
maintains that investigators of crimes are uncertain concerning the effective use of 
CCTV surveillance in the investigation of crime. The private sector and businesses 
also lack a clear understanding about the utility worth of CCTV in the investigation of 
crime (Welsh & Farrington, 1999: 500). Businesspeople only want to monitor their 
workers to prevent stealing and do not want to assist the police to reduce crime (Laura, 
2001: 17). McCahill and Norris (2002: 17) also discussed the “new penology as the 
actuarial, seeking to regulate the danger, as opposed to the old penology that 
concentrated on an individual criminal and diagnosis of the crime”. Norris and 
Armstrong (1999: 63), maintain that CCTV has exhibited its effectiveness. Accordingly, 
even more CCTV installations are needed where the crime levels remain high. 
However, Matchett (2003: 3) holds that CCTV cameras alone are not capable of 
protecting property from theft or vandalism. The cameras only gather and store 
information principally for use as evidence if required in any forthcoming court case for 
prosecution purposes, and are regarded as technology and equipment that assist 
crime prevention and law enforcement agencies to police better and respond quicker 
to a ‘crime-in-progress’.  
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According to the study, reported by Caplan and Kennedy (2010: 196), although there 
is no significant relationship between general IT and crime fighting and deterrence, the 
productivity of the police increases when the adaptation to using IT rises. The findings 
of this research will be of significance to scholars undertaking studies in the area of 
CCTV Surveillance Systems. The logic of CCTV, put simply, is that because (rational) 
offenders know they are being watched they will consequently decide not to risk 
committing crimes or deviant acts, and if they do they are conscious there will be an 
image that can help identify them and be used as evidence to support a prosecution 
(Lyon, 2011: 12). Such rationality by offenders will likely lead to decreases in crime 
and social disorder. Evidence of effectiveness from the reviews of CCTV paint “a 
somewhat mixed picture” (Ratcliffe, 2006: 35; Eck, 2002: 610-615) in that some studies 
show it has had an effect of some sort, while others show a negative effect, or a neutral 
one. It depends on many different factors and, the evidence suggests that CCTV works 
most effectively when bundled together with a package of other situational 
preventative measures (Home Office, 1994, as cited in Ratcliffe, 2006: 35). In other 
words, CCTV is useful when used as synergy in integration. As CCTV is adopted as a 
security technology, would-be users will be able to make informed decisions prior to 
installation and usage.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Globally, surveillance systems have been synonymous with detection and deterrence of 
criminal activities. Despite the enormous potential that exists in surveillance systems, 
the public continues to play down the importance of these systems as a key element in 
crime prevention in the area under study. The problem in the study therefore rests on 
the premise that awareness of the effectiveness of surveillance systems is still 
significantly high in the study area despite the lack of evaluation benefits that can be 
connected to them. Proponents of CCTV believe that it is “effective in facilitating 
immediate responses to incidents, combating certain types of crime and reducing fear 
of crime” (McCahill & Norris, 2002: 72). Critics, however, put forward the 
counterargument that there are major and noteworthy negatives to the use of CCTV 
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in public spaces. A significant objection being that CCTV may “target already 
vulnerable sections of the population and result in social exclusion” (Lyon 2011: 30).  
 
Other concerns about the installation, implementation and usage of CCTV surveillance 
systems relate to the possibility that CCTV surveillance will be used to “undermine 
individual freedoms and facilitate oppressive forms of social control” (Norris & 
Armstrong, 1999: 47). “Smart” policing has become the means for combatting street 
crime. This policing model uses Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
to enhance policing efforts. The South African Police Service (SAPS), some South 
African metropolitan municipalities (e.g. Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and 
Tshwane) and private companies are teaming up to use data-driven technologies, such 
as CCTV surveillance systems, with added technology, such as intelligent facial 
recognition and ANPR, in the fight against crime.  
 
This study has the potential to improve the overall understanding of the role that CCTV 
plays in crime management and makes recommendations that justify the investment 
in and systematic use of these devices to boost safety in urban city centres. Moreover, 
this study can increase community awareness of the reliability of CCTV cameras and 
thereby influence the way in which law enforcement agencies as well as private 
security companies implement and manage crime prevention initiatives in communities 
where CCTV has been installed. South Africa has followed international trends in 
street-level police investigation and embraced technologies whose influence on crime 
fighting and crime intelligence information gathering are, at best, unclear and 
inconclusive. Research by Welsh and Farrington (1999: 35) reveals mixed responses 
about the usage of CCTV surveillance systems, namely, that it has:  
 
• a positive effect (decrease in offences);  
• an undesirable effect (increase in crime); and  
• no effect, or unclear evidence (Welsh & Farrington, 2002: 13).  
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It should be noted, moreover, that attempts to link the implementation of CCTV directly 
to changes in the overall crime rate are problematic. It is for this reason that the 
researcher has undertaken a study into the evaluation of CCTV camera systems for 
crime control and prevention in the Johannesburg and Tshwane municipal areas. Such 
research can help avoid the ‘knee jerk’ installation of CCTV following a sensational 
crime incident, particularly in affluent residential areas.  
 
In this research project, the problem statement is therefore about evaluating the use 
of CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention in selected residential 
areas in Johannesburg and Tshwane (Pretoria) in the Gauteng Province of South 
Africa.  
 
1.3  RESEARCH AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSE 
The broad aim of this research study is:  
 
At the broadest level, the aim of this research study is to give a clear sense of what 
can reliably be believed to be true about the effects/impact of CCTV surveillance 
systems, based on the existing evidence; to link these findings to a wider set of 
questions about the implementation and operationalisation in selected areas (research 
sites) of the two selected cities (Johannesburg and Tshwane). This includes 
considerations at the level of policy and highlighting outstanding issues and areas 
where further research might be needed. 
 
The primary aim of this study then is to analyse the implementation of CCTV system 
as a crime prevention tool with a view to suggest the secure framework for South Africa 
environment. 
 
The purpose of the present study is to evaluate the use of CCTV surveillance systems 
for crime control and prevention. Furthermore, to explore the usage and benefit of 
CCTV surveillance systems with a view to determining their value within the 
community from the perspectives of Community Police Forums (CPFs), CCTV 
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Operators and residential areas impact on crime, value as both a crime prevention 
measure and as an aid to police. 
 
The study’s objectives are as follows:  
 
• to analyse the capabilities of CCTV systems as crime prevention tool from 
technology been introduced and widely used in Johannesburg/Tshwane in 
conjunction with international literature. 
 
• to examine the current CCTV system implementation in South Africa at the public 
acceptability level. 
 
1.4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this research is the following:  
 
• What is the contribution that installed CCTV surveillance systems can make 
towards crime prevention and control? 
 
• In other words: What was the impact of CCTV surveillance in the selected 
research areas (Johannesburg and Tshwane)? 
  
• Examining the effectiveness of current CCTV systems implementation in 
Johannesburg and Tshwane. 
 
Secondary/ancillary questions to the primary research question were formulated to 
broadly deal with such research issues as:  
 
• What were the residents/CCTV operators/security officers’ experiences with 
public CCTV surveillance? 
 
• What has been the impact that CCTV has had on crime in general? 
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• What has been the impact of public CCTV surveillance on the views of 
respondents regarding the privacy rights of individuals? 
 
• In what way can CCTV video footage be used as a surveillance technique in 
crime prevention and control? 
 
• In what way do respondents think CCTV video footage can be admitted as 
evidence in court? 
 
These research questions chiefly guided the progression of the study, in that they were 
always considered, referred to, and, if needed, clarification questions were posed to 
respondents, as the study unfolded. Answers to these questions were sought and 
provided in the research findings chapter of this study. 
 
1.5 STUDY AREA: BACKGROUND AND SETTING 
In this research study two sites were selected, namely the cities of Johannesburg and 
Tshwane (Pretoria) situated in the Gauteng Province of South Africa. 
 
Johannesburg – or as it is more commonly known: ‘Joburg’ – is the largest city in South 
Africa and the provincial capital of the Gauteng Province. Gauteng is the wealthiest 
province in the country, being both the industrial heartland and financial centre, not 
only of South Africa, but of the African continent as well. Johannesburg is one of the 
50 largest cities in the world and the largest city in the world not sited on the coast, a 
lake or a river (World Population Review, 2019a: np). According to Statistics South 
Africa the latest population estimates for the Johannesburg metropolitan area are 
around 5, 6 million (Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), 2018: 40).  
 
While the population estimate for the Tshwane Metropolitan Area – the Administrative 
Capital of South Africa – was put at approximately 2, 47 million at the end of 2018. 
The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality is the metropolitan municipality that 
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forms the local government of northern Gauteng Province The Metropolitan area is 
centred on the city of Tshwane with surrounding towns and localities included in the 
local government area. The Tshwane municipality is home to the Tshwane University 
of Technology; the largest distance education university in Africa (the University of 
South Africa, more commonly known by its acronym, UNISA); the University of 
Pretoria, one of South Africa's leading research and teaching universities; and the 
Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University (formerly known as the Medical 
University of Southern Africa, at the Medunsa Campus of the University of Limpopo) 
situated in Ga-Rankuwa, Pretoria North. The two state research councils: the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the South African Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR), are also in the Tshwane municipal area.The combined 
two city metropolitan population (Johannesburg and Tshwane) being therefore just 
over 8 million out of a total for Gauteng Province of 14.7 million (StatsSA, 2018a: 2; 
15 & 17; World Population Review, 2019b: np).  
 
Unfortunately the city centre of Johannesburg and in particular the precincts of Newton 
/ Hillbrow / Braamfontein, has over the years built up (and it must be said) a deserved 
reputation for being crime ridden and extremely unsafe, (Minnaar, 2006: 16).The 
persistent public image of the area was strongly that of being derelict, dysfunctional 
and having a crime problem. Typical inner-city decay conditions with its associated 
overcrowding of residential buildings, continual increases in crime, especially street 
crime, drug dealing and vehicle hijacking, was experienced in these areas during the 
early and mid-1990s (Leggett, 2002: 68).  
 
In the post-1994 years, the population mix of the Johannesburg CBD area changed 
dramatically with many foreign migrants (some of them undocumented and irregular 
immigrants) coming into the area. With the rising levels of crime in the area, the 
Hillbrow Police Station was identified as one of the about 140 (out of approximately 1 
200) problem (‘hot spot’) or priority crime police stations in South Africa. Foreign 
embassies and consulates in South Africa routinely warned their citizens traveling to 
the country to avoid the area, especially in the late-night hours. Consequently, central 
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Johannesburg is generally perceived to be a ‘dangerous place’ populated by a high 
number of criminals.  
 
With this background the installation of public (open street) crime control CCTV 
surveillance systems in the area became a high priority. Braamfontein is regarded as 
Johannesburg’s Central Business District (CBD) and includes municipal council 
offices; Wits University; private colleges, such as Damelin; businesses; and numerous 
retail stores and the Nelson Mandela Bridge, which crosses over 42 railway lines and 
links the two main business areas of Johannesburg: Braamfontein and Newtown. 
Unfortunately, the city centre of Johannesburg and the precincts of Newtown, Hillbrow 
and Braamfontein, have become the home of many apartment buildings and so-called 
‘high-rises’ but, at the same time, they continue currently to experience the 
accompanying high-levels of urban crime with an earned reputation for being very 
unsafe. The public viewed the area as “being derelict, dysfunctional and having a crime 
problem … [with] typical inner-city decay conditions with its associated overcrowding 
of residential buildings” that has persistent street crime, such as drug dealing and 
vehicle hijacking (Leggett, 2002: 56).  
 
Similarly to Johannesburg, the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality also experiences 
high levels of crime. At least 319 CCTV cameras, covering Marabastad, the CBD, 
Sunnyside, Brooklyn, Waterkloof and Centurion have been installed (2018). These areas 
also include the Union Buildings area and the Hatfield and Arcadia areas, where most 
high commissions, the diplomatic community and embassies are situated. However, 
due to long-running court disputes concerning the awarding to private companies of 
the tender to operate and monitor the CBD installed cameras, “…they’re not being 
monitored” (i.e. not operational). Although the operational systems were effective in the 
past in combating crime and enhancing safety the neglect of the CBD system in 
particular has put the public at risk and a predicted rise in smash-and-grabs, cable 
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1.6  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This research study will provide knowledge about the usage of CCTV as crime 
prevention tool and will enable creation of industry-wide best practices for the 
development, deployment, evaluation, and integration of policies related to the ethical 
use of CCTV in crime prevention initiatives. The researcher undertook this study 
project in the belief that students, policy makers and practitioners need to have a 
strong grasp of the thinking behind the strategies and tactics that are used to try to 
prevent crime and CCTV as a situational crime prevention strategy.  
 
Much of the analysis presented in this study is from the review of collected documents 
and publications. The empirical evidence which informs the findings presented in the 
latter part of the study is from a series of interviews with CCTV operators, policy-makers 
(CPFs and individuals in residential areas and service providers, inter alia private 
security companies in selected areas of Johannesburg and Tshwane, conducted during 
the latter part of 2018 and the first two months of 2019). In total 40 interviews were 
conducted with CCTV operators, (e.g. CCTV control room managers or controllers and 
other interested parties. Forty interviews were also conducted with members of local 
CPFs, including community representatives associated with CCTV provision in the 
selected local authority research site areas. The researcher will provide knowledge 
about the usage of CCTV as crime prevention tool.  
 
1.7  DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
This section provides general definitions of terms related to the study. According to 
Creswell, (2014: 2), there are certain concepts that are central to any inquiry. The 
concepts that follow are crucial to this study and are explained in order to simplify what 
was envisaged. 
 
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) 
At the most basic level, CCTV can be defined as surveillance systems composed of a 
“network of cameras and components for monitoring, recording and transmitting video 
images” (McCahill & Norris, 2002: 38). Caplan, Kennedy and Petrossian (2011), 
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replicated and expanded somewhat on this definition by indicating that CCTV could 
be: “any instrument, apparatus, equipment, or other device that is connected 
electronically from the image capture device to the display device that is capable of 
being used to visually observe an activity” (Caplan et al, 2011: 257-270). 
 
Image 1.1:   A street pole with CCTV cameras mounted at the top  
 
 
 (Photo by Victor Garcia, 2019).  
 
The above type of CCTV camera has an impressive high-tech license plate recognition 
feature that can scan the number plates of about 480 passing vehicles per minute 
(Parker & Federl, 1997). Then, by using fast built-in internet connectivity, the vehicle 
number plate images are checked against the SAPS’ database of stolen vehicles, 
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Image 1.2:  Typical CCTV installation in a suburb 
 
  
 (Photo by Victor Garcia, 2019). 
 
The above image is of a typical CCTV camera installation in residential suburbs or 
along streets. 
 
Crime prevention  
Crime prevention is a term describing techniques used for reducing victimisation as 
well as deterring criminals and preventing further crimes being perpetrated by them 
(Gill, 2016: 43). It is applied specifically to efforts made by governments to reduce 
crime, enforce the law and maintain criminal justice. Obviously, crime prevention is 
including any initiative or policy which reduces or eliminates the aggregate level of 
victimisation or the risk of individual criminal participation (Bowers & Johnson 2016: 
133). It includes government and community-based programmes to reduce the 
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incidents of risk factors correlated with criminal participation, the rate of victimisation, 
as well as efforts to reduce perceptions/fear of crime (Van Rooyen, 2013: 17). 
Accordingly, crime prevention comprises of strategies and measures that seek to 
reduce the risk of crimes occurring and their potential harmful effects on individuals 
and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2010: 45).  
 
Evidence 
Gilbert (2004: 58) defines evidence as anything properly admissible in a court of law, 
which will aid the function of criminal proceedings in establishing guilt or innocence. 
 
Investigation 
According to Marais and Van Rooyen (2013: 17), investigation is the systematic search 
for the truth with a basis of objective and subjective traces. 
 
Personal data 
According to the Protection of Personal Information Act (Act 4 of 2013) (known as the 
POPI Act), personal information means information relating to an identifiable, living, 
natural person or non-juristic person (e.g. a company). 
 
Surveillance  
According to National Instruction 3/2010 of the South African Police Service (SAPS, 
2010: 1), surveillance is a covert method used to observe people continuously, 
including places and properties, with the purpose of gathering information. 
 
1.8  CHAPTER OUTLINES 
 
Chapter 1:  General orientation 
This chapter serves as an introduction and background motivation for the study. It 
clarifies important concepts, establishes a brief motivation for the study and outlines 
the problem statement. The researcher introduces the phenomenon, explains the 
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rationale of the study, problem statement, puts forth research aims and objectives, 
research questions and key theoretical concepts are clarified and sets the course of 
the dissertation. This chapter also gives some geographic context of Johannesburg 
and Tshwane to give some context about the locations under discussion throughout 
this study. 
 
Chapter 2:  Research methodology and design  
Chapter Two outlines the research methodology adopted. The researcher opted for a 
qualitative approach utilising both inductive analysis and empirical design. The chapter 
further presents details of the research design, target population, sample and sampling 
procedures, description of research instruments, validity and reliability of instruments, 
data collection procedures, data analysis techniques and ethical considerations. The 
theoretical underpinnings for the use of CCTV will be another area that was examined 
in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3:  Literature review: CCTV surveillance  
This Chapter examines existing literature relating to CCTV, both in the South African 
jurisdiction and from an international perspective. In addition, the legislative position 
regarding public (street) CCTV systems from an operational, regulatory and data 
protection perspective and the current guidelines and operating protocols for public 
CCTV systems were examined and outlined in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4:  Research findings: data analysis and interpretation 
Chapter Four presents the findings of the research and an analysis and discussion of 
those results, impact, significance, implications for crime prevention initiatives. It also 
provides an analysis and interpretation of the interviews conducted and the street 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The study involved evaluating the use, impact and effectiveness of Closed-Circuit 
Television (CCTV) Surveillance Systems in crime management and the level of public 
perceptions about its effectiveness in deterrence, detection, delay and response to 
criminal activities in both central business districts and residential areas, as well as public 
streets in the areas in the two selected research sites (Johannesburg and Tshwane). 
Accordingly, several research methodologies were implemented and applied for the 
collection of the requisite research information and data. 
 
Creswell (2013: 56) argues that the choice of method is influenced by numerous 
factors including whether the intent is to detail the type of information to be collected 
in advance or whether to allow it to emerge from the study. Creswell further asserts 
that one needs to consider the full range of data collection possibilities (Creswell, 
2013: 30).  
 
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
After careful deliberation, the researcher felt that this study would be best served and 
suited by using both an exploratory and evaluation research design, primarily through 
a qualitative research approach (Creswell, 2014: 23).  
 
Subsidiary to this was a quantitative approach as applied by applying coding and 
statistical analysis to responses, for the street survey questionnaires administered. 
Then, the research design is best described as the use of a ‘mixed-methods’ approach. 
The notion of mixed methods or multi-methods approaches is an approach that brings 
together the value and benefits of both qualitative and quantitative approaches, whilst 
at the same time providing a middle solution for many (research) problems of interest 
(Creswell, 2013: 113). 
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By mainly adopting a qualitative research approach, the researcher felt that this would 
assist in answering different types of questions, the collection of research 
information/data and undertake document analysis.  
 
The current study was further shaped by using an inductive research design. The 
research analysis method employed was implemented through detailed one-on-one 
interviews based on a schedule of interview questions and applied analysis to 
responses in order to arrive at resulting findings of the research. The simplest definition 
of an ‘interview’ is a “conversation where questions are asked and the corresponding 
answers are given and it involves two parties: the interviewer and interviewee” 
(Creswell, 2013: 50). In the qualitative paradigm, interviews are often seen as one of 
the best ways to "enter into the other person's perspective" (Patton, 2000: 3410). 
Consequently, the research was designed to achieve the aims and objectives as set out 
by the researcher in Chapter 1. 
 
In addition, based on a reading of Davidson (2000: 45), a phenomenological 
methodology was identified as the best research design theoretical approach for this 
type of study. This theoretical design was chosen for the purpose of describing the 
meaning of people’s lived experiences of a concept or phenomenon. Hence, by focusing 
on identifying and analysing what all the participants have in common as they 
experience a phenomenon for a better overall understanding of participants’ ‘lived 
experiences’ (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010: 18). (See more detail on the chosen theoretical 
framework outlined in a later section below). 
 
2.3  RESEARCH APPROACH 
Baškarada (2014: 12) is of the opinion that the “qualitative research paradigm has 
increasingly served as a unique option for knowledge sharing and academic debate 
over the years”. An interview guide and questionnaire design, with open-ended 
questions, was used to explore the usage of CCTV surveillance systems for 
anticipated benefits of crime prevention and control.  
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The review of the literature related to the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime 
prevention and control in public and private space revealed that there are a myriad of 
CCTV technologies currently in use by law enforcement agencies Yet, no uniform 
standard for CCTV evluation exists that has, so fa, been followed.The preliminary 
intention of this research study was to gather data regarding the views and opinions of 
research participants about the utilisation of CCTV surveillance in crime prevention 
and control. Accordingly, the researcher elected to primarily adopt a qualitative 
approach to assist the researcher in obtaining a deeper understanding of the issues 
being investigated. This decision was based on the choice and understanding that such 
an approach is non-numerical (i.e. non-statistical methods of enquiry and analysis of 
social phenomena) (Creswell, 2014: 23), though findings may be presented in a 
graph/tabular format.  
 
Subsidiary to this was a quantitative approach as applied by applying coding and 
statistical analysis to responses, for the street survey questionnaires administered. 
Then the research design is best described as the use of a ‘mixed-methods’ approach. 
The notion of mixed methods or multi-methods approaches is an approach that brings 
together the value and benefits of both qualitative and quantitative approaches, whilst 
at the same time providing a middle solution for many (research) problems of interest 
(Creswell, 2013: 113).  
 
By mainly adopting a qualitative research approach, the researcher felt that this would 
assist in answering different types of questions, collect data and undertake document 
analysis. This type of research approach is conducted in natural settings (Creswell, 
2014: 23), in other words researchers collect data in the field at site where participants’ 
experience the issue or problem under study. The data collected is non-numeric as 
compared to a purely quantitative approach.  
 
As a result, the researcher undertook to visit participants at their workstations subject 
to pre-arrangement/appointments made and certain circumstances when permission 
was granted. The issue of permission is crucial since the researcher wanted to collect, 
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by means of examining on-site documents and observing behaviour in a natural setting 
(of interviewees). 
 
2.4 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The views, beliefs and thoughts of residents and the key representatives of both 
residents and operators (in control rooms) regarding CCTV surveillance to be reached 
by following a string of constructionism/interpretivism/phenomenological theoretical 
framework with reference to the following factors:  
 
• The study examines a relatively small, purposive sample;  
 
• The study measures intensively with relatively unstructured instruments; and  
 
• The results of the research are presented mainly in words (textual thematic 
analysis of responses) (Creswell, 2013: 13). 
 
It is hoped that the results will reflect realities as perceived by the participants/ 
respondents/interviewees. According to the purpose of the research, this study will 
then largely follow an exploratory/descriptive study path. According to Babbie, (2011: 
58), “[a]n exploratory study intends to explore what is happening; to seek new insights; 
to ask questions and to assess the phenomena in a new light”. This intended 
exploratory study will be valuable particularly since, in South Africa, there has been 
limited research undertaken on the research topic (CCTV surveillance impact on crime 
prevention and crime reduction) and there is very little information known about the 
phenomena per se (see further discussion on studies and published literature in 
Chapter 3).  
 
2.4.1 Phenomenological Theory 
The above includes using the Phenomenological Theory as the qualitative approach 
to investigate the phenomenon of CCTV surveillance systems. The operative term in 
a phenomenological study includes descriptive methodology to measure and 
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investigate the perceptions, awareness of the target population and selection of an 
appropriate sampling size. The descriptive method was suited to this type of study and 
measured and investigated what existed through the lived experiences of the subjects. 
A phenomenological study was chosen for several reasons: because it gives the 
meaning of lived experiences for individuals and focuses on common experiences of 
participants through the collection of data (Creswell, 2013: 59 & 68).  
 
“Phenomenology provides a deep understanding of a phenomenon as experienced by 
several individuals” (Creswell, 2013: 62). Since it is concerned with the meaning of 
people’s lived experiences of a concept or phenomenon, the researcher employed this 
research design which focuses on identifying and analysing what the participants have 
in common as they experience a phenomenon. According to Welman and Kruger 
(1999: 189), “the phenomenologists are concerned with understanding social and 
psychological phenomena from the perspectives of people involved”. This is to be 
done by reducing “individual experiences with a phenomenon to a description of 
universal essence” (Creswell, 2013: 23) or, in other words, a “grasp of the very nature 
of the thing” (Creswell, 2014: 56). Specifically, the researcher utilised Psychological 
Phenomenology (also termed Empirical or Transcendental) as expounded by 
Moustakas (1994: 67, as cited in Creswell, 2013: 54), which focuses less on the 
interpretations of the subjects and more on a description of the experiences of the 
participants.  
 
2.4.2 Five environmental criminological theories  
Five environmental criminological approaches were used to explain how CCTV can, 
theoretically, reduce crime, namely:  
 
i) rational choice;  
ii) routine activities;  
iii) crime pattern analysis;  
iv) situational crime prevention (as deterrence); and 
v) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). 
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i) Rational Choice Theory 
Cornish and Clarke (2003: 41 & 50) postulated the Rational Choice Theory, which is 
based on the assumption that “offenders seek to advantage themselves by their 
criminal behaviour‟. Rational Choice Theory, similar to the Routine Activity Theory, is 
formulated on the concept of the offender being a rational actor undertaking a cost 
benefit analysis at a given time and place to assess whether there is the opportunity 
to offend. 
 
The main tenets of the Rational Choice Theory being that adversaries act rationally 
when planning a crime by weighing the risks, rewards and effort needed to commit 
their crime(s) (Clarke, 1997: 15).  
 
The Rational Choice Crime Prevention Theory, developed by Roland Clarke, explains 
that adversaries using a hedonistic calculus during their decision-making process in 
selecting targets will act in their own best interests. Under this circumstance, security 
officers should therefore, understand this calculus, manipulate it and use it to their 
advantage. In view of this, Rational Choice Theory denies the existence of any kind of 
action or force other than the purely rational and calculating offender (Clarke, 1997: 
34).  
 
However, despite this portrayal of offenders as rational decision makers who base their 
actions on the costs and benefits they perceive in the contemplated activity, research 
suggests that offenders do not necessarily construct detailed plans for each offence 
(Steven, 2010: 51). Rather, rational choices and preconceived plans may be set into 
motion when the offender happens to come across a situation or target which fits the 
general description of an appropriate target.  
 
Accordingly, CCTV surveillance is grounded in the criminological theory that suggests 
potential offenders are less likely to commit crime if they believe they are being 
watched or have a greater risk of being apprehended.  
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ii) Routine Activity Theory 
Routine Activity Theory, postulated by Cohen and Felson (1979: 588-608), posited 
that for a predatory crime to occur three elements must be present, namely: a likely 
or motivated offender; a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Felson 
(1987: 915 subsequently refined the theory with the addition of a fourth element, that 
of the “intimate handler”.  
 
From a routine activities’ viewpoint, it is proposed that camera surveillance acts as a 
capable guardian. Given the presence of a capable guardian, offending behaviour will 
not occur even if a likely offender and suitable target converge in space and time 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979: 588-608; Felson, 1987: 925 .Routine Activity Theory explains 
the occurrence of a crime due to the spatio-temporal convergence of three elements: 
A motivated offender, a suitable target (victim), and the lack of capable guardianship.  
 
The basic premise of Routine Activity Theory is that the changes in routine activities 
associated with the increase in small households and two-income families, has 
increased the opportunity for property crimes mostly. Naturally, the density of 
offenders, attractive targets, and ineffective guardianship is not randomly distributed 
across space. Some places offer more crime opportunities than others. 
 
In this theoretical context then, the CCTV security camera is a proxy for guardianship.  
 
iii) Crime Pattern Theory 
Crime Pattern Theory takes into consideration both routine activity and rational choice 
theories and explores the dynamic of criminals becoming aware of opportunities for 
crime in the course of their daily routine activities rather than making a special trip to 
perpetrate specific crimes (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993: 128).  
 
iv) Situational crime prevention  
One of the principal advocates of Rational Choice Theory, Ron Clarke, also 
championed the situational crime prevention approach. The situational crime 
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prevention approach, under-pinned by the rational choice, routine activities and crime 
pattern analysis theories, seeks to make objects “crime resistant” via managed 
methods of crime prevention, including target hardening, environmental design, 
surveillance and crime pattern analytics. 
 
Situational prevention comprises of opportunity-reducing measures that are:  
 
• directed at highly specific forms of crime;  
 
• involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment 
in as systematic and permanent way as possible; 
 
• make crime more difficult and riskier, or less rewarding and excusable as judged 
by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 1997: 40). 
 
From a situational crime prevention viewpoint, it is proposed that CCTV increases the 
perceived risks associated with offending in locations under camera surveillance since 
it increases the likelihood of detection (Clarke, 1997: 31 & 45).  
 
Clarke and Eck (2003: 18-27) outlined the twenty-five techniques of situational crime 
prevention which fall into five main groups, through which the techniques achieve their 
preventive effect, namely: increasing the effort to commit crime; increasing the risks; 
reducing the rewards; reducing provocations; and removing excuses.  
 
CCTV is a type of situational crime prevention strategy in which levels of formal 
surveillance are increased within a targeted area (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 67; Welsh 
& Farrington, 2009a: 717). Situational crime prevention is focused on preventing crime 
by reducing criminal opportunities in a targeted area and increasing the risk of 
offending through modification of the physical environment (Clarke, 1995: 176). The 
situational prevention of crime is mainly rooted in the rational choice perspective, in 
which crime is considered to be “purposive, in which behaviour designed to meet the 
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offender’s commonplace needs” (Clarke, 1995: 180). According to Welsh and 
Farrington, (2009: 40), the suggested strategic aspects of CCTV schemes may be as 
important as the environmental setting. In addition, Piza (2018: 16) noted that because 
CCTV sites are permanent fixtures (hard wired to physical structures and configured 
to wireless communication networks), moving locations after use, would require 
additional costs. Agencies usually install cameras at locations of their choice, without 
giving prior consideration for these detracting factors. 
 
The above theories allow one either to focus on offenders or victims, but they do not 
focus exclusively on either of them, since overall, they are concerned with the 
convergence of offenders and victims in place and time. 
 
v) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
The theoretical concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
is also relevant in the context of CCTV surveillance and should not be overlooked. 
Following earlier work by Jacobs (1961: 80), CPTED was developed by Jeffrey (1971: 
56) who coined the phrase: “crime prevention through environmental design” and 
Newman (1972: 13) who developed the idea of “defensible space‟. CPTED is 
concerned with designing out crime generating factors from the built environment and 
surveillance is one of its integral principles.  
 
McCahill and Norris (2002: 78), for instance, have postulated three theoretical 
approaches to the use of CCTV surveillance. Firstly, they draw on sociological 
literature and Michel Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon, where they link the 
disciplinary potential of the Panopticon to the use of mass surveillance systems. Norris 
and Armstrong (1999: 60) argue that the extent to which CCTV systems mirror 
panoptic principles in their operation and effects depends on a number of issues 
including the fact that the area being monitored is not a closed space; that the watchers 
are not generally in a position to directly intervene; and that the watchers have little if 
any information on those being observed. 
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2.4.3 Case study approach 
In addition, to the exploratory, inductive study design and using the phenomenological 
paradigm, this study was complemented by utilising case studies as a research 
methodology to fulfil the overall aim of the research.  
 
This case study seeks to understand and interpret how stakeholders in selected areas 
make use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime prevention and control by 
considering their lived experiences. It is an approach that will enable the research 
questions to be answered by providing a rich picture of the actual conditions 
surrounding CCTV surveillance practices in the identified case studies. The target 
population for this research would be CCTV surveillance monitors, Community Police 
Forum members and the public. 
 
In the research site areas, selected case studies were used to evaluate the use of 
CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention in the selected research 
site areas in the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria (Tshwane) in the Gauteng 
Province. 
 
Babbie and Mouton (2001: 21), argue that the objective of case study research is to 
“investigate the dynamics of some single-bounded systems, typically of a social 
nature, such as a family, group, community and participants in a project”. Yin (1994: 
34), states that a case study permits a research study to “retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events”.  
 
2.5 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION TOOLS USED  
Data collection methods relates to how the data were collected (Creswell, 2013: 45). 
Primary and secondary data was collected by the researcher. According to Creswell 
(2013: 39), primary data refers to original data obtained first-hand by the researcher. 
Conversely, secondary data is data obtained/found in secondary sources (for 
example: logbooks, incident registers, case dockets and literature or information 
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collected by individuals or agencies and institutions, other than by the researcher 
themselves (Creswell, 2014: 49). 
The researcher used a combination of both, which led to the application of the concept 
of triangulation. Triangulation, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 50), triangulation 
or the use of multiple methods, as a plan of action, raises sociologists above the personal 
biases that stem from one single methodology. The combination of multiple (mixed) 
methods and techniques can overcome the deficiencies that can flow from utilising only 
one method/approach.  
 
Welman and Kruger (2001: 67), state that the purpose of using triangulation is to use the 
results from each utilized method of data collection and attempt to corroborate the resulting 
findings according to each method’s analyses as applied to the coll3ected research 
information.  
 
For the research information/data collection for this study the researcher used the 
following methods and instruments of data collection:  
 
• document analysis (including review of available published literature); 
• face-to-face interviews (based on standardised schedules of interview 
questions) (see Annexures G &H); 
• street survey questionnaires (see Annexure I); and 
• onsite observation. 
 
2.5.1 Document analysis/literature review  
In doing literature searches, the researcher decided to break down the topic into the 
main concepts of the study, such as:  
 
• surveillance;  
• closed circuit television (CCTV); and 
• private security control rooms. 
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With these core search terms, the researcher visited the various resource centres of 
the university to locate available material on the selected title/research topic. Several 
relevant books and journal articles on the chosen topic were found. The researcher 
consulted the Open Shelf collection catalogue at Unisa library, under the search term: 
‘surveillance’. Additional searches of electronic bibliographic databases, as well as 
manual searches of CCTV evaluations study bibliographies were undertaken. As the 
research study progressed, the researcher conducted further manual searches of each 
study/publication obtained for potential inclusion.  
 
The following databases were searched: Criminal Justice Abstracts and National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).6 These databases were selected since 
they had the most comprehensive coverage of criminological, criminal justice and 
social science published literature.  
 
The researcher also checked relevant journals, intranet and internet, including 
websites dealing with surveillance studies’ issues, including criminal justice websites 
on a broad range of topics relating to CCTV (in particular of literature reviews on the 
effectiveness of CCTV in preventing crime; admissibility and evidence; and issues of 
the privacy of information); for any material relevant to the topic under research.  
 
The researcher also extensively perused journals, such as Surveillance and Society 
and local newspaper articles, in search for any information on the use of CCTV 
surveillance systems for crime control and prevention. 
 




6  See National Criminal Justice Reference Services (NCJRS), Office of Justice Programs (OJP) of the 
US Department of Justice (DoJ) publications/abstracts lists available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/AlphaList.aspx#. 
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By reviewing all available related literature, such as books, periodicals and online 
journals and studies, provided the researcher with an in-depth background and 
meaningful answers to the research problems. 
 
2.5.2  Face-to-face interviews 
In structured face-to-face interviews the interviewer asks each respondent the same 
questions in the same way. This is the most basic and most common face-to-face 
interview type. A structured interview may include open-ended and closed-ended 
questions. This type of interview is usually used for large projects for which the 
researcher wants the same data to be collected from each respondent (Zorn, 2010: 
35). This was not the researcher’s choice for this study. For this study semi-structured 
interviews were preferred by the researcher since they offered convenience (Creswell, 
2013: 27) and assist in the correct gathering of focused, qualitative textual data (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2010: 12). Another advantage of their usage being that semi-structured 
interviews are “fairly reliable and easy to analyse” (Creswell, 2014: 30). This method 
offers a balance between the flexibility of an open-ended interview and the focus of a 
structured ethnographic survey questionnaire (Creswell, 2013: 50). Information from 
research methodology literature on qualitative research suggests that a total of 25 to 
35 interviews is enough to conduct research using the qualitative approach (Creswell, 
2014: 39). 
 
The aim of the usage (in this study) of a face-to-face research interview instrument 
was for the better identification of insights into an issue (study topic) from the 
perspective of participants/respondents (Creswell, 2014: 34). In this study the 
researcher used face-to-face interviews based on a standardised schedule of interview 
questions as the primary research information collection method. Among those 
identified to be interviewed included: CCTV operators (in control rooms); private 
security companies; and individuals (both residents and members of local CPF) in 
residential areas. Accordingly, a schedule of interview questions (see annexures G & 
H), (two sets slightly differing in accordance with target populations identified for 
interviewing) was prepared for implementation in the field. 
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The developed schedule of interview questions contained a series of mostly open-
ended questions based on the topic of study (there were a few close-ended questions, 
largely in the biographical information section (Section A), but some close-ended 
questions were followed by a secondary open-ended question requesting motivation 
for the answer in the close-ended question. Accordingly, the researcher opted for semi-
structured face-to-face interviews with CCTV operators, and a similar one with some 
changed questions with a different focus for residents and members of local CPFs for 
residential areas. (Annexures G & H).  
 
The schedules of interview questions consisted of 39 (Annexure G) and 33 questions 
(Annexure H) respectively, with the last 32 (Annexure G) and 30 questions (Annexure 
H) asked the participants to state their perception of CCTV’s role and objectives within 
their company’s operations or organisation to which affiliated. The intent was to 
understand whether the participants perceived a difference between roles and 
objectives, and if there was a different perception at the various work levels (Annexure 
G) and respondents (Annexure H) about the installation of CCTV surveillance cameras 
in their neighbourhood/residential area.  
 
The researcher, in undertaking each individual interview, attempted to create a positive 
and conducive atmosphere for the interview, namely by: Firstly, introducing himself to 
the identified potential interviewee. Secondly, by stating the aims, objectives and 
purpose of the study, as well as his relation (postgraduate research student) to the 
research study.  
 
During the interviews the researcher implemented the following:  
 
• used mainly open-ended questions in order to obtain lengthy and descriptive 
answers rather than using close-ended questions (i.e. those that only require 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer); 
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• avoided posing leading or ambiguous questions; 
 
• used terms that participants could easily understand, given their knowledge, 
language skills, cultural background, age, gender, etc.;  
 
• was mindful of the social or cultural contexts of all questions posed to the 
interviewees;  
 
• tried to have a one-on-one interaction with the interviewee (Creswell, 2014: 41).  
 
• tried to understand something from the subjects’ point of view and to uncover 
the meaning of their experiences (Pandey & Pandey, 2015: 1-30); and 
 
• if permission granted use was made of a digital audio recorder for verbal 
recording purposes (for facilitating ease of later transcribing of interviews). If 
such permission was not granted the researcher made fieldnotes of the 
interviewee responses. 
 
Furthermore, during the interviews, interviewees/respondents were free to express 
their views even on topics not included in the schedule of interview questions. Finally, 
the researcher endeavoured throughout the interview process to allow the interviews 
to flow smoothly. 
 
This semi-structured interview format allowed the interviewer to pose some open-
ended questions and the interviewee to express his/her opinion freely. This required 
both the interviewer and the interviewee to be at ease to create an interview 
environment similar to a discussion or ‘brainstorming’ session on the given topic. This 
interview technique allowed the researcher to delve deeper into the knowledge and 
information seeking process compared to other methods, such as surveys/focus 
groups (Creswell, 2013: 67). 
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Although the face-to-face interviews, used in this study, focused on key topics, there 
was also the opportunity provided to interviewees to discuss, in more detail, some 
areas of interest (Creswell, 2013: 41). A further advantage of the face-to-face interview 
technique was that it allows for the clarification of responses by probing (sometimes 
prompted by clarifying (additional) questions posed by the researcher), which tend to 
result in fewer missing responses (Creswell, 2014: 68). 
 
This means that the responses are, correctly, from the participant’s perspective, not 
influenced by the researcher doing the interview. The primary benefit of personal 
interviews is that they encompass personal and direct interaction between 
interviewees and the interviewer. This also helps to exclude non-response rates 
(Creswell, 2014: 53).  
  
By using this method, it was hoped to gain a better understanding of the research topic 
and the further exploring of issues raised by interviewees/participants. Study 
participants were given the opportunity to choose a location of their own convenience 
for the interview. All interviews, upon permission being granted to do so, were digitally 
recorded and then later electronically transcribed. All interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and, although certain semantics were eliminated, most were left intact 
(verbatim) as they were recorded. This method enabled the researcher to engage the 
participant in conversation about a topic in response to the interviewer asking open-
ended questions (Creswell, 2013: 41; Kumar, 2011: 90). 
 
2.5.3 Street survey questionnaires 
Questionnaire design 
The researcher adapted a researcher-assisted self-completion questionnaire 
(RASCQ) with a paper-and-pencil approach/methodology as based on the street 
survey questionnaire developed by Minnaar (2008: 1). To answer survey 
questionnaires, respondents need to comprehend a question, recall the relevant 
information, evaluate the link between the retrieved information and the question, and 
communicate their responses (Bowling, 2005: 67). In comparison to self-completed 
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questionnaires (SCQ), RASCQ reduces the cognitive burden related to the 
comprehension of questions since the researcher in this study read and clarified 
questions to the respondents who had agreed to participate, answered questions from 
respondents, and utilised images (of CCTV cameras on a cellphone) to aid 
respondents’ understanding of the survey questionnaire used in this study. 
 
During the interviews (and the site observations), the researcher made field notes to 
assist the researcher to analyse the gathered data.  
 
2.5.4 Onsite observation 
The researcher also carried out observational methods of data collection and 
evaluations by observing how individual residents/members of local CPFs residential 
areas, and CCTV control room operators at private security companies were engaging 
in their surveillance activities. Four types of data were recorded during the 
observational period.7 The observation period lasted five days, from 10-15 December 
2018. At the same time, attention was paid during observation periods, to CCTV’s 
deterrent effect with reference to four types of crime incidents (namely: theft from 
persons; vehicle theft; burglary; and robbery) occurring in the observation site area 
and within a 100m (328 feet) radius of each CCTV surveillance camera (for target and 
control purposes). The quantitative observational period data included information on 
shift data – number of operators per shift; types of people entering the control room 
and length of monitoring duties; targeted incident data. In other words: how and why 
the surveillance was initiated; by whom; characteristics data of observed subjects – 
age, sex and appearance of individuals from targeted incidents; and deployment data 
– whether deployment was necessitated and the outcome of any deployment action. 




7  These categories are closely related to Norris and Armstrong’s (1999: 56) study of 592 hours of 
observation. 
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2.6 TARGET POPULATION, SAMPLING AND SELECTING OF INTERVIEW 
PARTICIPANTS 
2.6.1 Target population 
The researcher decided, because of logical challenges and cost-effectiveness, not to 
use the whole population of the two selected cities (Johannesburg and Tshwane) for 
the study and intentionally chose selected areas in Johannesburg and Tshwane for 
investigation and for conducting research. The target population in this research 
consisted of CCTV control room operators and members of local CPFs and individuals 
in the selected residential areas. 
 
2.6.2  Purposive sampling 
In this study the researcher used purposive, non-probability sampling, with each 
member of the target population having a limited chance to be included in the sample 
but with each member of the sample having the same chance to be chosen (Welman 
& Kruger, 200: 31).This is consistent with David and Sutton (2011: 196), who defined 
purposive sampling as a non-probability procedure in which the researcher selects the 
units of analysis (in this study: members of local CPFs; CCTV operators and 
individuals from residential areas) to be observed on the basis of the researcher’s own 
judgement about which one from the sample will be the most useful because they have 
the needed information of interest. On the hand other Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 196) 
define sampling as the process by which a sub-group from the universe/population is 
selected from the larger population group which meets the characteristics of the target 
group from which the researcher seeks information. Sampling is further defined as the 
process of selecting certain members or a sub-set of the population to draw statistical 
inferences from them and to estimate characteristics of the whole population 
(Creswell, 2014: 35).  
 
The researcher primarily utilised purposive sampling techniques so that participants 
were recruited according to pre-selected criteria relevant to the research 
questions/characteristics of the sample. Respondents were selected by the researcher 
at random (non-probability sampling). In other words, the researcher determined the 
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sample by choosing the respondents according to characteristics in a non-random 
formula.The researcher used this sampling approach since the selected respondents 
have features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and 
understanding of the central themes and questions which the researcher wishes to 
study on CCTV surveillance systems. 
 
In addition, the researcher, after initial contact with a respondent, relied on chain 
referral sampling (Snowball Sampling) to get hold of more research participants for 
this research study. 
 
Sampling of CCTV operators 
In order to obtain the required data for this study, a request permission to undertake 
research letter (see Annexure D) was sent to ten companies located in the geographic 
areas of Johannesburg and Tshwane. Five companies approved the request for their 
employees to be interviewed and provide information to the researcher. Granted 
permission was followed by the setting up of appointments with selected CCTV 
controllers for the purpose of interviewing them. Interviews were arranged with via 
company directors/control room managers with CCTV operator interviewees being the 
primary unit of analysis in order to trace additional participants or informants. In other 
words, Snowball Sampling, as a sampling method of expanding the sample was used 
by asking one informant or participant to recommend others for interviewing (Creswell, 
2013: 42). The purposive sample interviewees were requested to give, at their 
discretion, the names and contact details of persons based in commerce, industry 
and/or government who were: a) co-responsible for implementation of CCTV 
surveillance systems. This included community police forums, church organisations, 
etc. In order to ensure ethical research was implemented, all potential interviewees 
were provided with a copy of the Participant Information Sheet (Annexure E) and the 
Informed Consent Form (Annexure F) to read (Kvale, 1996: 89; Creswell, 2013: 59). 
 
A total of forty participants for the above target population category were interviewed 
using these face-to-face interviews.  
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Sampling of CPF members 
A total of 40 CPF members/residents were sampled from selected areas of interest in 
Johannesburg and Tshwane. While 50 were approached and contacted only 40 
respondents managed to honour the appointments. These respondents were 
interviewed at their choice of venue. As for above all participants from this category 
were first provided with a copy of the Participant Information Sheet and the Informed 
Consent Form to read. The researcher used the schedule of interview questions 
designed for this category of participants (Annexure H) to elicit information from them.  
 
Sampling of individuals in CBD streets and residential areas 
The researcher administered the street survey questionnaire to elicit information from 
individuals randomly approached in CBD streets and selected residential areas of 
Johannesburg and Tshwane. A total of 50 individuals were interviewed using a paper-
and-pencil approach of the self-completed street survey questionnaire.  
 
All the survey questionnaires were carried out in a random manner at each location. 
The researcher was not associated with any of the selected locations and did not 
personally know any of the survey respondents. The researcher approached likely 
participants by visiting their workplaces, commercial and residential areas 
respectively. If the participants provided an initial positive response and volunteered 
for participation, they were given a copy of the Participant Information Sheet and the 
Informed Consent Form to read. Once they had read these two forms, they were asked 
if they understood the research within the context of the letter/information sheet, that 
participation was voluntary, that they can withdraw at any time during the survey and 
whether they have any further questions. They were then asked to participate in the 
research. Although the researcher was present during the initial commitment by the 
participant to complete the survey questionnaire, the researcher gave no incentives, 
suggestions or ideas to the participants about how to answer the questions. The only 
advice offered was to respond to the questions as honestly as possible and that there 
was no right or wrong answer. The participant was advised that all answers are correct, 
as the survey was about perceptions and opinions. 
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2.7  DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis is a systematic and essentially taxonomic process of sorting and 
classifying the data that have been collected (Bogdan & Biklen, 2006: 66).  
 
All interviews were transcribed by the researcher which provided the opportunity for 
the researcher to reflect on the data gathered and to identify emerging themes and 
patterns. open-ended questions and comments generated by the respondents were 
analysed in a similar manner to the data gathered from the interview process. This is 
in consistent to a statement by Boeijie (2010: 76), who defined data analysis as the 
process of systematically searching and arranging the interview scripts, fieldnotes and 
other materials that the researcher has accumulated to increase his own 
understanding of them, to enable the researcher to present to others. 
 
The researcher undertook thematic analysis. Accordingly, the researcher sorted and 
categorised field notes, interview transcripts in a systematic way. The aim is to 
transform raw data into findings. Participants responses were subjected to: Thematic / 
content analysis generating ‘codes’ that describe themes in the text, such as ‘safety’; 
‘crime prevention’; and privacy. The researcher made use of interview schedules of 
questions and a questionnaire design. This alleviated the challenges of misprint by 
participants and it was self-administered by the researcher taking into consideration 
narrative expressions/responses by participants. After the completion of interviews, the 
researcher applied data checks, check for outliers and edited the raw research data to 
identify and clarify any data points that may hamper the accuracy of the results.  
In accordance with this principle, the researcher organised the data obtained by 
breaking down the research questions by concepts, with the use of index cards, and 
further breaking down the large bodies of text into smaller units such as phrases. The 
researcher read the data several times to obtain a perspective of the whole and wrote 
down notes on the data. Themes and sub-themes were identified, and the data was 
organised according to these themes, which gave the researcher a general sense of 
the emerging patterns of the data.  
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2.7.1 Qualitative content analysis 
In this study, the researcher made use of the data analysis spiral method (Creswell, 
2013: 65). In accordance with this principle, the researcher organised the data – which 
he obtained by breaking down the research questions by concepts, with the use of 
index cards, and by breaking down the large bodies of text into smaller units, such as 
phrases. The researcher read the data several times to obtain a perspective of the 
whole dataset and wrote down notes on each section of the data. Themes and sub-
themes were identified, and the data was organised according to these themes, which 
gave the researcher a general sense of patterns of the data. The researcher then 
integrated and summarised the data for the reader (Creswell, 2014: 45). 
 
2.7.2 Data coding 
The collected interview responses were transcribed and collated in accordance with 
the schedules of interview questions and street survey questionnaire 
themes/categories. Within specific questions with multiple responses, those relevant 
to the analysis were coded to obtain an overview statistical analysis to go with the 
textual analysis and interpretation applied. 
 
For each question a coding scheme was designed based on the categories 
(quantitative). For analysing qualitative data, the researcher went through a process 
called content analysis of the contents of an interview in order to identify the main 
theme. This process involves several steps:  
 
• 1st Step: Identify the main theme;  
• 2nd Step: Assign code to main theme;  
• 3rd Step: Classify responses under the main theme; 
• 4th Step: Integrate themes and response into the text of report. 
 
A file with divisions for the various interviews was opened and the following hard copy 
documentation was filed with the following information:  
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• notes made during the interview; 
 
• the field notes made after each interview; 
 
• any notes or sketches that a participant made during the interview, which the 
participant gave to the researcher; 
 
• any additional information that the participant offered during the interview, for 
example, brochures, pamphlets or company operational and/or policy 
documents; 
 
• any notes made during the ‘data analysis’ process, e.g. grouping of units of 
meaning into themes; 
• the draft transcriptions and analysis of the interview presented after the first 
interview to the participants for validation; and 
 
• confirmation of correctness and/or commentary by the participant about the 
transcript and “analyses” of the interview. 
 
2.8  VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
2.8.1 Validity 
Validity concerns the accuracy of the questions asked, the data collected and the 
explanation offered. Generally, it relates to the data and the analysis used in the 
research (Denscombe, 2002: 100). According to Melville and Goddard (1996: 37), 
validity means that the measurements used in the research are correct. Bailey (1996: 
238) is of the opinion that one can determine accuracy in considering validity. Validity 
further refers to the degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretation of 
test scores entailed by use of tests (Creswell, 2014: 45). The validity of a research 
instrument (e.g. interview schedule of questions or a survey questionnaire) is the extent 
to which it measures what is supposed to be measured and that the participants 
interpret the questions as the researcher intended (Cresewell, 2014: 34). According to 
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Babbie and Mouton (2001: 34), validity is the accuracy and meaningfulness of 
inferences, which are based on the research results. It is the degree to which results 
obtained from the analysis of the data represent the variables of the study (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2001: 38). This view is also replicated by Creswell (2013), who provided the 
following categories of validity that are paramount in any research study:  
 
• Content validity: The content of the data collected provides adequate coverage 
of the investigative questions guiding the research study (answer research 
questions). 
 
• Criterion validity: The measures used for prediction and/or estimation are 
relevant, free from bias, reliable and existing (answers are true reflection of 
respondents’ perceptions). 
 
• Construct validity: The data reveals the true answers provided by respondents 
(answers given are actual answers of respondents) (Creswell, 2013: 318-321). 
 
2.8.2  Reliability 
Reliability is the ability of a research instrument to consistently measure characteristics 
of interest over time. It is the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent 
results or data after repeated trials. If a researcher administers a test to a subject twice 
and gets the same score on the second administration as the first test, then there is built-
in reliability of the instrument (Creswell, 2014: 18). Reliability is concerned with 
consistency, dependability or stability of a test (Babbie & Mouton, 2011: 72).  
 
The researcher measured the reliability of the questionnaires to determine their 
consistency in testing what they were intended to measure. To establish reliability, 
survey questions and face-to-face pre-arranged and predetermined questions 
(schedule of interview questions and questionnaire design) was moderated by Prof 
Minnaar (supervisor of the research study). In order to ensure trustworthiness and 
authenticity of data, information obtained from interviews, literature study and 
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document analysis (such as incident registers and occurrence books) was used in a 
combined manner to establish patterns and trends (Creswell, 2014: 49). The 
researcher looked for common themes in the information collected through the 
following two methods:  
 
• interviews; and  
• literature studies.  
 
 The reliability and accuracy of the data was further enhanced by the fact that all 
participants were interviewed with the same questions contained in the same schedule 
of interview questions and questionnaire. The researcher, moreover, ensured further 
reliability by personally evaluating all the results and conducting all the interviews 
himself. This ensured that they were all conducted in the same way. Feedback was 
sought from colleagues in the field of study to determine whether they agreed or 
disagreed that the research had made appropriate interpretations and had drawn valid 
conclusions from the collected data. Conclusions were then taken back to the 
participants after the analysis to validate whether they agreed with the conclusions, 
and for them to evaluate whether the conclusions made sense in their own experiences 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010: 100). 
 
Additionally, before administering in the field, to establish validity and reliability of the 
research instruments, a panel of nine experts in the field of security science were used 
to test them. The panel members were given the initial schedule of interview questions 
and the survey questionnaire as a pre-test and requested to read the questions for 
validity and construct. According to Rea and Parker (2005), a pre-test is a smaller 
scale distribution of the questionnaire to a convenience group, in this case the panel 
of experts (Rea & Parker, 2005:56).  
 
The panellists then returned the questionnaires with written comments and these 
questions were also moderated by the supervisor from the original survey. Five 
questions were eliminated from the final research version of the research instruments. 
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These five being redundant and unnecessary and not directly related to the subject 
matter of the study. Corrected versions of the questionnaires were finalised and 
included in the questionnaires’ design, and accordingly prepared for test distribution 
(self-administered by researcher) to the respondents. 
 
To measure the correctness of this research, the researcher conducted interviews, 
case studies and consulted literature. The researcher conducted personal interviews 
with the samples, and their responses were recorded. To ensure validity of the 
literature, the researcher used only information that was obtained from literature 
consulted, which was relevant to address the research questions and the aim of the 
study. Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 99) explain that a multi-trait multi-method is made 
use of when two or more different characteristics are each measured using two or more 
different approaches. The researcher used the triangulation approach of analysis and 
applied it to the collected data, which constitutes a multi-trait- multi-method, whereby 
data is collected from multiple sources. Triangulation, as explained by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2010: 99), will further enhance validity whereby multiple sources of data are 
collected, namely: literature, interviews, surveys and site observation and perusal of 
available relevant literature on the topic. All the interpretations, analysis and 
conclusions were made based on data gathered from the interviews, literature and 
case studies (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 110). The research instruments used were 
validated in terms of qualitative content analysis. The content related technique 
measures the degree to which the questions’ items reflected the specific areas covered. 
In order to ensure trustworthiness and authenticity of data, information obtained from 
interviews, survey and literature consulted was used in a combined manner to 
establish patterns and trends (Creswell, 2014: 49; Bouma, 1993: 47). The researcher 
looked for common themes in the information collected by the application of analysis 
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2.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 101-104) explain that most ethical issues pertaining to 
research studies are covered in the following categories:  
According to Creswell (2009:87) and Leedy and Ormrod (2010:101-104), ethical 
guidelines must be followed by the researcher at all times. The researcher did adhere 
to the following ethical issues during research: 
 
• Protection from harm: All participants were safeguarded from physical harm. 
The researcher conducted the interviews under circumstances where the 
participants were comfortable and not exposed to stress or embarrassment.  
 
• Informed consent: All respondents was informed on what the research study is 
about. Participation in this study was voluntary. Participants were given 
sufficient information concerning the research in order to help them to make an 
informed decision regarding their participation. Participants could withdraw at 
any stage. The necessary consent from the participants was obtained in writing. 
 
• Right to privacy: participants were assured that responses given will be treated 
with confidentiality No response by a participant will be disclosed in a manner 
that exposes the specific participant. The researcher allocated a code number 
to participants to honour their privacy.  
 
• Honesty with professional colleagues. Researcher did not fabricate data to 
support a specific finding. All sources used in this research are acknowledged 
to avoid plagiarism.  
 
• The researcher ensured that identifying information on the survey, including 
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All participants in the interviews and survey questionnaire participation were first 
provided with a copy of the Participant Information Sheet and the Informed Consent 
Form to read. Therefore, all persons interviewed were given enough information 
regarding the research project and their consent obtained prior to each interview. In 
addition, each interviewee was informed that their participation was voluntary and the 
researcher also provided an assurance that all views and opinions expressed would 
be anonymous and used for this research only, i.e. no identities of participants would 
be revealed.  
 
The researcher was also conscious of his own position in personally knowing some 
interviewees (from previous work experiences in the private security industry). 
However, the researcher was also confident that this did not in any way present any 
ethical dilemmas for the research or be a restriction to participants interviewed at their 
place of work areas or impact on their willingness to provide information.  
 
Kvale (1996: 67) remarked that, in order to ensure ethical research, one must make 
use of informed consent (Kvale, 1996: 15). Bailey (1996: 45) further observes that 
deception might prevent insights, whereas honesty, coupled with confidentiality, 
reduces suspicion and promotes sincere responses. The informed consent form was 
explained to all participants at the beginning of each interview. Most potential subjects 
signed the agreement and those who did not, were not pressured to further participate 
in the study. All participants who voluntarily agreed to participate also were in accord 
with its content and signed accordingly.  
 
In the light of the above the researcher had then informed all participants – the 
residents from selected areas, CPF members, security personnel of private security 
companies and the CCTV operators/data controllers in these companies’ control 
rooms – of the purpose, nature, data collection methods and extent of the research 
prior to undertaking any interviews or survey. The acceptance of participation was then 
obtained via a signed informed consent form (see Annexure F). 
 
50 
© Unisa 2019 
Accordingly, all potential participants received:  
 
• a signed cover letter informing them of the purpose of study and any 
implications of their participation (Annexure E). The researcher handed it out to 
participants to read and provided clarity where necessary; 
 
• a hardcopy handed out by the researcher of the informed consent form 
(Annexure F) to read and the researcher provided clarity where necessary; 
 
• the option to remain anonymous, i.e. they did not need to give their names, or 
they could provide a pseudonym; and 
 
• individual interviewee responses were identified in the researcher records by a 
number assigned to each interviewee/respondent to protect interviewee 
identities; 
 
Since the ethics of the researcher and the research itself determine the quality of the 
research inquiry, the researcher had to bear in mind some considerations. Ethical 
approval was obtained from the College of Law Ethics Review Committee of the 
University of South Africa (UNISA) (see Annexure A). The research complied with all 
the ethical codes as set by the committee. The researcher undertook and affirmed not 
to illegally use or misrepresent any material in the publication of the research study 
material/collected information and to give proper acknowledgement to any information 
used. The researcher pronounces that there is no conflict of interests that may 
endanger the capability to assume the research in a methodical and principled 
manner. The researcher pronounces that there is no obliteration of partakers’ 
individual human rights or contravention of contributors’ benefits and that the 
appropriate equality in the selection standards of contributors has been measured.  
 
Prior to the commencement of the study, ethical principles in research need to be 
applied. The current study was subject to certain ethical issues. As was mentioned 
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earlier, all participants signed their informed consent acceptance forms regarding their 
participation in the research. Several ethical considerations were considered during 
the research, primarily the protection of participants’ identity (guarantee of anonymity) 
taking part in the study. It was a requirement that participation in the study was 
voluntary, that the researcher would not disclose their identities, that an overview of 
the study was given by the researcher to each participant and that all participants were 
18-years and older. Although the questionnaire was designed to be as simple and 
easy to complete as possible, it was still anticipated that some participants might have 
experienced some level of stress. To reduce this, it was stated that no question could 
be answered incorrectly, i.e. that there were no right or wrong answers. These issues 
were clearly detailed in the study’s introductory Participant Information Letter. 
Participants were only selected if they volunteered and if they complied with the target 
population criteria. 
 
There were no financial incentives to complete the survey, or researcher bias or 
deception made during the completion of the interview questionnaires or surveys. It 
was made clear to the participants that they could withdraw from the study at any time. 
Also, that their completed interview questionnaire and/or survey questionnaires would 
remain strictly confidential; that they would not be quoted(i.e. be identified) in any way 
or form in the resulting research report in a way that might reveal their identities or 
work affiliations or that the survey information would be released to any other person 
or organisation.  
 
Creswell (2013: 67) states that the researcher has an obligation to respect the rights, 
needs, values and desires of the informants. Respect for persons requires that 
subjects be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them. 
The researcher informed the participants – the residents and security CCTV 
operators/data controllers – of the purpose, nature, data collection methods, and 
extent of the research prior to commencement. 
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Researchers must be ethically responsible. As Degu and Yigzaw, (2006: 80) explain 
these:  
 
“Your duty as a researcher is founded on your own set of moral principles. As 
a researcher you will have a duty to yourself and to the individual who is 
participating in the research. So even if the outcome of the proposed research 
is for a good cause, if it involves the researcher lying or deceiving his subjects 
in some way, then this would be regarded as unethical. The rights [of] the 
individual are assumed to be all-important, thus a subject’s right to refuse must 
be upheld whatever the consequences for the research”. 
 
Therefore, the first responsibility of the researcher must be to the individual 
participants and secondly to report as honestly and accurately as possible what was 
said by them (Strydom, 2011: 114). The research findings for this study were reported 
honestly and as accurately as possible. 
 
2.10  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Despite the resulting findings from this research study, there are several important 
gaps in our knowledge of the topic in the South African context. One of the primary 
shortcomings in this respect being that the study was limited by the use only of 
purposive sampling method employed by the researcher. This study was conducted 
without using experimental control areas comparing the success of the camera 
installation on crime in one area, to a similar area without intervention (Taylor, 2010: 
34). All the fieldwork research was conducted in selected areas of only two cities, 
namely: Johannesburg and Tshwane. Purposive sampling provides non-probability 
samples which receive selection based on the characteristics which are present within 
a specific population target group and related to the overall focus (topic selection) of 
this study. It is a process that is sometimes referred to as selective, subjective or 
judgmental sampling, but the actual structure involved remains the same. The 
selection criteria the researcher uses can be very arbitrary and are almost always 
subjective. As a result, firstly, it is unknown whether open-street CCTV works well or 
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not in non-selected areas. Secondly, it should be made clear that this was an 
evaluation of selected areas only hence the study’s findings cannot be claimed to be 
representative of all CCTV surveillance schemes countrywide. As such, since such a 
small sample population is often used, a small variation in the sample will cause 
deviance in the results. With probabilistic sampling, the general probability or odds of 
a good representation of the population are well established and known. With non-
probability data, the general population may not be sampled correctly. It may be 
harder to evaluate what has been achieved since purposive sampling can be so 
subjective. It would be methodologically inaccurate to simply apply the findings from 
this study to the general population. The onus is on the researcher to interpret and 
discuss the research findings within the context of the research and methodological 
limitations that are often unavoidable in many of the surveillance studies on CCTV 
(Welsh & Farrington, 2006: 76).  
 
These limitations include issues relating to sampling and data collection, as well as 
data quality and analysis. A third methodological criticism is that as a qualitative 
interpretivist, the researcher had to accept that argument that the descriptive narrative 
presented is but one view of social reality, written from one particular perspective. 
Another individual, researching the same setting, may well have uncovered an 
alternative set of findings, due to his/her philosophical or theoretical standpoint, 
personal values and prejudice. 
 
2.11  CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined the research methodology, research design and approach, 
research methods and research instruments used in the collection of research 
information/data. It also dealt with the data analysis methods applied to the collected 
information. Furthermore, ethical considerations involved in the study were presented. 
In addition, the validity and reliability of information and how it was ensured was 
discussed. Finally, the limitations in the study were briefly outlined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE STUDY: CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS,  
CRIME PREVENTION AND SECURITY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
CCTV camera surveillance is probably the most rapidly spreading and, at the same 
time, one of the most controversial instruments in security policing today. This fast-
developing technology basically enables an ubiquitous surveillance of public and 
private space, and security agents benefit from its enhanced capabilities for detecting 
or retracing criminal activities. Camera surveillance signifies:  
 
• a general extension of public surveillance systems;  
 
• a shift from direct, personal or print surveillance to remote, electronically 
transmitted, and even computer-enhanced self-monitoring, visual surveillance;  
 
• second-generation CCTV accelerates this process by providing digitalised 
images that can be automatically processed by recognition software, increasing 
the scope of surveillance and potentially also reducing monitoring costs (see 
Norris & Armstrong, 1999; Surette, 2005).  
 
• focusing on the surveillance and deterrence function of CCTV, the economics 
of CCTV surveillance, based on the traditional economic approach to crime, 
implies that the dissemination of CCTV camera surveillance enhances control 
capacities and leads to a partial replacement of human capital by technological 
investments, thereby increasing the productivity and efficiency of policing 
behaviour, and thus ultimately reduce crime in the monitored area by 
deterrence (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 1999: 1-8). 
 
Although research on CCTV was once sparse/limited, the state of the literature can no 
longer be described as such. The number of CCTV evaluations has increased 
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significantly over time. Furthermore, even though public surveillance research in 
general has been previously described as “methodologically weak, ” with more than 
55 percent of studies having less than a comparable experimental-control area design 
(Welsh, Peel, Farrington, Elffers & Braga, 2011: 82), but of recent times rigorous 
designs have been increasingly used in the study of CCTV (Welsh et al, 2011: 90). In 
examining the crime prevention potential of CCTV surveillance cameras. Deterrence 
Theory provides the blueprint for research in this area, (Clarke, 1997: 23; Welsh & 
Farrington, 2007: 90; 2009: 43). Under the Deterrence Theory CCTV surveillance 
system leads to crime prevention because offenders believe cameras may be 
monitoring their actions, putting them at a disadvantage, with a greater likelihood of 
apprehension by law agencies (Piza, 2018: 56). In South Africa, and the world at large, 
there has occurred an exponential increase in the adoption of this technology for crime 
prevention and control (Reaves, 2015: 46). A study of the available literature reveals 
that the evaluation of CCTV surveillance systems impact in the US has taken place 
(see Caplan et al, 2011: 260; La Vigne et al, 2011: 67; Mazerolle, Hurly & Chamlin, 
2002: 123). Reaching a firm consensus on the crime prevention capacity of CCTV is 
somewhat difficult (Caplan et al, 2011: 267), while numerous evaluations have 
reported some positive outcomes (Ratcliffe, 2009: 46-52). It is reported in literature 
that CCTV surveillance systems has not produced consistent benefits and, in many 
instances, there has been little or no evidence of crime reductions (Caplan et al, 2011: 
270; Farrington et al, 2007: 45; Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 40).  
 
Given these findings, it is difficult to anticipate the performance of CCTV upon 
installation. While previous works have called for the identification of precise contexts 
in which CCTV best performs (Caplan et al, 2011: 269; Gill & Spriggs, 2005; Phillips, 
1999: 42); Ratcliffe, 2009: 48-50, Welsh & Farrington, 2002: 75). little has been 
developed in the sense of ‘best practices’. Inconsistent findings may be due to 
differences in the utility of individual operations and characteristics of target areas La 
Vigne et al, 2011: 67). However, Caplan et al (2011: 265) suggested that limitations of 
common research methodologies may have also contributed to the uncertainty. 
Estimates from the United Kingdom suggest the presence of over 4.2 million cameras, 
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a ratio of 1 per every 14 citizens (Piza, 2016: 20). In the United States, 49 percent of 
local police departments report using CCTV, with usage increasing to 87 percent for 
agencies serving jurisdictions with populations of 250 000 or more (Reaves, 2015: 72).  
 
Complicating matters in the research on CCTV surveillance is the fact that while 
research designs have improved over time, the overall body of CCTV research has 
been classified as methodologically weak (Caplan et al, 2011: 260). In South Africa, 
CCTV is used in almost all commercial venues, such as hotels, casinos, banks, retail 
stores, airports, financial institutions, mines, garages, hospitals and shopping centres 
(Minnaar, 2006: 3).  
 
The United Kingdom, universally regarded as the most surveilled society in the world, 
provides a substantial portion of the available literature. Further reports from the 
European Union, United States of America, Canada and Australia are also examined. 
Unfortunately, from a South Africa perspective, the available literature is rather 
minimal. Apart from Minnaar (2006), most studies have been carried out by the media 
and, to date, these reports have not been universally published but have, rather, been 
retained within the media organisations archives for their own operational reasons 
(Duncan, 2018a: 34).  
 
One of the drawbacks to the implementation of CCTV surveillance systems in South 
Africa has been its costs and the inability of the SAPS to fund such implementation in 
the light of other more pressing priorities and demands on its finances and resources 
(Minnaar, 2006: 3-5).  
 
A number of reasons/motivation for, have been suggested for the use of CCTV in public 
spaces, with proponents advocating their potential to deter crime and criminal 
behaviour, facilitate police and other law enforcement agencies to more effectively 
analysis in the investigation of crime and facilitate the prosecution and detection of 
crime. Conversely, opponents argue that they are ineffective as a deterrent (Piza, 
2012; Caplan et al, 2011: 256). The literature further emphasis on theories 
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underpinning the use of CCTV, evaluations of selected studies into the effectiveness 
and impact of CCTV, governance / regulation and the proliferation of CCTV including 
the role of government, the media and the public in general. This literature review 
provides an analytical summary of related theories within CCTV and security. With the 
need to implement crime prevention strategies containing stronger security measures 
that are affordable for most municipalities and town councils. This statement above 
was replicated by Welsh et al (2011: 34), who stated that law enforcement agencies 
around the world are increasingly making use of the technology of CCTV surveillance 
systems to improve operational efficiencies, to extend their reach and reduce costs.  
Welsh et al (2011: 12) further suggested that CCTV surveillance systems have been 
adopted and adapted for use in public spaces around the world. Many of these 
systems were initially installed for their presumed deterrent effect on crime and 
promoted for their beneficial impact on the public’s fear of crime. However, at the time 
they were implemented, there was a dearth of scientific evidence that either supported 
or disproved these claims. Therefore, there is a need for an independent assessment 
of whether there is a relationship between the presence of CCTV in the city and public 
safety. This research study is a response to that need and describes what is known 
about the effect of CCTV on the public’s feeling of safety (Norris & Armstrong, 2012: 
56). While a range of potential crime prevention mechanisms have been theorised for 
CCTV the practical application of CCTV predominately relates to deterrence 
(Farrington et al, 2007: 42; Ratcliffe, 2006: 72). From a situational crime prevention 
perspective, notions of deterrence are rooted in the Rational Choice Theory of 
criminality (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 72). Whereas deterministic theories view crime as 
an inevitable byproduct of social ills, rational choice considers crime as “purposive 
behavior designed to meet the offender’s commonplace needs” (Clarke, 1997: 9-10). 
 
3.2 Theoretical underpinnings 
Before examining the reasons behind the application and impact of CCTV systems, it 
is worthwhile to explore the theoretical foundations upon which its use is based. 
According to Clarke (1998: 90), the development of what Garland (1990: 146) termed 
“criminological research”, was focussed on the individual, why certain people commit 
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crimes in terms of the “new criminologies of everyday life”. Previously, most crime and 
what can be done to prevent them from offending formed the basis of crime prevention 
research. According to Eck and Weisburd, (2011: 45) theories of crime can be divided 
into those that seek to understand criminal behaviour from the offender perspective 
and those that examine the criminal event itself. From the 1970s onwards several new 
crime theories began to emerge (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 74). These included routine 
activity, rational choice and crime pattern analysis theories and Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) (as outlined in more detail in Chapter Two).  
 
This theoretical paradigm is supported by Foucault’s Theory of Panopticon, as 
propagated by Bentham. Some critics have gone so far as to draw Bentham’s general 
panel principles from the regime for the panopticon. The panopticon was illustrated as 
a prison facility designed in a way that all prisoners are visible and, at the same time, 
the guards, jailers or supervisors, will always be able to watch the inmates (Bentham, 
1791: 95). Thus, the prisoners could always be seen by the supervisor, but they could 
not see the supervisor. This characteristic of panopticon has been likened to the 
concept of surveillance. Thus, CCTV’s primary function, from the above analysis, is to 
identify both perpetrator and victim (if there is one physically present) or, at the very 
least, the location of the offence (crime) in progress while being conscious of the 
perpetrator/s. Its secondary role is deterrence, in other words, the ability to stop any 
further criminal activity (Eck & Weisburd, 2015: 45). 
 
3.3  The Proliferation of CCTV 
Since the early 1980s there has been a rapid rise and spread of CCTV surveillance 
systems throughout societies worldwide, particularly in the UK (McCahill & Norris, 
2002: 45). This proliferation has, to a lesser extent, occurred in South Africa. However, 
this spread can be attributed to several factors. According to Minnaar, (2006: 3) CCTV 
in South Africa as a prevention, surveillance and detection measure was nothing new. 
In South Africa early use of CCTV was implemented by the mining industry on 
diamond mines and at gold/precious metals refineries, largely to prevent the 
smuggling and pilfering of diamonds and precious metals from these facilities and 
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mines. The gambling industry (casinos) in South Africa was also one of the first to use 
CCTV for surveillance purposes of gamblers and patrons in their establishments. But 
these uses were largely ‘in-house’ and on private property. At a later stage its benefits 
were recognised by the private security industry who utilised it for the provision of 
surveillance and access control largely at commercial and and business premises or 
private residences (and more recently at so-called ‘security villages/estates’) 
(Minnaar, 2006: 3-5).  
 
In discussing CCTV’s effect on auto theft Caplan et al (2011: 270). stated that car 
thieves faced a greater risk of detection in CCTV areas because different camera 
viewsheds could readily identify a stolen vehicle as it travels through the city. The lack 
of effect on the other crime categories also reflects the general trend in the literature, 
as CCTV has not consistently reduced street-level crime in public places. However, 
examples of successful public systems are not completely absent (Caplan et al, 2011: 
265). Welsh and Farrington (2009a: 60) found that CCTV worked best when integrated 
alongside other crime control strategies and when camera coverage was high. This is 
consistent with La Vigne et al (2011: 20), who found that found that police departments 
that realized crime reductions through CCTV largely incorporated proactive police 
activities into their operations. This suggest that anyone who want to make use of 
CCTV should include evidence-based strategies for CCTV to be effective (Piza, 2015: 
12). The initiative to start implementing and linking CCTV surveillance systems in 
CBDs in the major metropolitan cities of South Africa to local police services was taken 
in the mid-1990s by Business Against Crime of South Africa (BACSA) (Minnaar, 2006: 
2).  
 
The 2006 research study by Minnaar, using case study overviews from four South 
African CBD areas (Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria (Tshwane) and Durban), 
traced the use of CCTV as crime control or prevention surveillance, how such CCTV 
systems were implemented, the rationale behind their implementation and the 
operationalising of them in terms of preventing street crime and its uses in other 
surveillance. In addition, the study also examined CCTV use from the perspective of 
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the growth and commercialisation of the management of these services, and the co-
operation and co-ordination structures in partnership with the (SAPS. Furthermore, the 
2006 Minnaar study reviewed the purported impact on the reduction of crime of these 
systems in CBDs and finally the application of public crime surveillance by the CCTV 
control room operators (private security) in co-operation with the police (response 
team) and the role CCTV surveillance systems play in the observation, recording, 
arrest and conviction of suspects.  
 
CCTV surveillance systems are often portrayed as the all-purpose (panacea) security 
tool that greatly enhances the level of protection and asset against security risks. But 
as Minnaar (2007) concluded:  
 
“the South African CBD CCTV systems are not the panacea for all crime or 
wholly responsible for crime reduction in surveilled areas. Rather that such 
systems are but one cog in an overall crime reduction programme and provide 
support surveillance systems to the overall approach of crime fighting by 
making them more efficient, effective (in deterring criminals) and responsive 
(quicker) in catching offenders” (Minnaar, 2007: 20-21). 
 
However, the security industry promotes the performance of public street surveillance:  
 
“CCTV continues to be the buzz word around the world, [with] most [city] 
councils look to [other cities’] … experiences for arguments to convince 
stakeholders of the importance of the gadgetry” (Adam, 1998: 30).  
 
Research has shown that public street surveillance provides a decrease in levels of 
crime (Norris & Armstrong, 1999: 34). However, research has also shown that this may 
only be for a short period of time and only in certain crime categories (Norris & 
Armstrong, 1999: 80: 19; Painter & Tilley, 1999: 18; Ditton, 1999: 40; Short & Ditton, 
1998: 46; Waters, 1996; Brown, 1995: 46; Tilley, 1993: 12). Society views public street 
surveillance as a social benefit, which outweighs the perceived social risk or invasion 
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of privacy rights. Therefore, it is important that there is a method to measure CCTV 
surveillance systems application and impact on crime prevention and control and 
hence, social acceptance of public street CCTV surveillance. 
 
3.4  EVIDENCE OF CAMERA SURVEILLANCE EFFECTIVENESS 
Williams and Johnstone (2000: 67) observed that there are:  
 
“instances of systematic, selective racial and socio-economic profiling by 
CCTV system operators who aim their cameras at social groups that they 
subjectively judge as being high-risk or more likely to behave defiantly, 
especially young black males”.  
 
Discriminatory CCTV monitoring and a tendency towards racial and ethnic profiling in 
evidence gathering and law enforcement actions were also observed by Short and 
Ditton (1998: 84); Norris and Armstrong (1999: 90); and Norris (2001: 22). On news 
media, images taken from CCTV video footage cause public anxiety and influence 
public perceptions of the risks regarding violent street crime. This results in raising 
public demands for the further extension of CCTV surveillance systems in city centres 
(Jermyn, 2004: 71-72; Surette, 2005: 15). Brown’s (1995: 52) assessment of the CCTV 
systems in the city centres of Birmingham and Newcastle (in the UK)) illustrated that 
the displacement of crime from these areas did occur. The existing evidence regarding 
CCTV effectiveness is focused predominantly on the prevention of crime. The 
evidence backing CCTV effectiveness, as a situational crime prevention measure, is 
mixed. In the following section, this evidence is briefly summarised and discussed in 
order to outline the issues that need to be considered when evaluating CCTV in the 
context of crime prevention. The empirical key findings regarding the effect of CCTV 
on crime are summarised below. First, most of the studies that show CCTV to have a 
restraining effect on criminal activity were: i) carried out in the United Kingdom; and ii) 
concentrated on camera surveillance as applied to car parks (see the meta-analyses 
by Welsh & Farrington, 2003: 70; 2009a & 2009b: 32).  
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Furthermore, most existing CCTV evaluations originate from the United Kingdom. 
Almost all studies from other geographic areas, such as the United States or 
Scandinavia, do not provide clear evidence of it having a moderating effect on crime 
(see Welsh & Farrington, 2009a: 50 & 2009b: 13; Ratcliffe, Taniguchi and Taylor 2009: 
747-753). In addition, the impact of CCTV is directly linked to what kind of crime is 
being observed and monitored. By impacting on the expected costs of criminal 
activities suffered by the criminal, this type of surveillance by CCTV systems appears 
more applicable to combating planned or premeditated criminal behaviour, such as 
property-related offences (e.g. vehicle crime), but slightly less directly on burglary, 
simple theft, shoplifting and arson, than at preventing impulsive emotion-based 
violence (e.g. domestic violence, assault and battery). This is a partial explanation of 
why CCTV generally operates more effectively in car parks than on public squares 
and in mass transport services. Moreover, the location of a CCTV surveillance system 
is crucial to its effectiveness. While crime seems to be controllable (to some extent) 
by CCTV in small, enclosed or, at least, well-defined areas with limited and controlled 
access points (such as parking lots and car parks), there is hardly any significant 
evidence regarding highly frequented public spaces with open access (such as ‘hot 
spots’ in city centres) (Welsh & Farrington, 2009a: 41; 2009b: 67). Interestingly, the 
latter areas are exactly the ones where the application of CCTV is currently spreading 
most rapidly (Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 8; Cavoukian, 2008: 55). In this context, additional 
factors, such as the number and types of cameras (pan, tilt, zoom, multiplexing; 
resolution; fixed versus re-deployable), density of camera coverage of an area; control 
room operations (staffing; 24/7 versus passive monitoring, i.e. automatic recording 
when activated by certain activity, not real-time monitoring at all; and whether software 
analytical technology has been loaded on system), system management skills; 
objectives as formulated in the operational plan of the scheme are implemented; and 
the involvement of the police and other law enforcement agents. All these factors have 
an impact on the efficiency and success of any CCTV system. However, these listed 
factors are often based on perceptions and limited evidence substantiation (Welsh & 
Farrington, 2008: 20). It is obvious that there is a need for further research to assist in 
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identifying the factors and operational characteristics that make CCTV surveillance 
schemes a success or a failure.  
 
Information on these important implementation aspects should be provided by future 
CCTV studies, especially as these systems and their operations are not static but are 
modified and upgraded from time to time. CCTV generally has an ex-post investigative 
utility, at least if the recordings are stored and the relevant visual information is easily 
searchable (Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 56). This potential was successfully exploited when 
tracing the perpetrators of the second London bombings in 2005. However, there is 
also evidence of an experience-based adaptation in criminal behaviour patterns. This 
undermines the suitability of CCTV as a crime-prevention and evidence-gathering tool 
(Welsh & Farrington, 2009: 20). The general agreement surrounding the use of CCTV 
cameras was that they were a useful tool in the fight against crime (Norris & Armstrong 
1999: 72). The literature suggests several reasons for using CCTV surveillance 
systems in public spaces, namely:  
 
• use as an investigative tool after the commission of a crime;  
 
• an effective psychological deterrent to potential offenders; 
 
• aids in the early detection of crime thereby facilitating a larger share of crime to 
be brought directly to the notice of the police or security personnel; 
 
• early detection facilitates the co-ordination of responses to incidents as they are 
occurring and the implementation of strategies to reduce the level of harm to 
victims; 
 
• CCTV may improve rates of arrest and successful prosecution of offenders by 
facilitating the more effective deployment of officers and the gathering of 
evidence; and  
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• the presence of CCTV could reassure the public and thus increase feelings of 
safety or reduce fear of crime (Brooks & Corkill, 2014: 220. 
 
There are many publications dealing with the relationship between crime prevention 
and control and CCTV surveillance system. In fact, CCTV has been so disappointingly 
poor at bringing down crime levels the world over, that UK academic, Clive Norris, 
1999: 90 has even referred to its continued spread as “the success of failure”. In the 
case of Khayelitsha in Cape Town, the police made use of CCTV evidence a mere five 
times over a ten-year period. Privacy regulators generally insist that public CCTV 
cameras are signposted, whether they are operated by state or private actors, and that 
these signs include information about the data controller responsible for operating 
them and the contact details. This allows people to contact the controller to enforce 
their privacy rights if they so wish. In central London, signs warn people that ANPR is 
in operation (Duncan, 2018a: 45). Yet in South Africa, signage on CCTV cameras is 
inadequate or non-existent. This means that the public is forced to rely on the state’s 
claims about effectiveness (Duncan, 2018a: 46).  
 
Furthermore, the admissibility of CCTV footage as evidence in court remains unclear. 
In one of the most CCTV-saturated cities in the world, namely, London, CCTV has not 
contributed significantly to prosecutions, which has reduced its usefulness as an 
investigatory tool. Cape Town and Johannesburg have been introducing smart CCTV 
cameras fitted with ANPR and Johannesburg has also expressed interest in 
incorporating facial recognition into its camera systems. Facial recognition carries with 
it the risks of false positives or false negatives which means that innocent people may 
be identified falsely, while guilty people may not. A police study has also suggested 
that the technology may have built-in racial and age biases because the algorithms 
used for facial recognition have more difficulty identifying black and younger people 
accurately. A 2016 report from Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy and Technology 
found that half of all Americans are in police facial recognition databases, meaning 
that algorithms pick suspects from virtual line-ups of 117 million mostly law-abiding 
citizens (Caplan et al, 2011: 273). These problems increase the potential for falsely 
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accusing people of a crime based on race or age, leading to racial or age profiling. If 
state agencies are acquiring this software for law enforcement purposes, then they 
should include accuracy as a key requirement in any tender documents. Most 
controversially, some countries (such as Australia) are exploring using facial 
recognition in CCTV cameras in public spaces, to scan and identify ordinary passers-
by in real time. This is a truly frightening prospect, as it means that pedestrians can 
have no expectation of privacy in public spaces whatsoever. Your movements 
constitute personal information, which you have a right to exercise control over in 
terms of the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI) (Bygrave, 2014: 52; Roos, 
2007: 421). However, the police, spy agencies and private security companies are 
likely to argue that the Act does not cover criminal justice and national security issues 
(Act No. 4 of 2013: 60). The Act applies to these areas if it can be shown that existing 
privacy protections are inadequate, and smart CCTV roll-out is practically unregulated 
currently. This right is becoming increasingly important, as information about a 
person’s movements can reveal a great deal about a person’s personal, social and 
political activities. Increasingly, these cameras are being loaded with ‘smart’ 
capabilities such as Automatic Number Recognition (ANPR) and facial recognition 
software (Duncan, 2018a: 81). Secondary information was mostly obtained from 
articles in the journal Surveillance & Society. In the United Kingdom, CCTV 
technology, as a surveillance system, started many years before the United States, 
and has been more widely adopted there. As a result, there is a much larger body of 
knowledge assessing the extent to which the introduction of electronic surveillance in 
a place reduces crime in the United Kingdom than there is for the United States. In the 
search for evaluation studies about surveillance, more than a dozen for the United 
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3.5 THE USE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE AND ALLIED TECHNOLOGY FOR 
PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF CRIMINALS 
The installation of CCTV systems in South Africa is mostly done in the CBDs and 
buildings for public safety reasons. Most of the cameras are targeted at places where 
there are entrances and exit doors. For example, banking halls and ATMs have 
cameras that are strategically mounted in various locations especially facing the 
counters where money is delivered. Busy shopping malls are also common areas for 
CCTV installation, supermarkets, and bus and train terminals. Other places include 
car parks, busy streets and even libraries. Nowadays, even churches have been 
placed under surveillance (Norris & Armstrong, 1999: 89). But a closer look at the 
technology strongly indicates that it could lead to false arrests, the targeting of 
innocent citizens, and unfair discrimination against minority groups (Norris & 
Armstrong, 1999: 90). In Great Britain, facial recognition technology has, in fact, led 
to false arrests and the targeting of thousands of innocent people. In May 2018, British 
lobby group, Big Brother Watch, obtained information about the use of facial 
recognition from 35 UK police departments by making lawful requests for information. 
In their May 2018 report, they found that: “[t]he overwhelming majority of the police’s 
‘matches’ using automated facial recognition to date have been inaccurate … leading 
to the storage of biometric photos of thousands of innocent people” (Big Brother Watch, 
2018: 3). In other words, these people were wrongly identified as “persons-of-interest” 
(to law enforcement agencies) or criminals. It also emerged that the London 
Metropolitan Police has the worst record, with the accuracy of its automated facial 
recognition “matches” of less than two percent, which means that they had incorrectly 
identified innocent members of the public in 98 percent of the matches (Big Brother 
Watch, 2018: 3). (In South Africa, such requests can be made through the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act, which allows South Africans to request information from 
a state body or private entity in order to exercise or protect constitutional rights (Swart, 
2018: 60). 
 
The last 20 years in South Africa has seen the establishment and growth of CCTV 
surveillance systems in various large cities and towns, including Johannesburg, 
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Pretoria, Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth) and eThekwini (Durban). 
The City of Johannesburg, for instance, paid R50-million to have its CCTV system 
installed in 2008 with the City Council reporting at the beginning of 2018 that it costs 
about R1 million monthly to run and maintain the system (Swart, 2018: 65).  
 
In 2016, as part of its “safer cities” initiative, the City of Johannesburg announced a 
major upgrade to its existing CCTV camera network system – one that they said would 
use smart technology, including automatic number plate and intelligent facial 
recognition – in the Central Business District and would be rolled out in other public 
spaces as the system was expanded in order to keep law and order (Duncan, 2018a: 
56). But by the end of 2017, the City Council had not yet enacted the necessary by-
law requiring that signage alerting the public to the presence of CCTV surveillance be 
erected at entrances to those areas where the system was installed – a legal measure 
and key privacy protection requirement. In 2018, the City Council was still in the 
process of finalising a policy on the roll-out of CCTV, coupled with a master safety and 
security plan. At this stage, it was pointed out that, although the policy was at a draft 
stage, the technology had run ahead of the policy. For instance, the new modified 
ANPR systems allow the police to match vehicle number plates picked up on CCTV 
to a vehicle’s owner, and then further link the vehicle to SAPS crime databases if it has 
been used in a crime. Facial recognition allows them to identify a person from a facial 
database if s/he has been committing crimes in public spaces. Facial recognition 
software has also become controversial as it has used personal data gathered for one 
purpose, for another purpose, and not necessarily with a data subject’s consent (a 
basic requirement of data protection law) (Lyon, 2011: 61). 
 
Advanced new facial recognition technology adds intelligence to surveillance systems, 
allowing for proactive monitoring and control 24/7, automated facial wrapping and 
recognition, and even highly accurate identification. These modified and added on 
features to basic CCTV surveillance systems appear to be excellent crime fighting 
tools. Marius Coetzee, CEO of the South African-based identity specialist company 
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IDECO, added a further dimension by saying that, by adding intelligent facial 
recognition technology to existing CCTV surveillance systems,  
 
“retailers could not just count how many customers looked at a particular area 
of the store, but also determine how many customers came back more than 
once, conversions, customer demographics, and how they reacted to the 
products – based on their facial expressions” (Sibiya, 2018: 56).  
 
Coetzee further mentioned another example of its use:  
 
“At stadiums and public events, [it] can be deployed to identify troublemakers, 
manage risk or identify and protect VIPs. For safety and security, intelligent 
facial recognition allows authorities to list people of interest and be notified 
when they pass a camera; or secure a region of interest by triggering an alert 
when an unauthorised person enters that area” (Sibiya, 2018: 62).  
 
Coetzee further added that:  
 
“You can ‘wrap’ a face, extract the features and expressions, produce an 
identikit of the individual, identify the person and recognise them every time 
they pass a camera, identify who they associate with and track how they move 
through the organisation [or track them walking in the streets]” (Sibiya, 2018: 
67).  
 
Coetzee concluded that, with the new generation of intelligent facial recognition 
technology, “… there is so much more information [that can be] added to the video 
feed” to a CCTV surveillance system by upgrading to this technology (Sibiya, 2018: 
69).  
 
In 2017, Johannesburg did not renew its CCTV surveillance operations contract with 
Omega Risk Solutions – the company that had run Johannesburg’s operations since 
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the CCTV system’s inception in 2008. But the cancellation of the Omega contract and 
the relocation of the control room left the whole system vulnerable. Up to now, 
Johannesburg has relied on human operators to conduct surveillance. However, the 
cancellation of the Omega contract led to the retrenchment of many of their most 
experienced and trained operators who had, over the years, received extensive CCTV 
control room operator training, with most having seven to nine years of experience 
(Sibiya, 2018: 70). 
 
Eventually, in July 2018, Johannesburg started on the first phase of the high-tech 
upgrade (initially announced in 2016) to its current CCTV system which, at the time, 
comprised 450 cameras mainly installed in its crime-ridden CBD and the surrounding 
areas. The first phase involved the installation of an additional 50 cameras, “fitted with 
the latest and smartest technology” making a total of 500 cameras installed (Swart, 
2018: np).8 However, the whole management of the multi-million hi-tech upgrade was 
outsourced to a third party by the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC), which 
managed the so-called Intelligence Video Analytic Platform Project on behalf of the 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD). According to MTC’s field 
service technician, Sipho Phakathi, the new cameras would be installed in JMPD-
identified high-crime “hotspots” and have built-in fibre networks and WiFi connectivity, 
as well as facial recognition capability. Besides facial recognition, the CCTV system 
could be used to detect when there is suspicious movement or activity, for instance a 
sudden gathering of a crowd on a street corner or eruption of a commotion, i.e. utilising 
pattern analysis of any sort of activity or people movement. This new “intelligent” 
technology would enable the system to pick up “… if the same person keeps on 
passing or moving in the same area multiple times … the pattern” would be discerned 
and the control room would accordingly be alerted. In addition, the new system with 
number plate recognition would also assist “to detect a suspicious car that drives 
 
8  Heidi Swart is a journalist who, for this researched story in the Daily Maverick, was commissioned by 
the Media Policy and Democracy Project, an initiative of the University of Johannesburg’s Department 
of Journalism, Film and TV and Unisa’s Department of Communication Science. 
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around the neighbourhood”. Furthermore, the new cameras provided a much “sharper 
image of a suspect” (Phakathi, 2018: 90). 
 
To understand how the new Johannesburg CCTV system would work in practice, the 
Daily Maverick journalist, Heidi Swart, sent the City of Johannesburg detailed 
questions regarding the cost of the new systems, the problems inherent to facial 
recognition technology, the safeguards they would have in place to ensure footage 
and data was not leaked from their operations room, as well as an inquiry about 
complaints from the public that the current system is not functioning properly (Swart, 
2018: np). The response from the City Council, via JMPD’s spokesperson, Snr Supt. 
Wayne Minnaar, was that the new CCTV “contributes significantly towards the safety 
in the Johannesburg CBD, therefore detail of its functioning is confidential, and 
information may not be divulged for security reasons” (Wayne Minnaar as cited in 
Swart, 2018: 40).  
 
In contrast, to try and establish if it would work, Swart interviewed three security 
industry experts, all of whom wished to remain anonymous. Between the three of 
them, they had over four decades of experience in the business and share an intimate 
knowledge of urban and state visual surveillance in South Africa. The consensus of 
these experts was that, in South Africa, this type of technology would not work, since 
South Africa’s vehicular traffic and pedestrian flows are too irregular and 
unpredictable. “People could gather on a street corner at any moment for any reason, 
or similarly break out into a jog. Jaywalking is practically a national pastime” 
(Anonymous, as cited Swart, 2018: np). Furthermore, to prevent the type of bias and 
inaccuracy that comes with hi-tech CCTV programmable solutions, the human CCTV 
operators require proper training in suspicious activity “behavioural aspects and body 
language to pick up on crime indicators that could be signs that a crime has the 
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3.6  CRIME PREVENTION 
Many countries have implemented crime prevention initiatives for several years, and 
numerous examples exist where such projects have succeeded in bringing down crime 
levels. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in the United States of America provides 
examples of effective and promising programmes and practices in criminal justice, 
juvenile justice, and crime victim services. The NIJ has compiled profiles of a range of 
crime prevention initiatives evaluated globally and classifies them as effective, 
promising or no effect.  
 
In the UK, crime prevention discourses are often a reflection of what Garland (1996: 349) 
terms the “Responsibili[s]ation Strategy”, which is an attempt to implement “social” and 
“situational” forms of crime prevention as a means of “reordering the conduct of everyday 
life right across the social field” (Garland, 1996: 454). Garland, however, notes that the 
success of implementing a responsibilisation agenda quickly became constrained by 
issues surrounding the setting up effective multiagency co-ordinated action for crime 
prevention. Even when sufficient capacity and willingness does exist, questions have 
been asked about the validity of such approaches, particularly when they are used to 
hide deficits in frontline policing and crime control. Of particular interest is Garland’s (1996) 
description of responsibilisation strategies, which involve the “central government seeking to act 
upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social work, 
etc.) but instead acting indirectly, seeking to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and 
organizations” (Garland, 1996: 452). Despite this, crime prevention schemes of different 
varieties and forms are relatively common. 
 
Crime prevention aims to address some of the causes of crime. One way to explain 
this approach is to refer to the so-called problem analysis triangle, also known as the 
crime triangle. Crime prevention initiatives could focus on the victims, the offenders or 
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• Victims: Initiatives could aim to reduce the vulnerability of certain individuals, 
groups of people or communities; 
 
• Offenders: Initiatives could focus on the reasons why certain individuals or 
groups of people are at risk of committing crime;  
 
• The environment: Initiatives could address the physical characteristics or other 
situational factors of specific locations or areas that increase opportunities for 
crime. Possible interventions could involve law enforcement, situational crime 
prevention and social crime prevention approaches (National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ), [sa]. np).  
 
Often a combination of these three approaches has a better chance of delivering 
results. (It has its origins in one of the central theories of environmental criminology – 
Routine Activity Theory – developed by Cohen and Felson (1979: 588-608). According 
to this theory, certain types of crime could only occur when a likely (or motivated) 
offender and suitable (or vulnerable) target (property) or victim (person) are present at 
the same place at the same time. In addition, there should be an absence of effective 
control or protective measures, such as someone responsible for preventing the crime 
from happening or people willing to intervene. 
 
Being a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary and integrated endeavour, crime prevention 
has been defined by Ekblom (2005: 216) as an: “…intervention in the causes of 
criminal and disorderly events to reduce the risks of their occurrence and/or the 
potential seriousness of their consequences” (Ekblom, 2011: 220). Also, according to 
Sherman (1992: 78): “crime prevention is the attempt to reduce, deter crime and 
criminals”. There is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not 
only prevent crime and victimisation, but also promote community safety and 
contribute to sustainable development of countries (Ekhom, 2013: 12). 
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In South Africa, different crime prevention projects and programmes have also been 
implemented in various communities. Crime is not just a reality for South Africans, it is 
an obsession. The crime discourse in South Africa appears to be banal – people talk 
about it all the time in the same way that people elsewhere talk about the weather. It 
recognises that crime can “dominate the public psyche, contributing to counter-
productive public anxiety, fear and helplessness” (Baghel & Mayr, 2007: 234). It also 
underlines that public perceptions of crime place an undue burden on policy makers 
to address these crime priorities. “Prevention is the first imperative of justice” (Ekhom, 
2013: 45), and from the perspective of society, the best and most useful activity that 
law enforcement agencies can carry out is crime prevention.  
 
Crime prevention has come to mean many different things to many different people. 
The National Crime Prevention Strategy (SAPS, 1996: 79) recognises the importance 
of addressing the fear of crime via policing. In the context of CCTV these initiatives 
can include the following:  
 
• Law enforcement: targeted visible police patrols; supplemented by patrols by 
security guards or police reservists; Bye-law enforcement; training of response 
units for CCTV systems and private security guards; 
 
• Social crime prevention: educational programmes for children which raise 
awareness, for example, about child abuse; community neighbourhood watch 
programmes; provision of recreational facilities to occupy the youth; victim 
support centres;  
 
• Situational crime prevention: city centre CCTV systems; improving street 
lighting in townships and in CBDs; supporting street layout that encourages use 
by pedestrians; designing streets, buildings, parks, etc. to reduce opportunities 
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Often a combination of these three approaches has a better chance of delivering 
results. 
 
3.7  CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS AND CRIME PREVENTION 
From Foucault's description and analysis of the Panopticon and from the opinions of 
the theorists (as outlined above), it can be suggested that CCTV helps in crime 
prevention. CCTV has generally found its theoretical justification from situational crime 
prevention and the Rational Choice Theory that states that offenders make decisions 
about their intending offence situations. CCTV surveillance systems serve many 
functions and are used in both public and private settings (Armitage et al, 1999: 41). 
 
Karim (2007: 32) has also observed that the Routine Activities Theory: “demonstrates 
the method through which motivated adversaries (threats) find suitable targets (assets) 
and opportunities (vulnerabilities) during their routine activities”. Therefore, Karim 
further opined that, for a “criminal activity to become reality, the adversary, target and 
opportunity must converge in time and space for the crime to occur” (Karim, 2007: 15). 
In view of this, the need for security operatives to find opportunities that may interest 
the potential offender, through intelligence gathering, surveys, criminal profiling and 
all manner of vulnerability assessments, becomes imperative. 
 
As a form of situational crime prevention, CCTV surveillance seeks to prevent both 
personal and property crime and can be used in place of, or in addition to, police. 
Public surveillance cameras monitor, record, and transmit images of a specific area of 
interest and are either monitored remotely by security personnel or preprogramed to 
scan the specified area (La Vigne et al, 2011: 51). Routine Activity Theory, as 
postulated by Cohen and Felson (1979: 588-608), posited that for a predatory crime 
to occur three elements must be present: a likely or motivated offender; a suitable 
target; and the absence of a capable guardian. Felson (1987: 911-931) subsequently 
refined the theory with the addition of a fourth element, that of the “intimate handler‟. 
It is believed that the increased surveillance provided by CCTV will reduce crime and 
increase arrest, without displacing crime to other nearby areas where CCTV is not in 
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use (Ratcliffe, 2009: 49-55). Cornish and Clarke (2003: 80) postulated the Rational 
Choice Theory, which is based on the assumption that: “offenders seek to advantage 
themselves by their criminal behaviour‟. Rational Choice Theory, like Routine Activity 
Theory, is formulated on the concept of the offender being a rational actor undertaking 
a cost benefit analysis at a given time and place to assess whether there is the 
opportunity to offend. CCTV cameras are placed in areas where they are thought to 
be most effective, which typically includes highly populated towns, city centers, car 
parks, or various other high-crime areas (Welsh & Farrington 2008: 17).  
 
Throughout the world CCTV cameras are installed in streets and businesses with the 
stated goal of reducing crime and increasing public safety. It is argued that CCTV 
(especially if well publicised) may prevent crime since potential offenders are deterred 
by the increased subjective probability of their detection. Also, CCTV may increase 
the true probability of detection, may increase pedestrian usage of places and hence 
further increase the true and subjective probabilities, may encourage potential victims 
to take security precautions, and may direct police and security personnel to intervene 
to prevent crime (Armitage, Smyth & Pease, 1999: 226-227).  
 
Another possibility is that CCTV could signal improvements in the area and hence 
increase community pride, community cohesion, and informal social control, which in 
turn might decrease crime. CCTV surveillance cameras or video surveillance cameras 
(as they are also known) serve many functions and are used in both public and private 
settings. The prevention of personal and property crime is among the primary 
objectives in public space. As an intervention targeted at crime, CCTV is a type of 
situational crime prevention. Programmes and policies designed to prevent crime can 
include the police making an arrest as part of an operation to deal with gang problems, 
a court sanction to a secure correctional facility, or, in the extreme, a death penalty 
sentence. CCTV is considered to be one of the technologies adopted by law 
enforcement agencies to deal with the effect of alleviating shortcomings in the 
investigation of crimes. More often, though, crime prevention refers to efforts to prevent 
crime or criminal offending in the first instance – before the act has been committed. 
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Both forms of crime prevention share a common goal of trying to prevent the 
occurrence of a future criminal act, but what further distinguishes crime prevention 
from crime control is that prevention takes place outside of the confines of the formal 
justice system. These measures are more correctly referred to as crime control or 
repression.  
 
The prevention of personal and property crime is among the primary objectives in 
public spaces. As an intervention targeted at crime, CCTV may prevent crime because 
potential offenders are deterred by their increased subjective probability of being 
detected (Welsh & Farrington, 2009: 65). This implies that the presence of CCTV could 
cause potential offenders not to commit a crime as the risk outweighs the benefits. 
Therefore, CCTV reduces offenders’ opportunities to commit crimes. CCTV could also 
cause crime to increase. It could give potential victims a false sense of security and 
make them more vulnerable because they relax their vigilance or stop taking 
precautions, such as walking in groups at night and not wearing expensive jewellery. 
This shows that one cannot predict the actions of others even with the presence of 
CCTV everywhere (Welsh & Farrington, 2008: 12).  
 
This means that the offender must be made aware of the added surveillance for it to 
achieve its desired effect. Advocates of public surveillance systems also maintain that 
such systems can increase perceptions of safety among members of the public, and 
additionally reassure them to make increased use of public spaces they know have 
CCTV surveillance systems in place (La Vigne et al, 2011: 56). By means of the 
increases in people visiting such surveilled public spaces, more individuals can 
potentially serve as witnesses to crimes, presenting the possibility of greater crime 
reduction. As described by Cornish and Clarke (2003: 41-42), CCTV is a form of 
“formal surveillance”, meaning that not only can CCTV replace police or security 
officers (and often does) but it can also improve their capabilities, i.e. improve response 
times and accurately identify locations to which they can rapidly respond to real time 
crimes-in-progress (Welsh & Farrington, 2008: 17).  
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In addition to acting as a deterrent, CCTV cameras can alert police of crimes as they 
happen (‘real time’), which can enable officers to respond quicker and more efficiently 
(La Vigne et al, 2011: 57). On a larger scale, the use of CCTV also presents the 
possibility of aiding the criminal justice system, since CCTV video footage of a crime 
may help in investigations and prosecutions (La Vigne et al, 2011: 85).  
 
3.7.1 CCTV technologies: Facial recognition systems 
A facial recognition system is a computer application for automatically identifying or 
verifying a person from a digital image or a video frame from a video source (Duncan, 
2018a: 72). One of the ways to do this is by comparing selected facial features from the 
image and a facial database. It is typically used in security systems and can be compared 
to other biometrics, such as fingerprint or eye iris recognition systems. Popular 
recognition algorithms include Eigenface, Fisherface, the Hidden Markov Model, and the 
neuronal motivated dynamic link matching (Duncan, 2018a: 67).  
 
A newly emerging trend, claimed to achieve previously unseen accuracies, is three- 
dimensional face recognition. Another emerging trend uses the visual details of the skin, 
as captured in standard digital or scanned images. Tests on the FERET database, the 
widely used industry benchmark, showed that this approach is substantially more reliable 
than previous algorithms. There are also several potential uses for facial recognition that 
are currently being developed. For example, the technology could be used as a security 
measure at ATM’s; instead of using a bank card or personal identification number, the 
ATM would capture an image of your face, and compare it to your photo in the bank 
database to confirm your identity. This same concept could also be applied to computers; 
by using a webcam to capture a digital image of yourself, your face could replace your 
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3.7.2 The role of international research: Impact of CCTV surveillance 
CCTV camera networks can provide warning signs of potential criminal offences and act 
as a responsive instrument. CCTV can monitor crowds and individuals, respond to 
threats and thus notify the operator (in a central control room) of unsafe, dangerous or 
criminal conduct and activities during and after the occurrence of an event (McCahill & 
Norris, 2002: 34). Video observation cameras have been extremely useful in recognising 
offenders. For example: in the 1993 Bishopsgate bombing (in London, UK) as well as 
the series of bombings on the London underground on 7 July 2005 (Switzerland Federal 
Department of Police and Justice, 2007: 72).  
 
Video surveillance cameras can also assist the authorities in other criminal acts. For 
instance, in Barcelona, video surveillance cameras on the metro rails enabled authorities 
to find a young Spanish man who had forcefully attacked a Latino American man in the 
metro (Cambon, 2007: 102). Such occasions have spread awareness on the viability of 
CCTV surveillance systems as a security device. This has enticed countries, such as 
Germany, to introduce CCTV networks in public transit frameworks in case of similar 
incidents occurring on their rail systems (bombings/assaults etc.). Such CCTV networks 
offer constant surveillance in places where humans cannot see, i.e. underground tunnels 
of trains. In the case of an incident (e.g. a fire), this innovation can inform control 
operators and lead to rapid response(s) to any such situation arising and can also 
indicate a way out (escape) from a fire in progress on the underground (Müller & Boos, 
2004: 173). Innumerable studies show that CCTV networks are a successful 
administration device since they are more affordable than police officers physically on 
the beat and are more productive in recognising or forestalling criminal offenses. Wear 
Babwin (2007: 101) states that, not at all like security officers, cameras are not subject 
to weariness or loss of focus and accordingly give continuous and consistent effort. 
Accordingly, the financial burden of the underlying cost of acquiring and introducing a 
CCTV network of cameras is impeded by its long-haul proficiency over utilising extra 
police officers who might be less significant. In addition, CCTV camera networks are 
additionally a key device for helping police forces in solving crimes. Goold (2009: 3-6) 
directed an investigation to analyse whether the association and administration of a 
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CCTV network conspires to influence how observation was completed. Goold’s work 
uncovered negative and positive results. In a few cases, the implementation and 
administration of introduced CCTV frameworks without consulting with the police, or if 
the police took control of the system, the effects/results were restricted.  
 
3.8  CYBERSECURITY AND CCTV 
This literature review outlines many simple innovative tactics by cyber criminals that 
have led to unprecedented outcomes of cybercrime as a global threat activity. Security 
control rooms and CCTV surveillance operations are no exception to cyberattacks by 
criminals that can compromise the data (video images stored in databases) that might 
be shared for crime intelligence purposes with law enforcement agencies by the 
private security companies managing such surveillance operations. Such sensitive 
digital information, as well as other data, can be accessed by criminal hackers.9 Since 
CCTV surveillance operations operate largely via online internet electronic platforms, 
this makes all the stored information vulnerable to hackers. In other words, digital 
online data that is not properly secured by high levels of cybersecurity is vulnerable 
to criminal exploitation, or even industrial espionage by rivals. When a computer or 
network is the target, source tool or the medium of crime, such a criminal activity is 
referred to as computer crime, hi-tech crime, e-crime or electronic crime. In this regard, 
CCTV that uses computer networks in operations, i.e. in data gathering for law 
enforcement agencies (Norris & Armstrong, 1999: 52), are potentially liable to be 
compromised by cybercriminals in a cyberattack (see Minnaar, 2014: 16, for more 
detail of cyberattacks and cybersecurity vulnerabilities).  
 
Digital technology provides this connectivity and gives its users many valuable 
benefits. New technologies create new criminal opportunities and new types of crime. 
But, at the same time, they provide a rich environment for criminal activity, ranging 
from vandalism to stolen identity to theft of classified government information. Also, 
 
9  Hacking is an approach by which a computer system or computer network is attacked and accessed, 
and the cyber vulnerability thereby exposed is exploited by the hackers, most often for the theft of 
sensitive information (Mali, 2010: 60). 
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individuals may store sensitive information on their laptops, computers, tablets and 
smartphones. The internet is an open world where there are groups dedicating their 
time to gaining access to sensitive information. These groups are known as hackers; 
they use the vulnerabilities of the systems or networks to attack computer systems 
(Mali, 2010: 60). 
 
Computer security, also known as cybersecurity or IT security, is the protection of 
information systems from theft or damage to computer equipment, the software 
programmes and information stored in databases. Cybersecurity is also used to 
protect IT systems from being disrupted or interrupted. This implies physical access 
to computer equipment and devices must also be controlled and protected from any 
harmful activity emanating from hackers accessing a network. This includes the 
infection of IT systems by the spreading of malware, whether intentional, accidental, 
or due to operators/users being tricked into diverging from cybersecurity operating 
procedures. In the field of CCTV digital systems’ increasing reliance on computer 
systems, the internet and wireless networks in their operations and the growth of 
‘smart’ technologies linked to CCTV, cybersecurity has become important for the 
storage and protection of the integrity of recorded video images (Schatz, Bashroush & 
Wall, 2017: 53-54).  
 
3.8.1 The mechanism of crime reduction 
The mechanisms under which CCTV aims to reduce crime are based upon the following 
assumptions:  
 
• Deterrence: The potential offender becomes aware of the presence of CCTV, 
assesses the risks of offending in this location to outweigh the benefits and 
chooses either not to offend or to offend elsewhere. 
 
• Efficient deployment: CCTV cameras allow those monitoring the scene to 
determine whether police assistance is required. This ensures that police 
resources are called upon only when necessary. 
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3.8.2  CCTV systems as a security concept 
CCTV is a valuable management and security tool. The installation of a CCTV system 
as part of a series of security recommendations generally intended to prevent or detect 
crime. CCTV can be very effective in maintaining security. Video evidence can help with 
security enquiries or investigations and assist in securing criminal convictions. The visual 
recording of incidents, for evidential or investigative purposes, has many benefits and 
with a competitive customer driven market is no longer cost prohibitive. CCTV systems 
will vary in size and complexity depending on the following context/situations:  
 
(i) By Potential Offenders: The threat of potential surveillance (whether the 
cameras are being monitored may be irrelevant) acts to produce self-discipline 
in which individuals police their own behaviour. In prison, the cells are arranged 
around a central watchtower from which a supervisor could constantly survey 
them. Prisoners could never be sure whether they were being watched, so 
began to police their own behaviour. Foucault (1991: 90) laid down the principle 
that power should be visible and unverifiable. With reference to visible: the 
inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower 
from which he is spied upon. As to unverifiable: the inmate must never know 
whether he is being looked at any moment, but he must be sure that he may 
always be so’. Similarly, the CCTV camera may produce self-discipline 
through fear of surveillance, whether real or imagined. 
 
3.8.3  Cyber threats to control rooms and CCTV surveillance operations 
There are two primary aspects that need to be considered in securing the integrity of 
the control room and client site from possible attack. One aspect is the integrity of the 
controllers that are employed and the second is the integrity of the network against 
possible cyber and hacking attacks. Contract Surveillance Services (CSS) is an 
independent control room offering the monitoring of CCTV, fire and alarm systems. It 
offers a direct-to-client service or a third-party control room for other security 
companies that do not have their own control room. The company has a continuous 
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programme of technology adaption enabling it to connect. to sites anywhere in South 
Africa. CSS has found that, having its control room outside of the main business 
centres, removes controllers physically from the probability of intimidation by criminal 
syndicates. Operating in an out-of-the-way city reduces the possibility of external 
intimidation and collusion. Many control rooms connect to sites through the public 
internet and use home Domain Name Systems (DNS) protocols (Mali, 2010: 32).  
 
A simple internet search will reveal many ways to hack networks. Closed networks or 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) offer higher levels of security for connecting remote 
sites with users and their devices. Site specific usernames and passwords are equally 
important, used in conjunction with private network security features. Routers and 
switches, designed for VPN applications, also come with built-in firewalls and, with a 
reasonable router or switch, reasonable levels of security can be achieved. In addition 
to network security, passwords and access levels to control room computer 
workstations needs to be strictly controlled so that operators have limited access to 
system files. This will also reduce the possibility of a cyberattack or collusion with 
hacker intruders (Mali, 2010: 42). 
 
An identified threat is any vulnerable point in the network or the operation system and 
in the software in use, and is considered a risk, due to its potential to be used in a 
cyberattack. Computer operating systems and software in use will determine whether 
there is a risk to the computer system or to the information stored on the computer or 
computer network being used for CCTV surveillance operations. Also, a factor that 
affects and increases the level of risk is the user/operator of the system. The threat of 
an “insider” giving approval to the attacker to hack the computer without the 
management of the company finding out, remains high. Such insider facilitated access 
to sensitive information is often based on bribery, corruption or intimidation, i.e. the 
operator (insider employee) may be blackmailed to provide access to the information 
by cybercriminals who are thereby enabled to circumvent company cybersecurity 
measures. If the operating network system does not have a malware detector, such 
as antivirus software and/or anti-malware software, this will also increase the risk of 
83 
© Unisa 2019 
being attacked because the computer does not have software that cyber controls the 
incoming online traffic (Georgia Tech Information Security Center [GTISC] and 
Georgia Tech Research Institute [GTRI], 2015: np for a more detailed exposition of 
cyberthreats). 
 
3.8.4  Deliberate Denial of Services (DDoS) 
The researcher emphasises the importance of a Deliberate Denial of Service (DDoS) 
and jamming attacks carried out on CCTV surveillance systems. A Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) attack involves multiple DoS agents configured to send attack traffic 
to a single victim computer. In most cases, uninterrupted and untampered operation 
is critically important for CCTV surveillance systems because they are used to 
monitoring and recording crimes or other important activities. DDoS is a deliberate act 
that significantly degrades the quality and/or availability of services offered by a 
computer system by consuming its bandwidth and/or processing time. CCTV operates 
from network computer connection. The interruption of computer may affect the digital 
recording of events which could be used by law enforcement agencies. As a result, 
legitimate users are unable to have full quality access to a web service or services. 
Producing a DDoS attack on a CCTV surveillance system, even for one minute, could 
make them miss a significant event, such as an extremely quick bank robbery or 
crimes with more dire consequences. That is why, while a DDoS attack on a home 
router could be an insignificant irritation, the DDoS attacks on CCTV surveillance 
systems have a serious impact and must be considered when designing, evaluating 
and testing a new CCTV system (Neumann, 2000: 136). 
 
3.8.5 Some preventative cybersecurity measures 
There are several basic preventative measures that can increase the security of the 
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• factory reset button; 
 
• strengthening an organisation’s overall cyber-resilience; 
 
• improving online access controls;  
 
•  applying ‘strong’ firewalls to block unwanted incoming or outgoing cyber traffic 
on an internet connection;  
 
• implementing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) (Maat, 2009: 61). It also 
prevents them from interrupting CCTV operations or damaging a server 
(Chitauri, 2015: 23);  
 
• using ‘private addressing. This involves not using an Internet Service Provider, 
such as Google, for email addresses. This is a way to protect publicly routable 
IP addresses. Many home-based broadband routers rely on private addressing 
to protect systems in the home or for small business networks (Bowen, 2009: 
67). 
 
3.8.6 Risk planning for cyber protection 
All organisations, especially government agencies, prefer to keep their information 
private. For that they must have a good risk management plan in place and a strong 
security system to prevent any cyberattack or leak of sensitive information. Having an 
insider providing access to information databases to cybercriminals is more dangerous 
than experiencing a cyberattack since, if strong cybersecurity measures are in place, 
a hacking attack can be timeously detected, and the network and online operations 
can be secured by a company’s IT department by means of firewalls. But an insider 
already has access to company databases by passing all the security checkpoints. To 
secure an organisation from an insider, the following security checks should be 
implemented (Neumann, 2000: 136). 
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• not allowing any employees to use a removable disc, external hard drive, CD-
RW or DVD. This will protect the organisation from many security issues, 
threats and risks, such as malware (e.g. viruses, spam, spyware and Trojans) 
and combat the insider threat (Neumann, 2000: 136). 
 
• Make use of high security with a password (frequently changed) and security 
questions. A second security authorisation token on login into the system can 
also be used. This will provide protection from compromised passwords and 
security questions (Neumann, 2000: 136). 
 
• in the sphere of information security, more than one or two methods can be 
used for checking if the attempt to log in is by a trusted employee or not. First 
step is a user ID and password, and when the password has upper letters and 
lower letters, numbers, and more than eight characters, it will be more 
complicated for an attacker to hack the system. Second step is an authorisation 
token that changes the security code every 30 seconds. This will protect the 
agency from outsiders or an attacker trying to access information on the 
internet, monitoring the log in locations and the time of intrusion attempt. This 
monitoring will help the IT department to understand if the employee is logging 
into the system outside of the facility and/or out of working hours (Gerber, 2000: 
12-17).  
 
• Other measures for securing a system are making use of biometrics, such as 
a fingerprint system, iris eye scan or voice recognition system, all of which will 
help to prevent an outsider from accessing systems (Mali, 2010: 34). 
 
• Educating employees to be more aware of cyberattacks and what they should 
do to avoid them. This includes implementing proper operating procedures, 
frequent changing of passwords, and proper authentication when logging on, 
among others. Education and awareness campaigns within a company have 
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proven to be more effective than any other countermeasures for protecting 
information (Maat, 2009: 45) 
 
• Since many attacks destroy data or programs, making copies (backups) of 
digital information is essential to recover from an attack. Backups need to be 
done for any critical information and need to be stored some distance from the 
systems they track so no common disaster (e.g. fire, flood, and earthquake) 
affecting both locations is likely. Optical-disk storage is preferable for backups 
because it cannot be as easily damaged as magnetic media. A backup can be 
an entire duplicate computer system when it is important to maintain 
continuous operation (Akuta, Ong’oa & Jones, 2011: 130). 
 
• Encryption hides data in a form that cannot easily be read. A character-string 
“key” to decode it can be provided if necessary (Chitauro, 2015: np). Any 
attempts to modify encrypted data will result in rendering it undecipherable so 
it is possible to tell if encrypted messages or programmes have been modified 
(or repeated if a time is included in the message). Strong and virtually 
unbreakable methods of encryption have been developed recently with ‘public-
key cryptography’ and software that is available for free downloads from 
several Web sites. Encryption methods can also be used for “authentication” 
or to provide digital ‘signatures’ on documents to prove who wrote them and 
when. Encryption has been touted as a solution to many security problems but 
is overrated. If an attacker gains system-administrator privileges, he/she may 
be able to get encryption keys or disable encryption methods without the 
company or organisation’s knowledge (Akuta, Ong’oa & Jones, 2011: 133). 
 
3.9  LAWS AND POLICIES FOR CYBERSECURITY 
This section will cover the laws and the policies for cybersecurity. The most recent 
update on cybersecurity was the 2013 executive order by President Barack Obama of 
the United States of America about the importance of the cyber threat to critical 
infrastructure and how its continuing growth represents a serious national security 
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threat. It also expounded on cybersecurity information sharing with the policy 
mentioning that the private sector security should increase its ability to defend itself 
against cyber threats (Obama, 2013: Section 1; Sec. 4a). According to the US National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), each organisation needs a good risk 
management plan to protect its valuable assets in accordance with the NIST standards 
on securing information systems and data assets. Furthermore, organisations should 
apply access controls to these assets to secure them properly and to ensure that these 
access controls fully protect these assets (Obama, 2013: Section 1; Sec. 4a).  
 
At present the current legal framework relating to cybercrime in South Africa is a hybrid 
of different pieces of legislation and the common law. Offences relating to cybercrime 
are primarily under the Electronic Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002) 
(Electronic Communication and Transactions Act (ECTA), 2002: Chapter XII). The 
ECT Act seeks to provide for the Department of Communications to appoint cyber 
inspectors. The cyber inspectors may monitor Internet websites in the public domain 
and investigate whether cryptography service providers and authentication service 
providers comply with the relevant provisions. The inspectors are granted powers of 
search and seizure, subject to obtaining a warrant. Inspectors can also assist the 
police or other investigative bodies, on request. Chapter XIII of the ECT Act seeks to 
make the first statutory provisions on cybercrime in South African jurisprudence. The Act 
seeks to introduce statutory criminal offences relating to the following:  
 
• unauthorised access to data (e.g. so-called “hacking” and trading in passwords 
used to commit an offence); 
 
• interception with data (e.g. tapping into data flows or denial of service attacks); 
 
• interference with data (e.g. viruses and denial of service attacks); 
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• computer related extortion, fraud and forgery (e.g. where someone gains 
financially by undertaking to cease or desist from doing something using a 
computer) (ECTA, 2002: Chapter XIII). 
 
Any person aiding or abetting another in the performance of any of these crimes will 
be guilty as an accessory. The ECT Act prescribes the penalties for those convicted 
of offences which render a person liable to a fine or imprisonment for periods not 
exceeding 12 months in certain circumstances or five years in certain circumstances 
(ECTA, 2002: Chapter XIII). 
 
There are cybersecurity laws that prohibit all the cyberattacks mentioned above, but 
the laws do little to prevent them in practical terms. The United States and many other 
countries have laws prohibiting eavesdropping on communications and damage to 
computers, which covers most of the attacks mentioned. But most attackers do not 
concern themselves about getting caught since it is hard to track them down and 
legislation dealing with cybercrime and cybersecurity are hard to apply. Laws can, 
however, be effective against repeat offenders within a given legal jurisdiction, such 
as spies selling secrets. 
 
According to the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) (of the US 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)), cybersecurity is divided into 
seven categories, namely:  
 
• security provision;  
• operation;  
• maintenance;  
• protection and defence;  
• investigation;  
• collection of analyses; and 
• providing support (technical, updating and equipment).  
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In terms of cybersecurity provision, there are organisations that deal with people-
sensitive information. They need to be well organised, especially in the context of 
information security management, and must make sure that whoever handles these 
duties knows explicitly what their jobs entail (National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Education, 2011: 45). 
 
3.10  CYBERSECURITY, CYBERCRIME, INFORMATION SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY ISSUES RELATING TO THE USE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEMS 
The right to privacy includes all those things that are a part of us, such as our body 
home, thoughts, feelings, secrets and identity. The right to privacy enables us to 
choose which parts in this domain can be accessed by others, and control the extent, 
manner and timing of the use of those parts we choose to disclose. Different countries 
across the globe have defined their privacy requirements, by articulating the conditions 
for the protection of personal data and preventing harm to an individual whose data is 
at stake. CCTV is a valuable management and security tool. The installation of a CCTV 
system as part of a series of security recommendations generally intended to prevent 
or detect crime. CCTV can be very effective in maintaining security. Video evidence 
can help with security enquiries or investigations and assist in securing criminal 
convictions. The visual recording of incidents, for evidential or investigative purposes, 
has many benefits and with a competitive customer driven market is no longer cost 
prohibitive. CCTV systems will vary in size and complexity depending on their purpose 
and the defined security operational requirements. However, the basic purpose of any 
system will be to observe a scene and the activities that occur within it, namely:  
  
• covert: the camera is concealed;  
 
• discreet: the presence of the camera will be known to some people, but its 
appearance will not automatically suggest its purpose; and 
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• overt: the appearance of the camera will be designed to clearly indicate its 
function and maximize the deterrent effect.  
 
For crime prevention overt CCTV systems are usually more suitable whereas discreet 
or covert systems are more appropriate for crime detection and prosecution. 
 
3.10.1  Privacy issues vs CCTV surveillance systems 
According to the claims of some sociologists (Whitaker, l999: l36; Lyon, 1994a: 190, 
2001: 150), privacy has little theoretical or practical utility in the 21st century. Electronic 
surveillance has been challenged as an unwarranted invasion of privacy and 
conceptualised as a component of a new social control strategy involving the diffusion 
of the surveillance panopticon ranging from prisons to public spaces worldwide (Lyon, 
2011: 89).Generally, most of the concerns about CCTV surveillance systems are 
related to privacy issues for obvious reasons. The privacy impact of CCTV surveillance 
systems is especially important in the light of revelations about global surveillance 
programs (the Snowden case10 and subsequent revelations of blanket surveillance of 
the internet of individuals), and video surveillance scandals.  
 
However, besides privacy issues, an insecure or compromised CCTV surveillance 
system can raise a myriad of other non-privacy related issues. For example, breaches 
have been shown to endanger the security and safety of a prison, pose theft risks to 
institutions operating with money, such as banks and casinos, emotionally affect other 
persons (especially children), or interfere with police and law-enforcement crime 
prevention activities. At the same time, as more and more embedded devices are being 
analysed at a large scale for security vulnerabilities (Welsh & Farrington, 2008: 34) it 
 
10 It is important to note here that Lyon and other surveillance scholars have discussed many aspects of 
mass surveillance over the past couple of decades predating Snowden. However, according to Lyon, 
the Snowden revelations have provided “clear evidence” of mass surveillance happening, bringing 
concerns about mass surveillance to the public eye in ways never seen before. David Lyon’s 
Surveillance After Snowden, compellingly demonstrates the relevance of the former NSA contractor, 
Edward Snowden’s revelations about the global mass surveillance implemented by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) in the United States and throughout the world. 
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is no surprise that CCTV surveillance systems have recently gained a dramatic 
increase in attention from security researchers.  
 
Those and similar studies led to more than a handful of vulnerabilities being exposed 
with a large-scale impact in real life for more detail on security threats, vulnerabilities 
and attacks on CCTV systems). It has been argued here that the kinds of surveillance 
highlighted by the Snowden revelations are on one hand information-intensive, often 
relating to the internet and on the other, ‘national security-oriented. The concept of 
‘security’ also requires problematising in this context, which is yet another task for the 
multi-disciplinary research that today is patently urgent. As with surveillance or privacy, 
defining security is difficult especially under present conditions, where ‘national’ security 
has been elevated to a top priority by many governments. It is a highly contested 
concept, often erroneously supposed to be in conflict with claims to a right to privacy or 
to civil liberties (Zedner, 2009: 43). Much more nuanced understandings of security are 
required if the term is to retain any connection with the desires, aspirations and indeed 
well-being of everyday citizens.  
 
3.10.2 The data protection legal framework in South Africa 
Prior to the promulgation of the POPI Act, South African law did not have an omnibus 
of data privacy legislation. Currently, within South African legislation there are 
predominantly three statutes that contain data protection provisions (albeit limited) 
that are worth mentioning, namely: The Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA); The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA); and the 
National Credit Act (NCA). PAIA is essentially a law that has been enacted to give 
effect to an individual’s constitutional right of access to any information held by the 
State or any another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights. This Act, to a limited extent, addresses the active control principles as well as 
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• individuals’ access to records containing personal information about 
themselves in the public and private sector; 
 
• requiring public and private bodies to take reasonable steps to establish 
adequate internal measures which provide for the correction of personal 
information (if such measures do not exist) until legislation providing for such 
correction comes into effect; and  
 
• prohibiting the disclosure of a record if it would involve the unreasonable 
disclosure of personal information relating to a third party (ECTA, 2002) 
 
The aims and objectives of the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI) are, in 
brief, to promote the protection of personal information processed by public and private 
bodies; introduce conditions to establish minimum requirements for the processing of 
personal information; provide for the establishment of an Information Regulator to 
exercise certain powers and to perform certain duties and functions in terms of this Act 
and the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; provide for the issuing of codes 
of conduct; provide for the rights of persons regarding unsolicited electronic 
communications and automated decision making; regulate the flow of personal 
information across the borders of South Africa; and to provide for any other matters 
connected with any of the points above (Bygrave, 2014: 42).  
 
Chapter 2, Section 14 (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996) provides that all have the right to privacy that includes a right to protection 
against the unlawful collection, retention, dissemination and use of personal 
information. In other words, the government has an obligation to ensure the fulfilment 
of that specific right as enshrined in the South African Constitution of 1996. The POPI 
Act 4 of 2013 part I contains Schedule 1. This is a set of eight general data protection 
principles which lie at the very root of the data protection legislation. This schedule 
imposes a duty on every data controller to comply with the data protection principles 
in relation to all personal data in respect of which he or she is in control of and for 
93 
© Unisa 2019 
which they are responsible in terms of its information security. In April 2014 the some 
of the provisions of the POPI Act relating to the information regulator and the Act’s 
regulations came into effect. Once the remainder of the provisions of the Act become 
operational, parties that process personal information will be required to conform to the 
provisions of the Act within one year of the commencement such provisions. To date 
the President of South Africa has not yet announced the commencement of the 
balance of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the bulk of the provisions discussed 
in this study will only come into effect on the publishing of the enactment date by the 
President, in the South African Government Gazette. 
 
This is the most comprehensive Act in the South African legal framework that 
recognises electronic transactions. The current legal framework in South Africa 
provides specifically for the protection of personal information or personal data. There 
is need to establish a balance between the protection of personal data to safeguard 
an individual’s right to privacy and, at the same time, ensure that regulation does not 
interfere with the right of various data users who use personal data for legitimate 
purposes. An additional significance is the criminal law principle of legality which 
provides that conduct cannot be deemed to be illegal unless there is an existing law 
that prohibits such conduct (Bygrave, 2014: 49). Historically, privacy has often been 
equated with a right to dignity. However, the common law has developed to give 
recognition to the independent right to privacy. The locus classicus for support for 
this view is O’ Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd where the Plaintiff 
complained that her photograph and name had been used for advertising purposes 
without her consent. 
 
3.10.3 What are data protection principles? 
Data protection principles are also known as information privacy principles. They 
include: what data may be collected about individuals; who should be notified of any 
collected data; under what conditions collected data must be stored; the right of 
individuals to access and call for correction of stored data; and limits to the use and 
disclosure of stored data. Some other concepts included in data protection legislation 
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are: allowance for anonymous participation, trans-border data flow control and the 
handling of specifically sensitive information, such as health information. There have 
been several international attempts to define an international data protection standard 
(Bygrave, 2014: 60). 
 
3.10.4 How do data protection principles relate to cybercrime? 
Cyber criminals often use devices to gain unauthorised access to data or to commit 
cybercrimes. These devices may consist of hardware devices or attachments and 
software programs. Most software programs can be downloaded from the internet. 
Some of these software programs can be installed through electronic mail to the 
victim’s computer. Valuable information, such as credit card numbers and personal 
passwords, may be obtained in this manner (Bygrave, 2014: 40).  
 
POPI Act uses the term “personal information” instead of “personal data”, “responsible 
party” instead of the term “data controller” and “operator” instead of the term “data 
processor”. However, these terms bear the same meaning as ascribed above. The 
international instruments that will be discussed herein refer to data privacy “principles” 
which are to be applied when processing personal data; however, the POPI Act 
instead refers to “conditions for lawful processing”. Again, data privacy “principles” and 
“conditions” refer essentially to the same concept.  
 
In the context of data privacy, Roos correctly states that where the privacy of a 
person has been infringed by the processing of personal information (by unlawfully 
processing true and correct data about an individual or by processing false and 
misleading data about an individual) the aggrieved party can rely on the principles of 
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Such remedies will be limited to the following:  
 
(a) an interdict to prevent the wrongful processing of personal data or further 
processing of personal data; and / or 
 
(b) a claim based on the actio iniuriarum for solatium for non‐patrimonial loss for 
the injury caused to the Plaintiff’s personality as a result of the wrongful 
intentional processing of personal data; or 
 
(c) a claim for compensation under the action legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss 
(damnum iniuria) sustained due to the wrongful, negligent processing of 
personal data (Neethling, Potgieter & Knobel, 2006: 34). 
 
3.10.5  International instruments for data privacy and protection 
As already mentioned, in 1973 Sweden was the first country in the world to enact data 
privacy legislation. However, by the 1980s data protection had become an 
international issue due to the emergence of a global market and the increase ease 
with which personal information could be transmitted outside the borders of the 
country of origin which lead to the increase in the exchange of personal information 
across national boundaries, known as “trans‐border data flows” . International data 
protection instruments that emerged post the 1980s, generally have two primary 
goals:  
 
i) the setting of standards at an international level for the protection of personal 
data; and  
 
ii) providing for the free flow of information across national boundaries (where 
there are adequate controls). 
 
Bygrave (2014) raises four general features which are characteristic of most successful 
international instruments dealing with data privacy:  
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i) privacy law is largely statutory;  
 
ii) data privacy legislation normally establishes independent regulatory bodies, 
often referred to as Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) to oversee its 
implementation;  
 
iii) data privacy laws often take the form of ‘framework’ laws; and  
 
iv) DPAs often play a lead role in how data privacy law is understood and applied, 
even where their views are only advisory (Bygrave, 2014: 60-61). 
 
The most important international attempts for data privacy protection were the following 
three vital instruments, that have had a profound effect on data privacy laws across 
the world relating to the trans-border flows of data, namely: the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Data Protection; the Council of 
Europe (CoE) Convention on Data Protection; and the European Union (EU) Directive 
related to data protection. 
 
The 2013 revision to the 1981 version of the OECD Guidelines was required due to 
changing technologies, markets, user behaviour and the greater importance of digital 
identities over the past forty years. The OECD Guidelines also contains a set of basic 
principles that apply to the processing of personal data where member countries and 
non‐member countries are encouraged to implement the provisions contained in 
OECD Guidelines. However, the 1981 version of the OECD Guidelines did not 
contain requirements as to how these principles are to be enforced by member 
nations. The revised OECD Guidelines explicitly make provision for the 
establishment of DPAs. There are eight core principles contained in the revised 
OECD Guidelines. They include the limitation principle, quality principle, 
specification principle, use limitation principle, security guard’s principle, openness 
principle, individual principle and the accountability principle. Additionally, the revised 
OECD Guidelines contains three principles relating to trans-border data flows, 
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namely, that:  
 
i) the data controller remains accountable for personal data despite the location 
of the data;  
 
ii) trans‐border data flows should not be restricted where the other country 
substantially observes the OECD Guidelines or sufficient safeguards exist to 
ensure a level of protection consistent with the OECD Guidelines; and  
 
iii) restrictions to TBDFs should be proportionate to the risk considering the 
sensitivity of the data, the purpose and context of processing. 
 
Non‐Member states are also invited to adhere to the OECD Guidelines and to 
collaborate with member countries in the implementation of the eight principles 
across borders. In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) issued its privacy guidelines which are applicable to video 
surveillance. The main aim of the guidelines (updated in 2013) was to protect privacy 
and promote free flow of information. To obtain these aims, the OECD guidelines set 
out five principles for member countries that subsequently became the basis for 
national laws around the world:  
 
• Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits to the collection of 
personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means 
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
 
• Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for 
which they are to be used and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, 
should be accurate, complete and kept up to date. 
 
• Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for which personal data are 
collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and 
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the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as 
are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion 
of change of purpose. 
 
• Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be protected by 
reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised 
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. 
 
• Openness Principle: There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means 
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal 
data and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual 
residence of the data controller” (OECD, 2013: 14-15). 
 
3.10.6  The General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union 
The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) is a regulation in EU 
law on data protection and privacy for all individual citizens of the European Union 
(EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). It also addresses the transfer of 
personal data outside the EU and EEA areas. The GDPR aims primarily to give control 
to individuals over their personal data and to simplify the regulatory environment for by 
unifying the regulation within the EU. 
 
3.10.7 CCTV surveillance and value adding to public spaces  
What values do public spaces produce for society and citizens? CCTV video 
surveillance has both positive and negative effects. CCTV encourages broad 
participation and interaction in public spaces, for instance, by increasing citizens’ 
sense of community safety. With the help of CCTV, both public and private spaces 
can be made more secure and serve more social functions such as:  
 
• spaces of shared and individualised economic activities; tourism; cultural 
activities; begging; and social integration (Lyon, 2011: 36). 
99 
© Unisa 2019 
Research has shown that shared spaces do or, at least, can contribute to a sense of 
community (Skjaeveland & Grayling, 1999: 34). Conversely, research has also shown 
that exclusionary spatial practices contribute to disintegration, social exclusion, hate 
and intolerance in private spaces (Madanipour, 1998; Flint, 2004: 50). The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has outlined many concerns about video surveillance. 
ACLU maintains that those with access to the data have routinely misused data 
collected through Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras (Lyon, 2006: 37). In the 
United Kingdom, video surveillance privacy falls under the Data Protection Act of 1998. 
Most countries follow the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) guidelines for privacy protection of personal data including video data. In 
South Africa, the POPI Act 4 of 2013 regulates the usage of video data. Experts agree 
that video surveillance undermines our right to anonymity. CCTV Video surveillance, 
augmented with biometric technology (e.g. facial recognition), needs to follow certain 
principles of protection, namely:  
  
i) Principle 1: Fair and lawful processing. This principle requires that personal 
data must be processed fairly and lawfully and must not be processed 
unless at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 of the POPI Act is met. 
 
ii) Principle 2: Obtaining and further processing of data for specified and lawful 
purposes is acceptable. 
 
iii) Principle 3: Requires that personal data should be adequate, relevant and 
not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which it is acquired. 
 
iv) Principle 4: Retention policy. Video and other surveillance data to be stored 
and kept by users for a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 90 days. 
 
In other words, user-specific user-interaction privacy principles relating to retention 
policies require built-in privacy protection capabilities (software), i.e. broad-based 
cybersecurity measures, that require, if there is any invasion of privacy of innocent 
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individuals, at the very least to obtain consent to use video data collected, for instance, 
as evidentiary purposes in court.  
 
3.10.8 Criticising surveillance and surveillance critique: Why privacy and 
humanism are necessary but insufficient 
Surveillance’s present notoriety makes this an opportunity and urgent moment for such 
a debate. It has been argued that without Snowden, we would not have had such a public 
opportunity to influence what ‘surveillance’ means and entails (Drum, 2014: np; Lyon, 
2015: 19).This is especially the case in the United States yet the Snowden affair 
demonstrates the status of telecommunications surveillance, at least, as an object of 
international concern. Whatever the morality and legality of his actions, it is clear enough 
that the leaks have rendered the future of state surveillance a little less certain, a little 
more open for negotiation. Nevertheless, surveillance is equipped with its own kind of 
rationality, one which works to close such windows of opportunity. These consistently 
insist on surveillance’s autonomy that is, its ability and right to internally justify its own 
scope, validity and efficiency. When the NSA implores the public that the sensible thing 
to do is simply trust the security experts and let the unknown lie undisturbed (Lizza, 2013: 
23; Ackerman, 2014: 12), they are working towards a situation where surveillance 
justifies itself according to its self-created mechanisms of proof. This extends to 
surveillance systems’ claim to their strategic necessity. Public Senate committee 
hearings are used to broadcast that the (Western) world has become more dangerous 
than ever before, requiring ever more expansive forms of surveillance (U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014: 63).The Snowden leaks help attract proper 
scrutiny on exactly these schemas of justification, persuasion and validation. In cases, 
such as social media participation, many of us have determined the surrendering of 
personal information to be, by and large, beneficial to our interests. After all, within the 
present state of affairs, giving up some degree of privacy can provide greater individual 
autonomy and scope of action (Lyon, 2015: 62). The loss of privacy is thus outweighed, 
in some contexts, by the fear of being isolated by the irrelevance of our secrets (Lyon, 
2015: 31). This is not to say that we have knowingly and happily jettisoned privacy; more 
often, privacy is slipping through our fingers unwillingly and unwittingly. Increasingly, the 
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choice to ‘opt out’ of privacy intrusive services becomes a non-option, the equivalent of 
social erasure (Lyon, 2015: 36). One major reason that privacy-based criticism ends up 
fighting an uphill battle is that surveillance can typically fall back to the felt sense of 
security d its moral legitimacy), and in doing so, depict privacy as a disposable luxury.  
 
During the early 2000s, two events occurred that were to shape the direction of 
surveillance decisively, although the potential connections between them were not made 
public until 2010. One was the attacks on the US on 11September 2001 (‘9/11’), the 
London bombings on 7 July 2005 (‘7/7’), and the Madrid train attack, the aftermath of 
which hugely boosted security-related surveillance at least in the global north. 
Interestingly, the activities of the quickly formed Department of Homeland Security took 
some cues from ‘Customer Relationship Management’ in their quest for ‘Total 
Information Awareness’ (Lyon, 2003: 92f). The other was the definitive appearance of 
social media, symbolised by the invention of Facebook in 2004, that quickly established 
itself as a mainstream dimension of the internet, simultaneously facilitating new levels of 
consumer surveillance (not to mention social surveillance, now based on self-expressed 
preferences and tastes (Marwick, 2012: 60; Trottier, 2012: 80). By President Obama’s 
inauguration in 2009 the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had developed a 
Social Networking Monitoring Centre to check for ‘items of interest’ (Lynch, 2010: 45). In 
a sense, then, the Snowden disclosures may be functioning as a wake-up call to publics 
still unaware that the day of mass surveillance of ordinary citizens had already dawned. 
If it was not already clear, after 9/11 the ‘national security’ rationale for intensified 
surveillance (Ball & Webster, 2003: 78) became prominent and with it the use of data 
analytics (now generally referred to as ‘Big Data’) (Lyon, 2015: 23).  
 
The Total Information Awareness programme was dependent on a very large-scale 
database using “new algorithms for mining, combining and refining data” that included 
bank machine use, credit card trails, internet cookies, medical files anything, indeed, that 
might produce interesting correlations that might indicate meaningful relationships 
between records. These, the Snowden files show, are among just the methods used by 
the NSA in its surveillance both domestic and foreign (Lyon, 2015: 24). 
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3.11  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The increasing reliance on surveillance measures and technology security policies is 
based on an insufficient and incomplete knowledge and consideration of the social and 
economic cost of surveillance. The researcher predicts an increasing demand for 
surveillance solutions (stand-alone and integrated) rapid growth for commercial, 
residential, private and public places. There seem to be a number of potential benefits 
associated with CCTV. For the police, the potential benefit of CCTV in reducing crime 
by deterring offenders from committing an illegal activity may be much lower on its list 
of priorities than the apprehension of suspects who were caught on camera committing 
a crime (Norris & McCahill, 2006:45). The use of a camera image to aid in the 
identification and apprehension of a suspect, as well as to help secure a conviction in 
criminal court, is a common justification that is used by the criminal justice system alike 
in many jurisdictions currently experimenting with increased use of video surveillance 
in public places. The growth of CCTV seems largely dissociated from its capacity to fight 
crime, while it remains hard to prove that it is in line with a global population surveillance 
project. The diffusion process of CCTV development rather result from the combination 
of several factors: political parties’ intention to announce safety concerns, headline 
grabbing by local authorities, central government wishing to strengthen public private 
partnerships at the local level (such as in Great Britain), growth of the security market, 
business interests, etc. CCTV can be analysed as a socio technical device, able to 
aggregate different types of protagonists carrying various specific interests. As an actor 
-network, CCTV turns out to be able to enlist protagonists by different mechanisms, 
beyond the circle of its initial supporters. Indeed, CCTV users can take the object on 
board and progressively acquire its multiple uses that then become justifications for its 
use, fuelling the buy- in process in a specific place. One stone remains unturned in this 
general overview of the international CCTV literature: is the diffusion of CCTV systems 
the expression of a new penology? This issue, raised in particular by Surveillance 
Studies, seems important, as contemporary cities, marked by a growing social 
heterogeneity, make up a background conducive to fear of strangers (Lyon,2011;45). 
However, only systematic comparison between observed CCTV uses and the 
adjudications made following case selection would allow the examination of two theses: 
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the extension of State surveillance capacities and the emergence of a new form of social 
control (shaped by local authorities) focused on the management of specific targets and 
behaviours. Such a comparison would gradually lead to totally new conclusions about a 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes and discusses the findings of the study that was conducted in 
selected areas of Johannesburg and Tshwane in Gauteng Province. The primary aim 
of the research was to evaluate the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime 
prevention and control from selected areas from Johannesburg and Tshwane. The aim 
was achieved by identifying what information to seek from participants/ respondents. 
The researcher tried to achieve this aim by utilising data elicited from  
a review of current literature, manual searches of CCTV evaluation study 
bibliographies. As the research study progressed, the researcher conducted manual  
searches of the references section of each study for potential inclusion.  
 
The central or primary research question in this study was: What is the contribution 
that CCTV surveillance systems can make towards crime prevention and control? As 
a consequence, the interview questions and questionnaire were structured with a 
number of linked questions to expand on the above focus. 
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with CCTV operators, and members of CPFs 
and residents in residential areas based on two sets of similar but slightly different 
interview question schedules and a survey questionnaire randomly applied to persons 
in streets. These two research instruments (schedules of interview questions and 
survey questionnaire) were first ‘pre-tested’ and then approved and certified by the 
supervisor before being implemented in the field. The questionnaire was revised in 
order to evaluate the respondents’ perceptions of its purposes and capabilities, and 
any public concern in respect of CCTV implementation.  
 
The interviews to CCTV operators focused on exploring several issues including the 
adequacy of training; how suspicious behaviours were identified; what monitoring 
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strategies were adopted; the quality of working relationships with external agencies; 
and the evidentiary value of CCTV surveillance systems. 
 
While questions posed to members of residential CPFs/residents in those areas 
concentrated more on the following aspects: 
 
• When were CCTV surveillance cameras installed in your 
neighbourhood/residential area (month/year date)? 
 
• If ‘public space’ (streets/entrance to neighbourhood) (as opposed to on 
private/business/commercial property) has been indicated above what was the 
motivation/reason provided for its (CCTV Camera Surveillance System) 
installation in such public areas? 
 
• If installed in ‘public space’ (streets/entrance to neighbourhood) who was 
responsible for deciding on its installation use of CCTV System as Evidence in 
Court. 
 
The above primary framework components for the two sets of interview questions 
assisted in finding the state of current evaluation and implementation and other factors 
related to formulation of a secure crime prevention framework CCTV surveillance 
systems.  
 
The researcher made both primary and secondary findings regarding the research 
questions. 
  
4.1.1 Interview and survey questionnaires 
Two sets of schedules of interview questions and one survey questionnaire were 
utilised in this research study, namely, 
 
i) Interview Schedule of Questions: Private Security Control Rooms: CCTV 
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Surveillance Operations (Annexure G); 
 
ii) Interview Schedule of Questions: CPFs & Residential Areas: CCTV 
Surveillance Operations (Annexure H); and  
 
iii) Street Survey Questionnaire (Annexure I).  
 
The Interview Schedule of Questions questionnaires were set out (with 
subsidiary/clarifying questions for each topic/theme) as follows: 
 
Section A: 
• biographical information; 
• highest educational/training qualification(s); 
• experience related to the research focus; and 
• occupational/work position/job description of interviewees. 
 
Section B:  
• area or location of the CCTV surveillance operation;  
• what operational processes are followed in the control room for CCTV 
surveillance operations;  
• what happens when a suspicious activity is picked up on CCTV cameras?  
 
Additional questions for selected CPF area members/residents interview 
questionnaire: 
 
• how is the CCTV installed in your area currently funded? 
• what do you think are the crime reduction/prevention values/benefits of the 
installed CCTV surveillance cameras in your area? 
 
107 
© Unisa 2019 
Accordingly, Section A set out to measure the socio-demographic variables of the 
participants which included gender, age category, level of education and work 
experience. 
 
Section B measured the level of CCTV surveillance camera awareness with reference 
to CCTV installation, ownership and decision makers regarding the recommendation 
of CCTV cameras as a security control measure. 
 
4.2  DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONS 
 
4.2.1 Schedule of Interview Questions: Private security control rooms:  
 CCTV surveillance operations (Annexure G) 
Sixty participants were interviewed for this schedule of interview questions. 
 
As a preliminary research procedure, the researcher sent out ten letters to different 
private security companies requesting permission to do the research at their company 
and interview selected members of staff, particularly in the control rooms. (see: 
Annexure D: Letter requesting permission to do research at their respective sites). This 
is in accordance with the principles of ethical consideration as discussed in Chapter 
Two of the study. Permission was received from six companies and names withheld 
for the sake of confidentiality. Computer laptop was used predominately during the 
observational period with minimal use of paper field notes (proving too cumbersome 
to complete within a limited working space). The primary audience for CCTV is a small 
number of relatively low-ranking workers within a security system (Smith, 2008: 12). They 
watch, with greater or lesser alertness, monitors which show flickering, grainy views, 
often of empty spaces. Entering data directly into an Excel spreadsheet was deemed 
an appropriate method for data collection in this particular setting. Benefits included 
the reduction in time spent transcribing handwritten field notes later and the ability to 
record data verbatim and accurately (i.e. speed of typing versus handwriting). The 
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manager and operators of the control room consented to the use of a laptop and 
expressed no reservation about the taking of notes during the observational period.  
 
Four types of data were recorded during the observational period and these categories 
are very much related to Norris and Armstrong’s (1999: 52) study of 592 hours of 
observation. The quantitative observational period included shift data – number of 
operators per shift, types of people entering the control room and length of monitoring; 
targeted incident data – how and why the surveillance was initiated and by whom; 
characteristic data – the age, sex and appearance of individuals from targeted 
incidents; and deployment data – whether deployment was necessitated and the 
outcome of deployment. 
 
This study has enabled the researcher to partially fill a gap in the literature, by giving 
a voice to those closest to CCTV; a first-person account from ‘those who know best’. 
This research focus led to the construction of several specific field questions. These 
were, namely:  
 
• What goes on inside a CCTV control room? (By this is meant the job structure, 
length of shifts, pay, forms of management and interaction between co-workers 
etc.} 
 
• How does the system work – i.e. who is targeted and why?  
 
• Are the cameras effectively and rigorously monitored at all times?  
 
• How are the operators trained and do their social backgrounds and personal 
prejudices influence who is monitored?  
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• Are CCTV cameras on the malls /residential areas, that is, to make the areas 
appear a safe place for the public to encourage potential customers/residents 
there?  
 
• What do the operators themselves think of the cameras?  
 
The principal research instrument for data collection was through systematic, 
investigative observation, where the ‘observer-as-participant’ technique was adopted 
(Gold, 1969: 36). This method is generally employed in short ethnographic studies, as 
it allows for relatively brief spells of formalised, overt observation, rather than 
prolonged periods of informal, covert observation or regular group participation 
(Clarke, 1997: 141).  
 
In addition, data through the general conversations held with the operatives was 
amassed. Indeed, many of these wide-ranging discussions were turned into an 
informal style of interviewing. For most of the day, the cameras are left on an 
‘automatic’ setting Despite the fact that they are not being manually controlled, each 
camera still records everything that comes across its path in a time-lapse format. 
 
Section A: Biographical and demographic information 
The important biographical and demographic information reflected in this study relates 
to gender, age, educational level and years of experience. A total of 60 respondents 
were revealed by the demographic data. 
 
Gender composition of CCTV operators 
 

























The gender demographics of the CCTV operators interviewed comprised 58 percent 
females (35) and 42 percent males (25). The preponderance of females in the sample 
may just be indicative that most CCTV monitor operatives in control rooms are in fact 
females, having proved to be more effective in monitoring operations having better 
concentration levels than their male counterparts (Donald, 2015: np).  
 
Age Analysis of CCTV operators 
 
Table 1.2: Age categories of CCTV operators 
 
Age category (X) Age (X) 
20-24 years old 11 26-29 6 
30-34  12 35-39 7 
40-44 9 45-49 7 
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The above age grouping helps to understand the age group associated with the use of 
CCTV operations. The largest proportion of respondents is in the age category of 30-
34 years (12) – an indication of years of experience. This is closely followed by those 
aged 20-24 years old (11) with lower numbers for the other age categories. This also 
implies that the industry requires energetic staff with experience. There are only a few 
aged above 50 years that represent a wide knowledge base about the theme being 
studied. Also, there are few below 20 years indicative of their lack of required 
experience.  
 
The next section will look at the demographic summary relating to highest educational 
level of respondents. 
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Highest educational qualification 
 
Table 1.3: Highest educational qualification (NQF levels) (n=60) 
 
Highest educational qualification (X) 
Standard 8/Grade 10 12 
Standard 9/Grade 11 10 
Standard 10/Grade 12 8 
Certificate Level NQF 3-4 9 
Certificate Level NQF 5 6 
1-year Diploma  7 
3-year Diploma 8 
 
[Note: The categories of: BA degree; BTech; Advanced Diploma; Hons/Postgraduate 
Diploma; Masters; and Doctoral – all had nil returns.] 
 
Fifty percent of the respondents’ highest qualification was in the combined high school 
categories, namely, Standards 8-9-10/Grades 10-11-12 (30). (Standard 8/Grade 10 = 
12; Standard 9/Grade 11 = 10; and Standard 10/Grade 12 = 8. Total = 30)). Next 
highest had a certificate (Higher Education Qualification Framework (HEQF) level 3-4) 
= 9; followed by a three-year diploma (8); a one-year diploma (7) and a certificate 
(NQF level 5) (6). The post-matric educational levels represented by these 
qualifications had a total of 30 making up the balance of 50 percent. None of the 
postgraduate categories had any representatives. Their respective roles and levels of 
responsibility (seniority) were governed by their educational qualification levels. It can 
also be concluded that the highest number per category having only a Standard 
8/Grade 10 level of schooling points to the need for on-the-job training by the employer 
companies.  
 
The following section indicates the total number of years of work experience in the 
private security industry of interviewees. 
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Years of work experience in the private security industry 
 
Table 1.4:  Years of experience working in the private security industry sector 
(n=60) 
 
Years of work experience in PSI (X) 
Less than 1 year 20 
1 year  12 
2 years  7 
3 years  13 
4 years  1 
5 years 3 
6-9 years 4 
 
[Note the categories of: ‘10 years’; ‘11-15 years’; and ‘more than 15 years’ – all had 
nil returns]. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the years of experience per CCTV controller who were interviewed. 
The largest number (20/33%) as displayed in the table had less than a year in the job. 
The next highest category was ‘three years of experience’ (13/22%); followed by one 
year of experience (12/20%); and lesser numbers for ‘two years of experience 
(7/11.7%). 
 
The following section refers to what position (job) and for how long that position been 
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Table 1.5:  Occupational position in the company 
 
Position  (X) 
Site Manager 3 
Supervisor 5 
Team leader 15 
Member of response team 13 
Control Room Operator 11 
CCTV Surveillance Operator 13 
 




Table 4.5 displays, the hierarchy of occupational position in the company where they 
currently worked of CCTV operator interviewed. The highest number reflects that of 
CCTV operators which means they are the majority dealing with the monitoring of 
CCTV surveillance. Figure 4.3 indicates that 22 percent of participants are in the CCTV 
surveillance operators’ category with the same number being members of a response 
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How many years of work experience in current position? 
 
Table 1.6:  Years of experience in current post 
 
Years of experience in current post (X) 
Less than 1 year 25 
1 year  7 
2 years  14 
3 years  3 
4 years  10 
5 years 1 
 
[Note: For the following categories there was a nil return: 6-9 years; 10 years; 11-15 
years; more than 15 years.] 
 
According to the table above, 42 percent of the participants had less than one year’s 
experience in their current job position.  
 
Section B: CCTV surveillance operations 
In this section of the interview questions set out to determine various aspects of CCTV 
surveillance operations. In addition, the interviews set out to obtain information on the 
following aspects: For each incident, the following information was recorded by the 
observer: date of incident, start and end time of incident, total surveillance time in 
minutes, camera or cameras used, camera operator, location, description of incident 
(i.e. assault, intoxicated in public), description of individual/s if applicable (i.e. male, 
approximate age), police deployment and whether arrest/s were made. Each incident 
was double checked against the control room’s logbook to ensure:  
 
i) time of surveillance was correct;  
ii) whether the incident resulted in an arrest; and  
iii) whether footage was requested by police, etc.  
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At all times, an operator was present in the control room with a second operator 
working during ‘busier periods’, such as Friday and Saturday nights, as well as events 
that attracted higher than usual crowd numbers in areas under surveillance. A CCTV 
system is not a physical barrier. It does not limit access to certain areas, make an 
object harder to steal or a person more difficult to assault and rob. This does not mean 
it is not an example of situational crime prevention. It is highly situational, and as will 
be shown, does have some crime prevention capacity in the right situations. Although 
CCTV has many functions, the primary preventative utility is to trigger a perceptual 
mechanism in a potential offender. It seeks to change offender perception so the 
offender believes if he commits a crime, he will be caught. In other words, CCTV aims 
to increase the perceived risk of capture, a factor which, assuming the offender is 
behaving in a rational (or limited rational) manner, will de-motivate the potential 
offender. For this crime prevention process to succeed, two elements must exist:  
 
(i) The offender must be aware of the cameras’ presence; and  
 
(ii) The offender must believe the cameras present enough risk of capture to 
negate the rewards of the intended crime. 
 
The researcher felt that the pre-interview informal discussions held with a potential 
interviewee were very beneficial, particularly from the perspective of ‘breaking the ice’ 
and helping the interviewees to relax (Creswell, 2013: 45). The recording of the 
interview, rather than taking notes, also allowed the researcher to pay more attention 
to the mannerisms and body movements of the interviewee and the researcher neither 
observed nor received any concerns from any interviewee about the interview being 
recorded (taken into consideration the element of concentration by the interviewer). A 
variety of themes were identified from the responses to the interview questions and in 
the informal discussions both before and after the interviews. These themes are 
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• significant consultation with a wide range of stakeholders takes place in 
advance of the installation of any system;  
• there was widespread community concerns about criminality and social 
disorder in their areas. 
 
To the question of where CCTV surveillance systems (cameras) were installed the 
following was indicated in the responses: 
 













The highest number of cameras installed are in residential areas as demonstrated 
above in the table. The reason for installation sites identification being for the 
researcher to understand precisely whether there is interaction between CCTV 
operators and the various installed surveillance systems sites. 
 
The above table and graph show that public streets and residential areas have the 
largest proportion of installations (18%), followed by CBDs (15%). This suggests that 
CCTVs are installed where the highest criminal presence or number of crime incidents 
occur.  
  
CCTV installed site (X) 
1. On public streets 11 
2. Residential neighbourhood 11 
3. Central Business District (CBD) 9 
4. Shopping centre/mall 7 
5. Gated neighbourhood 6 
6. (Private) Security estate 5 
7. Business premises 5 
8. Factory/industrial site 3 
9. Along highways 3 
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Description of CCTV camera installations at sites 
Below is a description of the specific site where the CCTV cameras have been installed 













All areas in which CCTVs are installed are indicated in Table 4.7, with (in order of 
priority) the top three sites for CCTV camera installations being: i) Inside malls along 
walkways/passages; ii) Underground parking/parkades; and iii) In open-air shopping 




Table 1.9:  Residential neighbourhoods 
 
 Residential neighbourhood (X) 
1. At entrance access roads 27 
2. Along residential streets 18 
3. At cross roads/corners of streets inside residential area 12 
On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties 3 
Shopping centre/mall (X) 
1. Inside mall along walkways/passages 19 
2. Underground parking/parkade 18 
3. In open-air shopping centre car park 13 
4. At entrances to shopping centre 7 
5. Inside shops 3 
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The above table indicates places where CCTVs are installed in residential areas with 
45 percent indicating “at entrance to access roads”; followed by 30 percent “along 
residential streets”. 
 
Central Business Districts (CBDs) 
 
Table 1.10:  Central Business Districts 
 
Central Business District (CBD) (X) 
1. On street corner mast 39 
2. Along pedestrian walkways 11 
3. Mounted on selected buildings 7 
4. Along pedestrian walkways 11 
5. Inside buildings 3 
 
Most cameras installed in CBDs are to be found mounted on street corner masts 
(streetlight poles) (65%). (The names of CBDs are withheld for security reasons). 
 
Table 1.11:  Gated neighbourhoods 
 
Gated neighbourhood (X) 
1. At boom gate access-controlled entrance 21 
2. At entrance access roads 12 
3. Along residential streets 14 
4. At cross roads/corners of streets inside security estate 7 
5. On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties 6 
 
As the table above points out, CCTV installations are mounted at boom gate entrances 
to gated neighbourhoods (35%); followed by along residential roads (23%) in the 
vicinity and at the entrance to access roads to the neighbourhood (20%). In car parks, 
there may be little resistance to the installation of CCTV cameras. In part, this is 
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because the public space is utilised for one rather inconsequential purpose – the 
parking of vehicles. It is also the case that a car park is a well-defined and clearly 
marked physical space, meaning that individuals know that it is a car park and can 
choose to park their vehicle there or not (providing there are other alternatives). These 
points stand in sharp contrast with how individuals come into contact with CCTV in 
other public settings. 
 
Private security estates 
 
Table 1.12: Private security estate  
 
Private security estate (X) 
At boom gate access-controlled entrance 25 
At entrance access roads 13 
Along security estate roads 11 
Along perimeter walls (at intervals) 6 
On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties 5 
 
 As the table above shows, the largest number of CCTV installations at private security 
estates are mounted at boom gate entrances (42%); followed by entrance access 
roads (22%); and along security estate streets/roads (18%). 
 
Table 1.13: Business premises 
 
Business premises (X) 
Over vehicle parking area 29 
At access-controlled entrance 13 
Along perimeter fencing/wall 7 
Mounted on business premises’ building  6 
Inside business premises 5 
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At business premises, most of the CCTV installations are found at the vehicle parking 




Table 1.14: Factory/industrial site 
 
Factory/industrial site (X) 
Over vehicle parking area 34 
At access-controlled entrance 14 
Along perimeter fencing/wall 6 
Mounted on factory building  3 
Inside factory building 3 
 
Similarly, to business premises, at factory/industrial sites, 57 percent indicated that 
the CCTV cameras are installed in the site’s parking areas followed by 23 percent at 
the access-controlled entrances. 
 
4.2.2  Operational processes followed in control rooms for CCTV surveillance 
In this section ten questions, reflecting differing opinions on the use of CCTV, were 
posed to the participants for the purpose of ascertaining their general views on the 
subject. Each participant was asked to indicate their level of understanding and 
awareness with each statement, by providing answers about their views on CCTV, 
which display some of the general attitudes towards this measure. Here the researcher 
focussed on their knowledge of the technology and the meanings that they ascribed to 
it. The researcher consequently looked at selected aspects of the interviews, namely: at 
how the informants link CCTV to crime. In this regard the researcher discussed their 
perception of CCTV as a measure against crime and their assessments regarding the 
assumed aims of public CCTV surveillance.  
 
122 
© Unisa 2019 
As David Lyon (1994) has pointed out, the sociological response to the general issue of 
surveillance has been dominated by images of the Panopticon (Lyon, 1994: 61). These 
interviews focused on exploring several issues including the adequacy of training; how 
suspicious behaviours were identified; and what monitoring strategies were adopted; 
the quality of working relationships with external agencies, and the evidentiary value 
of CCTV. 
 
An issue raised by Norris & Armstrong (1999: 28) in relation to the disciplinary potential 
of public CCTV systems concerns the problem of classification. As Poster (1990: 34) 
pointed out, the disciplinary power of the panopticon is only complete when one-way total 
surveillance is combined with a detailed “dossier that reflects the history of his deviation 
from the norm” (1990: 91). As Norris and Armstrong point out, the street population 
monitored by open street CCTV surveillance systems are unknown to the observer, 
which means that those watching the screens are unable to systematically identify and 
classify people in public space. 
 
To the question: What operational processes are followed in the control room for CCTV 
surveillance? – interviewees provided various descriptions of what operational 
processes are followed by control room operatives when operating CCTV surveillance 
systems. For instance, below are various descriptions of what operational processes 
are followed by control room operatives when operating CCTV surveillance systems: 
 
A control room is manned 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. For most of the day, the 
cameras are left on an ‘automatic’ setting. This means that they follow a pre-
programmed, computerised time-pattern schedule by rotating round full circle 
approximately every 2 to 3 minutes. Even though they are not being manually 
controlled, each camera still records everything that comes across its path in a time-
lapse format. Each day this footage is stored on a special videotape, allowing anyone 
with a legitimate complaint the chance to review a tape from the day of a particular 
incident (Interviewee AD, 2018). However, this can be a lengthy process: “It usually 
takes us about 3 to 5 hours to do, and it has to be done on the central monitor... which 
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means the operator [while this process is going on] can only monitor the little, split 
screens to watch the campus” (Interviewee, A6, 2018). 
  
Perhaps more importantly, and echoing findings by McCahill and Norris (2002 :171), 
when tapes are being reviewed, none of the cameras actually record. The process of 
requesting CCTV footage follows a strict chain of evidence and can only be accessed 
by relevant authorities, usually the police. The tapes are kept, by law, for a maximum 
of 31 days after which time they must be wiped clean. This process is a computerised, 
automatic setting which enables the operator to monitor a single camera (the image 
from which appears in real-time enlarged on the central screen), and to systematically 
‘ignore’ footage from the other cameras showing on the monitors in the control room. 
However, this ‘prioritising’ process does have its drawbacks as one operator pointed 
out. 
 
“While monitoring CCTV cameras is one of the primary roles for staff in the 
security control room, they also spend a significant amount of time retrieving 
footage when it is requested by internal and external parties, including SAPS” 
(Interviewee H2, 2018). 
 
These responses to the above question complement what was found by Norris and 
Armstrong (1999: 45) that the level of operator integration within other agencies of control 
– such as the police – private security officers patrolling on the ground are a crucial 
determinant factor behind quick and successful deployment. Furthermore, the research 
took as its starting point the general view put forward by McCahill and Norris, (2002: 40) 
that the relationship between surveillance and society is that of exchange.  
 
Another example of the social processes underpinning CCTV operations can be seen in 
McCahill and Norris’s (2002: 67) research, which revealed how management’s use of 
cameras to monitor and control employees was undermined and resisted by security 
staff and lower level workers due to their shared class identity. CCTV operators 
demonstrated how fire prevention, property management, co-ordinating the activities of 
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the workers and car park administration, as opposed to explicit social control, sit higher 
on day-to-day managerial operational agendas. According to McCahill & Norris, (2002 
:44), CCTV systems have diverse operating procedures, staffing policies and levels of 
technological sophistication. McCahill and Norris (2002: 67) further describe, for 
example, how handling alarms, parking barriers and door entry systems, along with 
health and safety concerns, form the basis of an operator’s day rather than monitoring 
and targeting certain social groups with the cameras. Indeed, McCahill and Norris’s 
(2002) state that the usage of CCTV in this way was “rare” (McCahill & Norris, 2002: 67). 
CCTV operators are also intensely exposed to the emotional control of the actual camera 
images they watch, frequently being overcome by resultant negative feelings of 
boredom, frustration, stress, guilt, sadness and anxiety (Smith, 2008:12). 
 
Nearly all of informants assumed that CCTV has been applied mainly for crime reduction. 
CCTV operators discussed the process of contacting police when an incident appeared 
to warrant police attention or deployment. Operators expressed the relativity of time 
when police respond to incidents, especially knowing they may be attending to other 
incidents, short of staff, or an officer is unable to answer the telephone/view the monitor 
due to a more pressing (crime) situation. In addition, operators knew to also prioritise 
incidents in relation to the workload of police, yet would store footage for future use if 
requested or necessitated.  
 
4.2.3 Response to suspicious activities observed 
To the question: What happens when suspicious activity is picked up on the CCTV 
cameras? – descriptions of what happens when suspicious activity is picked up on the 
CCTV cameras and observed in the control rooms were provided, namely: 
 
“CCTV surveillance systems direct security personnel to situations which may 
lead off their translation into crime. CCTV monitors are monitored by CCTV 
operators who reports instantly suspicious criminal activity in the areas 
covered video surveillance. CCTV deters potential offenders who perceive an 
elevated risk of apprehension. CCTV may be perceived as reducing the time 
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available to commit crime, preventing those crimes requiring extended time 
and effort” (Interviewee, A4, 2018). 
 
“Reaction/patrol officers are summoned to attend to the scene. This reaction 
activity is done with the collaborative effect with the control room. If the 
suspicious activity constitutes crime, more resources are mobilised, e.g. the 
SAPS and supervisor on duty on the specific day” (Interviewee A5, 2018). 
 
In this regard, in these conditions, policing becomes increasingly proactive rather than 
reactive. In his survey of town centre managers Reeve (1996: 75) found that a third of 
respondents had “new powers to ensure that inappropriate activities and uses do not 
occur”. 
 
“The camera network is actively monitored from a security control room, which 
enables the deployment of SAPS and response security personnel when 
incidents are detected” (Interviewee A6, 2018).  
 
Furthermore, the kind of activity/incident on which a response team is sent out is 
described below:  
 
“Response team is summoned to investigate the matter; they do this in 
collaboration with CCTV Controller. The most common signals we receive are 
burglary, panic, electric fence activation and power failures. We also monitor 
various other equipment such as CCTV and various guard monitoring systems. 
Our vehicles are all equipped with live satellite tracking which helps us with 
control and logistics. They are also dedicated to their areas allowing for 
quicker response times” (Interviewee A6, 2018). 
 
To the question of whether their company co-operates with the SAPS in responding to 
observed crime incidents, all respondents answered in the affirmative (100%). In 
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describing the manner in which they co-operate with the police, one interviewee 
described in detail how this is done: 
 
“Intelligence sharing [is] very common between the SAPS and private security 
staff. One of the functions of CCTV surveillance systems is [as] an instrument 
used as ex-post investigative tool used by police [video footage as evidence 
in court]. There was also evidence of the police supporting offender information 
to mobilise the security staff in the active monitoring of the offenders” 
(Interviewee, A7, 2018). 
 
Another participant mentioned that: 
 
“In our office board we have contact numbers for the SAPS and other 
emergency departments. For instance, for police we call 10111 and for the 
Fire brigade we contact 998/999 and for Life Line11 we contact 086 132 2322” 
(Interviewee A7, 2018). 
 
Now that some CCTV systems have audio links, the operators can actually ‘speak’ in 
real time to the watched. In the absence of such, a patrol officer is summoned to the 
scene of the suspicious (or crime) activity being observed.  
At its best, CCTV was said to be a cost-effective tool which could help speed up 
investigations and encourage offenders to plead guilty, saving police and court time. 
This is similar to findings by Levesley and Martin (2005) regarding police attitudes to 
CCTV usage. CCTV was also seen as an aid in locating a wide range of incidents that 
might require police intervention. This related not only to criminal conduct but also to 
public safety issues. CCTV surveillance cameras have been used to locate lost 
children, missing persons and to initiate ambulance responses for people that had 
collapsed (fallen down) in public places. In addition to assisting in the deployment of 
officers to incident scenes, CCTV is also valued by CCTV operators for assisting in 
 
11  AN NGO providing counselling, particularly for people who phone in and reveal indicate suicidal 
tendencies. 
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the tracking and location of offenders, and for providing an independent witness once 
an offender is located. The major perceived advantage of footage is that it encourages 
suspects to plead guilty, thereby reducing the administrative workload of police and 
saving time spent in prosecuting offences.  
 
In this regard, Bowcott, (2008:np) reported that “only 3% of street robberies in London 
were solved using CCTV images” (Bowcott, 2008: np), although other studies report 
that the three percent statistic in fact applied to all crime (Edwards (2009:np), 
commenting on the same report, stated that: “up to 80 per cent of CCTV footage seized 
by police is of such poor quality that it is almost worthless for detecting crimes” 
(Edwards, 2009: np).  
 
One of the major purposes of CCTV surveillance systems is to provide appropriate 
evidence to arrest and convict offenders. Police in all locations visited spoke highly of 
the value of video evidence and viewed this as one of the most tangible benefits CCTV 
offered to policing. Communications between police and control room operators are 
vital to any actively monitored system. The common practice is for there to be some 
form of direct telephone link between control room operators and local police stations 
or police officers out on patrol, allowing operators to inform police of incidents and vice 
versa. In addition, operators commonly have a two-way radio tuned into the police 
frequency in the control room, to enable them to focus on relevant incidents and 
provide video evidence that may later be required in prosecutions. In most locations 
where there is active monitoring, operators maintain telephone communications with 
Police Communications Centres or the police station during an incident. The 
advantage of a monitor located in police facilities is that police personnel can then 
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Accordingly, CCTV is perceived to assist policing in a number of ways. These are:  
 
• co-ordinating police responses to incidents;  
 
• improving detection and clear up rates; and  
 
• providing evidence for prosecution  
 
To the question on how CCTV surveillance fits into overall crime prevention initiatives, 
most participants indicated that:  
 
“Footage from CCTV surveillance system can be presented to court by the 
SAPS testifying in [a] court of law to seek conviction and suspects may also 
present in court seeking [a] verdict [in their favour], [In other words] it works in 
the other way” (Interviewee A8, 2018). 
 
To the question of what value they thought CCTV surveillance operations can provide 
to crime prevention initiatives in local areas, most participants indicated the following:  
 
“In places where CCTV is installed, research shows there is a crime reduction” 
(Interviewee A9, 2018). 
 
The literature study in Chapter 3 revealed the importance of CCTV in crime prevention. 
In addition, the effect of CCTV on the public, including: evidence of effects of CCTV 
systems on feelings of safety in public; evidence of the effects of CCTV on alleviating 
fear of victimisation is also given. 
 
When asked how CCTV surveillance systems can best assist in solving crime, again 
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“One suburb saw a 90% drop in crime since the addition of the cameras. This 
fall in crime is attributed to camera installation and its impact either as a 
deterrent” (Interviewee R, 2018). 
 
To the question of whether any CCTV footage from the CCTV surveillance operations 
in the control room where they were working resulted in the solving of a crime (i.e. led 
to the arrest of a perpetrator and/or a successful prosecution of the suspect), all 
respondents answered this question in the affirmative (100%) and indicated that at 
least one of their cases in the previous three years had been used as evidence in court 
leading to a conviction. A major example of such successful use being the Bozwana 
murder case:  
 
“The High Court in Pretoria has admitted CCTV video footage as evidence, 
showing slain North West businessman, Wandile Bozwana, before [and as] he 
was assassinated” (Interviewee Q, 2018).12 
 
Overall, CCTV operators were of the opinion that CCTV surveillance systems add 
great value to crime prevention and positively add to overall reduction in crimes in the 
areas surveilled.  
 
Two final questions regarding how the utilisation of CCTV surveillance can be 
improved for more effective crime prevention, the general consensus was:  
 
“The use of human beings as CCTV monitors must be discouraged, fatigue 
affects concentrating, rather opt for automation” [i.e. addition of analytics 
software] (Interviewee 2, 2018). 
 
 
12 In the Pretoria High Court, a senior police forensic analyst detailed the techniques used in analysing 
close-circuit television (CCTV) footage to map out the movements of four men accused of the murder 
of North West businessman, Wandile Bozwana and his business partner and lover, Mpho Baloyi. 
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In this regard, available literature on CCTV monitoring operations points to the fact 
that the use of humans in the process of operating CCTV is not the best recommended 
procedure due to fatigue during the long hours of work (Norris & Farrington, 1999: 12). 
This factor might lead to the risk of offenders/perpetrators of crimes going unnoticed.  
 
Even though it is regarded as very effective since: 
 
“CCTV surveillance offers multiple eyes [cameras] at the same time unlike a 
security guard stationed at a specific point [and] instructed not to desert a post” 
[i.e. being static] (Interviewee SI, 2018). 
 
To the question: Has any CCTV footage from CCTV surveillance operations in this 
Control Room been used to solve (leading to arrest of perpetrator/successful 
prosecution) a crime? And follow up questions requesting more information on the 
response to the primary question in this section, namely: i) if yes, provide some 
examples/cases of such?; ii) how often (number) in the last (indicate selected time 
period with an ‘X’) has that occurred (indicate number of cases); iii) list (in order of 
priority by number of incidents) for what crimes (no more than ten crimes to be listed)? 
iv) in the listed cases above were any of the perpetrators arrested? To these questions 
the following data was provided:  
 
Table 1.15:  Number of cases used within time period 
 
 
[*Note: the category in the questionnaire: ‘five years’ had a nil return.] 
Period of time* “X”  (Estimated) Number of cases 
Previous six months 6 4 
12 months 4 2 
Two years 1 2 
Three years 3 1 
Four years 1 0 
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As shown in Table 4.15, CCTV evaluations on crime statistics showed mixed results 
in their effectiveness in reporting crime. For the previous six (6) months ,4 cases were 
reported as narrated by participants. However, participants argued that an increase in 
police recording consequent on CCTV installation was desirable since it was evidence 
that CCTV surveillance is important for crime prevention and control. Table 4.15 
displays the frequencies of cases reported within a certain time period under CCTV 
surveillance system observations. As indicated in the table, for the previous six 
months, four cases were reported followed by two cases for the preceding 12 months 
and two years’ periods respectively. 
 
Only three types of cases (crimes committed) that were used were listed as follows (in 
order of priority by number): 
 
Table 1.16:  Crimes in order of priority of cases used 
 
1. Murder 
2. Vehicle hijacking  
3. Theft 
 
In all the cases listed, the participants indicated suspects were arrested. The CCTV 
footage provided as evidence led to both successful arrests of perpetrator(s) of the 
crime(s) and successful conviction(s) assisted by the video evidence provided by 
CCTV systems. Most of the convictions occurred within six months of the arrest(s) and 
were most successful in murder cases. As one participant put it (in a murder case): 
 
“In the case of Zwelethu Mthethwa, he was convicted last year for murder 
evidence of his action retrieved from CCTV footage, the judge described it a 
‘Silent Witness’” (Interviewee A12, 2018). 
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The key finding from this part of the study was what was termed the ‘boredom factor’. 
The aim of the daily routine is to prevent trouble and to resolve disturbances, wherever 
they occur. The boredom factor arises principally from the monotonous viewing of 
hours of routinised, uneventful televisual images. The general concord surrounding 
the CCTV cameras, was that they were a useful tool in the fight against crime: “They 
[the cameras] certainly make life a little bit easier... I mean it’s much easier to follow 
someone with the cameras then it is to follow them on foot, because most of the time 
they don’t even know that they’re being followed” (Interviewee A7, 2018). Findings call 
into question the effectiveness of the control room detecting incidents with operators 
spending less than one-fifth of their time actively searching for and monitoring 
incidents and most incidents (55%) being initiated by police communication.  
 
In conclusion, the objectives to employ and use video-surveillance are shaped 
different expectations and practices of the actors involved. The researcher observed 
that the control room is connected to its environment by several links – communication 
and information devices. The researcher noted the following:  
 
• radio or telephone link to the security patrol in the mall and to facility staff in the 
centre (technical and cleaning service); 
 
• cell phone ‘always carried’: all shops have an emergency number to inform 
security in case something happens; 
 
• emergency linkage to parking ticket dispenser and car park entry/exit; 
 
• elevator emergency alarm fire alarm systems, connected to the fire station entry 
alarm systems; and 
 
• direct telephone lines or radio linkages to maintenance service, activated in 
case of an alarm. 
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These multiple linkages make it clear that many sources of information impact the 
work of the observer in the control room which really is the 'nerve centre’ of the 
shopping mall. It is the place where incoming information needs to be handled and 
managed and where, if necessary, decisions are made immediately. The CCTV-
system represents one information source besides others. A contracted security 
company runs both systems observed. The staff are divided into specialised operators 
and guards. Two modes of internal work organisation are applied:  
 
• a strict division between video operator and guard; and 
 
• a more flexible mode where everyone on staff performs video work and 
patrolling according to internal arrangements and changing demands. 
  
4.2.4 Schedule of Interview Questions: CPFs and residential areas: CCTV 
surveillance operations (Annexure H) 
In the study by Ditton (2000: 692-695), respondents were presented with several 
CCTV-related statements such as: ‘CCTV might stop the innocent from being wrongly 
accused’; and ‘CCTV won’t reduce crime; it will drive it elsewhere’. Overall, 
respondents showed mixed responses towards these. Few studies have measured 
respondents’ actual knowledge of how CCTV works, and the link between people’s 
level of knowledge and support for CCTV. One study observed that, “public 
acceptance is based on limited, and partly inaccurate knowledge of the functions and 
the capabilities of CCTV systems in public places” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999: 56).  
 
This interview questionnaire was aimed at determining the knowledge and 
attitudes/opinions of residents with regard to CCTV surveillance camera operations in 
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Table 1.17: Gender composition of CPFs and individuals in residential areas 
(n=40) 
 
Gender (X)  (X) 
Male 16 Female 24 
  




Figure 4.4 and Table 4.14 depict the gender composition of participants interviewed in 
residential areas with CPFs having CCTV surveillance systems in their areas. A total 
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Age of participants 
 
Table 1.18: Age categories of respondents 
 
Age (X) Age (X) Age (X) 
20-24 years 8 26-29 5 30-34 12 
35-39 7 40-44 4 45-49 2 
50-54 2 55-59    
 
 
Figure 1.5: Age categories of CPF members and individuals in residential  




The bar graph above displays the frequencies of age distribution of CPFs members and 
individual respondents. The age group that participated was mostly in the category: 
30-34 years old (30%); followed by the category: 20-24 years old (20%). 
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Highest educational qualification of participant 
 
Table 1.19: Highest educational qualification 
 
Highest educational qualification (X) 
Standard 10/Grade 12  11 
Certificate Level NQF 3-4 8 
Certificate Level NQF 5  12 
1-year Diploma   2 
BA degree  1 
BTech   1 
 
The largest proportion of the participants, as indicated in the above table, had 
certificate (NQF level 12) followed by Grade 12 respectively. 
 
Section B: CCTV surveillance operations (in CPF/residential areas) 
To the question of where CCTV surveillance cameras were installed in their 
neighbourhood/residential area, the following sites were indicated:  
 
Table 1.20: Where CCTV installed in neighbourhood/residential areas 
 
CCTV installed site n=40 
Shopping centre/mall 7 
Central Business District (CBD) 9 
Business premises 5 
Factory/industrial site 3 
Residential neighbourhood entrance 2 
Gated neighbourhood 4 
(Private) Security estate 1 
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On private residential property 1 
On public streets 5 
Along highways 3 
 
The above table and graph show that public streets and residential areas have the 
largest proportion of installations (18%), followed by CBDs (15%). 
 




Table 4.17 and Figure 4.7 display the findings of the statistical analysis of areas with 
CCTV installations in CPF/residents interviewee areas with the highest being in local 
CBDs, (22.5%); followed by shopping centres/malls (17.5%). This suggests that such 
places are saturated by cameras. This is slightly different as indicated in the interviews 
with CCTV operators, which data indicated that: public streets and residential areas 
had the largest proportion of installations (18%); followed by CBDs (15%) (see Table 
4.6 above). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.    Shopping centre/mall
2.    Central Business District (CBD)
3.    Business premises
4.    Factory/industrial site
5.    Residential neighbourhood entrance
6.    Gated neighbourhood
7.    (Private) Security estate
8.    On private residential property
9.    On public streets
Along highways
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The information from Table 4.17 and Figure 4.7, was further expanded with site specific 




Table 1.21:  Shopping centre/mall 
 
 




0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20






3.    In open-air
shopping
centre car park
4.    At
entrances to
shopping…
5.    Inside
shops
Shopping centre/mall  (X) 
Inside mall along walkways/passages 19 
Underground parking/parkade 18 
In open-air shopping centre car park 13 
At entrances to shopping centre 7 
Inside shops 3 
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All areas in which CCTVs are installed, as indicated in Table 4.18 and Figure 4.7, with 
(in order of priority) the top three sites for CCTV camera installations being: i) inside 
malls along walkways/passages; ii) underground parking/parkades; and iii) in open-air 
shopping centre car parks.  
Residential neighbourhoods 
 
Table 1.22:  Residential neighbourhoods 
 
 




1.   At entrance access roads
2.   Along residential streets
3.   At cross roads/corners of
streets inside residential area
4. On masts on private property 
of selected residents’ properties
Residential neighbourhood  (X) 
4. At entrance access roads 27 
5. Along residential streets 18 
6. At crossroads/corners of streets inside residential area 12 
7. On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties 3 
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The above diagram indicates places where CCTVs are installed in residential areas 
with 45 percent indicating “at entrance to access roads”; followed by 30 percent “along 
residential streets. It suggests that CCTV cameras are mounted at entrances to 
monitor all people entering respective places, for sake of footage. 
 
Central Business Districts (CBDs) 
 
Table 1.23:  Central business districts 
 
Central Business District (CBD)  (X) 
On street corner mast 39 
Along pedestrian walkways 11 
Mounted on selected buildings 7 
Along pedestrian walkways 11 
Inside buildings 3 
 
With respect to the central business districts research question, results also showed 
many cameras mounted on street corners than any other places as shown in Table 
4.20 and effects of open-street CCTV, depending on location characteristics, on 
specific crime types. In particular, CCTV had significant reduction effects on assault, 
robbery, and burglary in residential areas, but it did not have significant reduction 
effects on auto theft and theft from auto in any location type. Location base rates of 
crime, however, were critical to the effectiveness of CCTV for assault, robbery, 
burglary, and theft from auto. For each of these crime types, CCTV effects were 




© Unisa 2019 
Gated neighbourhoods 
 
Table 1.24:  Gated neighbourhoods 
 
Gated neighbourhood  (X) 
At boom gate access-controlled entrance 21 
At entrance access roads 12 
Along residential streets 14 
At crossroads/corners of streets inside security estate 7 
On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties 6 
 




As the diagram above points out, CCTV installations are mounted at boom gate 
entrances to gated neighbourhoods (35%); followed by along residential roads (23%) 
in the vicinity; and at the entrance to access roads to the neighbourhood (20%). 
Offenders use these entrances when entering a neighbourhood when committing 
crime and therefore it is necessary that at gated neighbourhoods and boomgates, 
cameras should be mounted. 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
1.    At boom gate access-controlled entrance
2.    At entrance access roads
3.    Along residential streets
4.    At cross roads/corners of streets inside security estate
5. On masts on private property of selected residents’ …
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Private security estate 
 
Table 1.25:  Private security estate  
 
Private security estate  (X) 
At boom gate access-controlled entrance 25 
At entrance access roads 13 
Along security estate roads 11 
Along perimeter walls (at intervals) 6 
On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties 5 
 
Table 4.22 above and Figure 4.10 below illustrate the differences between various 
categories of CCTV installation at various places as indicated in the tables.  
 





1.                            At boomgate access-
controlled entrance
2.                            At entrance access
roads
3.                            Along security estate
roads
4.                            Along perimeter walls
(at intervals)
5. On masts on private 
property of selected residents’ 
properties
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As the diagram above shows, the largest number of CCTV installations at private 
security estates are mounted at boom gate entrances (42%); followed by entrance 




Table 1.26:  Business premises 
 
Business premises  (X) 
Over vehicle parking area 29 
At access-controlled entrance 13 
Along perimeter fencing/wall 7 
Mounted on business premises’ building  6 
Inside business premises 5 
 




At business premises, most of the CCTV installations are found at the vehicle parking 
areas (48%); followed by 22 percent at the access-controlled entrances. The reason 
for installation at business premises is that, these areas are targeted by criminals and 
CCTV surveillance system is used as situation crime prevention strategy. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
1.            Over vehicle parking area
2.            At access-controlled entrance
3.            Along perimeter fencing/wall
4. Mounted on business premises’ building 
5.            Inside business premises
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Factory/industrial site 
 
Table 1.27:  Factory/industrial site 
 
Factory/industrial site  (X) 
Over vehicle parking area 34 
At access-controlled entrance 14 
Along perimeter fencing/wall 6 
Mounted on factory building  3 
Inside factory building 3 
 




The bar graph above displays the percentages of CCTV installed at specific at a point 
in time. The reflection above shows the highest of CCTV is found at parking areas, 
followed by access control areas. This reflects that, these areas are prioritised 
because of the criminal activities at the spots. Similarly, to business premises, at 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Perimeter         10
Access Ctrl            25
Parking Area          55
Factory Building   8
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factory/industrial sites, 15 percent indicated that the CCTV cameras are installed in 
the site’s parking areas followed by 23 percent at the access-controlled entrances. 
 
Analysis 
To the question: If “public space” (streets/entrance to neighbourhood) (as opposed to 
private/business/commercial property) has been indicated above what was the 
motivation/reason provided for its (CCTV Camera Surveillance System) installation in 
such public areas? 
 
A selection of responses to this question are presented below: 
 
“For crime prevention and control” (Interviewee D10, 2018).  
 
“I conceptualise open-street CCTV as a regulatory project which is generated 
as an emotive response to socially constructed ‘deviant populations’ in the 
city” (Interviewee D11, 2018). 
 
“The perception of cities as breeding grounds for deviance often deters 
investment, and the implementation of CCTV is used as revitalising tool to 
attract back investors into cities” (Interviewee D12, 2018). 
 
“The motivation behind implementing the open-street CCTV schema is to deter 
vandalism occurring in the downtown core and apprehend offenders culpable 
of mischievous actions” (Interviewee D13, 2018). 
 
“Cameras record live feeds continuously, and are often viewed by local police 
in order to apprehend or charge offenders” (Interviewee D14, 2018) 
 
“Anti-crime police services have no comprehensive plan for dealing with 
[crime] displacement, and no public consultations were held before the issue 
went to city council to be ratified” (Interviewee D15, 2018). 
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The example of “anti-crime” or crime-prevention initiatives suggests that it is not simply 
metropolitan areas with large, visible, underclass populations who are turning to CCTV 
as a “silver bullet” to police perceptions of disorder, but that camera surveillance, as a 
form of governance, is diffusing into smaller, rural communities (Norris & Armstrong, 
1999: 12):  
 
“The scope of open-street CCTV in cities is growing, and there is little 
indication that this trend will reverse” (Interviewee D16, 2018). 
 
“The objective of the CCTV project was to deter crime, vandalism, and 
rowdyism on Jeppe Street in downtown” (Interviewee D17, 2018). 
 
“The initiative had the unanimous support of local companies which indicates 
that CCTV in Johannesburg and Pretoria was generated from both the level of 
police and the level of business” (Interviewee D18, 2018). 
 
The above resonates and corroborates the theory behind using CCTV in crime fighting 
by police and private citizens as summarised by Armitage (2002: 34). 
 
Although rarely addressed in the research literature, there is also the distinct 
possibility that if offenders are aware and cautious in the presence of cameras, they 
may be unaware of the extent of the cameras’ capabilities. As a result, they may curtail 
their criminal activity in a wider area than that covered by the camera system. In effect, 
this extends the value of the cameras beyond their area of operation; process 
criminologists call a diffusion of benefits. 
 
Cameras can also be used to gather intelligence and to monitor the behaviour of 
known offenders in public places (such as shoplifters in public retail areas). Camera 
operators often come to know the faces of local offenders, and the cameras become 
a way to monitor their movements in a less intrusive manner than deploying 
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plainclothes police officers. For example, officers in one city were able to gather 
intelligence on the behaviour of individuals selling stolen goods. This intelligence was 
gathered remotely by CCTV cameras and enabled police to interdict in an organized 
and coordinated manner. Although intelligence gathering is a potential benefit of 
CCTV, the use of intelligence gathered from CCTV to control public order through 
surveillance is perceived by some to be a threat to civil liberties. CCTV can be used 
for general location management. The cameras can be used to look for lost children, 
to monitor traffic flow, public meetings, or demonstrations that may require additional 
police resources, or to determine if alarms have been activated unnecessarily thus 
removing the need for a police response. Brown (1995: 35) reports that some police 
commanders claim that assaults on police have reduced because the cameras allow 
them to determine the appropriate level of response to an incident, either by sending 
more officers to large fights, or by limiting the number of officers to a minor incident 
and avoid inflaming the situation. Camera footage can also help identify potential 
witnesses who might not otherwise come forward to police. CCTV camera evidence 
can be compelling, though issues of image quality are a factor if CCTV images are 
used for identification purposes. If the cameras record an incident, and police respond 
rapidly and make an arrest within view of the camera (and the offender does not leave 
the sight of the camera), the recording of the incident can help investigators gain a 
conviction, usually through a guilty plea. The potential to assist in police investigations 
may also drive offenders away from committing offences that take time, as they run a 
greater risk of capture. 
 
In this section, a number of themes were revealed which are discussed below. 
However, the two major themes that emerged were the issues of support for CCTV 
installation in their area, and privacy. 
 
The general argument is that the area will benefit from a positive economic impact 
when people feel safer. The findings are mixed but generally show there is some 
reduced level of fear of crime among people in CCTV areas, but only among people 
who were aware they were in an area under surveillance. 
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4.2.5 Support for CCTV 
One of the principal aims of the study was to measure the level of support for the 
installation of CCTV cameras in residential areas amongst those individuals with no 
prior knowledge and experience of CCTV in their area. 
 
The extent to which CCTV is perceived to be an invasion of privacy may influence the 
degree to which residents support such systems. Around 17 percent of all respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that the introduction of CCTV would be an invasion 
of people’s privacy and this proportion varied between 12 percent and 23 percent 
across the nine target areas (see Interviewees A1, A2 & A3, 2018). 
 
4.2.6 Issue of privacy 
To the question: Do you have any concerns about issues of ‘invasion of privacy’ with 
the installation of CCTV cameras in your neighbourhood? – the following: 
 
As in the case of support for CCTV, given that a low number of people that expressed 
the view that CCTV invades privacy, similar arguments apply to the comparison of 
these groups with other variables. Many participants understood there was an interest 
for extra security and surveillance systems crime prevention and control. However, 
find difficulties to continue sacrifying their privacy, human rights, and civil liberties. 
 
Around 17 per cent of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the 
introduction of CCTV would be an invasion of people’s privacy, and this proportion 
varied between 12 per cent and 23 per cent across the nine target areas. 
 
4.2.7 Analysis of the different survey samples 
Analysis of the different survey samples showed an acceptable degree of similarity 
between the residential surveys on most socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics (CPFs communities). This similarity meant that the results from these 
could be meaningfully reported as a whole and levels of variation of the particular 
variable under consideration would be reported when necessary. 
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There are several possible explanations for the similarity, given that residential areas 
are not ‘public space’ in the same way as city centres. The areas in which the systems 
are installed tend to be highly localised. In most areas respondents have been 
consulted or informed about the proposed CCTV system prior to its installation. As 
was mentioned above, bids had to show evidence of this consultation process and to 
demonstrate support among residents. Of those supporting CCTV, 11 per cent felt that 
it was an invasion of privacy. 
 
As in the case of support for CCTV, given that a low number of people expressed the 
view that CCTV invades privacy, similar arguments apply to the comparison of these 
groups with other variables. Both are discussed in more detail in later sections.  
 
When was and where is CCTV surveillance systems installed in your area? 
To the question of when the CCTV surveillance cameras were installed in the 
neighbourhood/residential area by month and/or year, most were unsure of exact 
dates and could not place a month or year date however very familiar with the 
presence of CCTV installation in their locality, As one participant put it: From the first 
question, which is asking the existence of CCTV cameras in various places, all the 
respondents noticed the presence of this system and they clearly indicates the places. It 
shows the CCTV system is not a new thing in Johannesburg/Tshwane. Then, 70 percent 
of respondents agreed the purposes of these cameras are for monitoring and security 
reasons, such as the following actions: 
 
4.3  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In this section, a number of themes were revealed which are discussed below. 
However, the two major themes that emerged were the issues of support for CCTV 
installation in their area, and privacy. 
 
The general argument is that the area will benefit from a positive economic impact 
when people feel safer. The findings are mixed but generally show there is some 
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reduced level of fear of crime among people in CCTV areas, but only among people 
who were aware they were in an area under surveillance. One of the principal aims of 
the study was to measure the level of support for the installation of CCTV cameras in 
residential areas amongst those individuals with no prior knowledge and experience 
of CCTV in their area. The extent to which CCTV is perceived to be an invasion of 
privacy may influence the degree to which residents support such systems. Around 17 
percent of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the introduction of 
CCTV would be an invasion of people’s privacy and this proportion varied between 12 
percent and 23 percent across the nine target areas (see Interviewees A1, A2 & A3, 
2018). 
 
The question: Do you have any concerns about issues of ‘invasion of privacy’ with the 
installation of CCTV cameras in your neighbourhood? – the following: 
 
As in the case of support for CCTV, given that a low number of people that expressed 
the view that CCTV invades privacy, similar arguments apply to the comparison of 
these groups with other variables.  
 
Around 17 per cent of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the 
introduction of CCTV would be an invasion of people’s privacy, and this proportion 
varied between 12 per cent and 23 per cent across the nine target areas. 
 
Analysis of the different survey samples showed an acceptable degree of similarity 
between the residential surveys on most socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics (CPFs communities). This similarity meant that the results from these 
could be meaningfully reported as a whole and levels of variation of the particular 
variable under consideration would be reported when necessary. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the similarity, given that residential areas 
are not ‘public space’ in the same way as city centres. The areas in which the systems 
are installed tend to be highly localised. In most areas respondents have been 
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consulted or informed about the proposed CCTV system prior to its installation. As 
was mentioned above, bids had to show evidence of this consultation process and to 
demonstrate support among residents. Of those supporting CCTV, 11 per cent felt that 
it was an invasion of privacy. 
 
4.3.1 Views about CCTV 
Having described the characteristics and behaviour of the respondents, their views 
about CCTV are now assessed. They were asked several questions including whether 
cameras were already operating in the target area, their beliefs about the capabilities 
of CCTV cameras and systems, and their attitudes towards the installation of cameras.  
 
When was and where is CCTV installed in your area? 
To the question of when the CCTV surveillance cameras were installed in the 
neighbourhood/residential area by month and/or year, most were unsure of exact 
dates and could not place a month or year date. As one participant put it:  
 
“Not sure, about two years ago” (Interviewee T2, 2018). 
 
To the question: Were you in agreement with the decision to install? (CCTV cameras), 
the following: 
 
To test all of the above questions the researcher relied on data from the interviews 
conducted with participants. The diverse array of views from the individuals 
interviewed in residential areas ran the gamut of views ranging from: those who not 
only feel safer in spaces where they know cameras are present, but who actively seek 
out such ‘safe’ spaces, to those who questioned the utility at all of CCTV surveillance 
systems. 
 
Other participants advised that they actively sought out certain facilities because of 
the presence of cameras, meaning that they were not involved in the decisionmaking 
regarding the installation of CCTV in the first place.  
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What is seldom considered within the research literature is the possibility that CCTV 
may also lead to a sense of greater social inclusion for the citizen by affording them a 
measure of potential security (whether it be ‘real’ or ‘perceived’ security) and/or 
creating instances where the people who have been a victim of crime, may assert their 
right to access justice or be afforded equal treatment under the law. 
 
To the question: If yes, what were your primary reasons for wanting its installation? 
 
Support for the notion that public forms of CCTV provide an ontological security effect 
was not, however, universal across service providers or service users. Indeed, the 
majority of interviewees were positive about the possibility that public CCTV might 
prevent crime. 
 
To the question: If no, what were your reasons for not agreeing with installation? 
 
Privacy issues identified here: One of the most influential premises in Criminology is 
that crime rates decrease in correlation with an efficient control and crime prevention 
strategy. However, the implementation of an intensified surveillance as a generalized 
mechanism for controlling crime and deviance raises different conflicts in various fields 
of an individual’s life and activities (Lyon, 2011:15). Such conflicts have been 
overlooked as long as security reasons are becoming more prevalent when balancing 
opposing interests (citizens’ privacy or sex offenders reintegration versus community 
safety or the public interest) (Welsh & Farrington, 2009b:28). In this sense privacy 
continues to be at risk given that societies are preferably more inclined to choose 
security in the first place. One should ask before implementing a CCTV system about 
what kind of effects it will have on civil rights. CCTV has actually come to prominence 
at a time when privacy issues are at the forefront of public debate (Gill, 2006: 450). As 
Andrew von Hirsh has put it (2000): When CCTV is in operation there are collateral 
damages, for cameras recording people cannot discriminate between criminals and 
non-criminals (Gill: 61). That is to say, CCTV involves scrutinizing ordinary people’s 
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comings and goings. Surveillance in public spaces may have a chilling effect on 
freedom of speech or assembly (Gill, 2006: 62). 
 
To the question: After installation of the CCTV system in your neighbourhood did you 
feel safer and more secure? 
 
Overall, the reported level of support for the installation of a new CCTV system was 
high, with almost 82 percent of participants either very happy (57.3%) or fairly happy 
(24.4%) with the prospect. 
 
Below is a particularly revealing response to this question:  
 
“CCTV is also good in detecting and prosecuting anyone carrying out crime. It can 
be effectively use in detecting crime if and only if the monitoring room is also at the 
same place. It is because, if anything wrong happen in the area under CCTV 
supervision, the personnel can immediately alert the person in charged in that area, 
so that crime can be stopped directly. In the case of prosecution, the recorded 
video of the CCTV can be used as evidence in court. Whoever is being caught with 
CCTV while doing crime, there are no other way out. Of course, the video must be 
tested for the originality beforehand” (Interviewee A12, 2018). 
 
Overall there was a high level of support for the introduction of both new and additional 
cameras, with particularly high levels in Johannesburg CBD where approximately 94 
per cent of all respondents indicated they would be happy to see cameras in the town 
centre. The extent to which respondents are informed about the capabilities of CCTV 
could impact upon their perceptions of how it works and whether it is likely to have an 
impact on crime and anti-social behaviour. Respondents were asked:  
 
To the question: To the best of your knowledge, did the installation of CCTV 
surveillance system lead to any direct successes against criminals? The following 
information was provided by respondents. 
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The relatively vague response of ‘making the respondent feel safer’ was the most 
frequently given answer. In contrast, more specific answers describing how CCTV 
could work (e.g. to provide evidence, to provide surveillance and monitoring) were 
mentioned by no more than a fifth of the sample. Respondents in all areas supported 
the installation of CCTV, regardless of whether these were new or existing cameras 
systems. The most common reason given was that it would make respondents feel 
safer. Overall, respondents were clear about how they thought that CCTV would work. 
 
4.3.2  Civil liberties 
Having examined respondents’ knowledge of CCTV, this question will consider their 
opinions of it. The first issue is the perceived threat to civil liberties. Unlike the 
introduction of CCTV cameras in obviously public spaces, such as shopping areas or 
car parks, their installation in residential areas raises a number of questions as to how 
they are viewed by local residents who live in the area as opposed to visiting it for 
short periods of time.  
 
To the question: Do you have any concerns about issues of ‘invasion of privacy’ with 
the installation of CCTV cameras in your neighbourhood? 
 
The extent to which CCTV is perceived to be an invasion of privacy may influence the 
degree to which residents support such systems. Around 17 per cent of all respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that the introduction of CCTV would be an invasion 
of people’s privacy, and this proportion varied between 12 per cent and 23 per cent 
across the targeted areas. The belief that CCTV is an invasion of privacy is influenced 
by the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent. Previous studies have 
found that younger men are more likely to feel that CCTV is an invasion of privacy 
(Ditton, 2000: 697). and this relationship holds for the current study. 
 
Privacy is an often-mentioned topic in the literature related to any discussion of CCTV 
monitoring (Goold, 2007: 61-63; Lyon, 2002: 50; Schlosberg & Ozer, 2007: 23; Solove, 
2011: 42). Solove (2011) writes that a common statement made when individuals 
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accept without question, some government or private entity gathering personal 
information is, “I’ve got nothing to hide” Solove, 2011: 21). The assumption by many 
is that you do not have to worry if you have done nothing wrong (Solove, 2011: 34). 
Privacy research conducted by Solove and supported by Goold (2007: 61-63), argues 
that privacy should be protected at all costs because the failure to protect personal 
information can “inhibit such lawful activities as free speech, free association, and other 
first amendment rights” (Solove, 2011: 4). 
 
Respondents were also asked what they thought the installation of CCTV could 
potentially achieve. This was assessed by posing the following questions: 
 
To the question: After installation did you notice a reduction in crime in your area? 
respondents were also asked three related questions, namely:  
 
• What do you think are the crime reduction/prevention value/benefits of installed 
CCTV surveillance cameras? (If your opinion none indicate so as well); 
 
• Can you think of any ways of improving the use and utilising of the installed 
CCTV surveillance cameras for crime reduction/prevention? 
 
Respondents were positive that the CCTV system would address specific perceived 
problems i.e. criminal activity at their specific targeted areas. Approximately 80 per 
cent of the sample agreed that ‘with CCTV on the estate, the level of crime would get 
lower’. This perception was correlated with the scale comparing perceived capabilities 
of CCTV.  
 .  
How best do you think can CCTV surveillance systems assist in solving crime?  
 
Video footage is a form of real evidence – it is not the videotape itself that is evidence, 
but the images recorded on the tape. Video evidence must be authenticated in court 
(Palmer, 1998: 61), and authentication is usually provided either by the camera 
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operator or a system manager responsible for releasing the tape to the police as 
evidence. Some legal scholars have argued video images are potentially overly 
persuasive. Even where not directly tendered as evidence in court, it was argued video 
footage provided invaluable background information for prosecutors, allowing them to 
ask pertinent questions and assess the validity of various witnesses. Although there 
were occasionally problems with image clarity in videotape evidence, police generally 
believed CCTV footage was invaluable and that ‘a picture speaks a thousand words. 
Two related questions were posed to respondents. 
 
To the question: Were you in agreement with the decision to install? – all respondents 
answered in the affirmative. 
 
To the question: What are your thoughts on CCTV as a tool for crime prevention and 
control? – overall the participants tended to support the installation of cameras in their 
area, and in the case of seniors, almost unanimously so, while in approximately half 
of all cases of shelter residents. However, the researcher cannot be more specific, 
since several participants changed their minds during the interviews. Reasons for 
supporting cameras mirror many of those found in official discourse. Two assumptions 
prevail, the first of which is that CCTV surveillance effectively deters crime. 
 
“Surveillance helps, let’s put it that way, it is a deterrent and it certainly helps. I don’t 
care what areas they are in: it helps” (Interviewee, A10, 2018). 
 
“I don’t think it stops crime, I think it stirs them up and prevents accumulation of crimes 
in certain areas that are detrimental to the city’s growth and safety” (Interviewee A12, 
2018). 
 
To the question: Which private security company manages/operates them? – the 
following appeared to be the overall view on this question: Awareness of how and who 
does the monitoring of CCTV in their areas is equally low across all respondents. 
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Issues of uncertainty include who is responsible for monitoring, whether the cameras 
are recorded, and when the cameras are operational. 
 
To the question on how CCTV surveillance fits into overall crime prevention initiatives, 
most participants indicated that:  
 
Asking only for a general assessment of the efficiency of CCTV, the researcher tried to 
avoid preconditioning possible answers. However, many informants talked at their own 
initiative about issues, such as crime prevention and public safety. Twenty-seven of the 
respondents stated that crime prevention was an important aim of CCTV. All of them 
equated prevention with deterrence. Risk calculations, the consideration of costs and 
benefits and the assessment of a possible prevention or deterrence effect by CCTV 
are interdependent. Thirty-three interviewees mentioned the enhancement of feelings of 
safety as one of the aims of CCTV. Their assessments differed depending on, whether 
their own feelings of safety improved by CCTV or not. Many participants affirmed that 
their feelings of safety and security improved with the presence of cameras. The 
statements of these respondents indicated that the term ‘feeling of safety’ is used in 
subjective manner and a variety of ways. The mechanisms under which CCTV aims to 
reduce crime are based upon the following assumptions:  
 
• Deterrence: The potential offender becomes aware of the presence of CCTV, 
assesses the risks of offending in this location to outweigh the benefits and 
chooses either not to offend or to offend elsewhere. 
 
• Efficient deployment: CCTV cameras allow those monitoring the scene to 
determine whether police assistance is required. This ensures that police 
resources are called upon only when necessary. 
 
• Presence of a ‘capable guardian’: The Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 
1979: 588-608) suggests that for a crime to be committed there must be a 
motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Any 
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act that prevents the convergence of these elements will reduce the likelihood of 
a crime taking place. CCTV, as a capable guardian, may help to reduce crime. 
 
• Detection: CCTV cameras capture images of offences taking place. In some 
cases, this may lead to punishment and the removal of the offenders’ ability to 
offend (either due to incarceration, or increased monitoring and supervision). The 
latter mechanism is by far the most publicised, with few bank robbery cases, in 
which images of the offenders on CCTV aided their detection and subsequent 
arrest. 
 
Regardless of the potential for a CCTV system to have a role in crime prevention, it 
can still contribute in a detection role. There are numerous examples of tapes aiding 
in an offender’s conviction. Camera footage can also help identify witnesses who might 
not otherwise come forward to police. CCTV camera evidence be compelling, though 
issues of image quality are a factor if CCTV images are used rapidly and make an 
arrest within view of the camera (and the offender does not leave the sight of the 
camera), the recording of the incident can help investigators obtain a conviction, 
usually through a guilty plea. The potential to assist in police investigations may also 
drive offenders away from committing offences that take time, as they run a greater 
risk There are several possibilities which CCTV system can have an impact on car crime. 
The following factors are presented for consideration in this context:  
 
• CCTV reduces car crime by making it more likely that present offenders will be 
caught, stopped, removed, punished and deterred. 
 
• CCTV reduces car crime by deterring potential offenders who will not wish to risk 
apprehension and conviction by the evidence captured on videotape or observed 
by an operator on a screen on which their behaviour is shown. 
 
• The presence of CCTV leads to increases in usage of car parks, because drivers 
feel less at risk of victimisation. Increased usage enhances natural surveillance, 
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which deters potential offenders, who feel they are at increased risk of 
apprehension in the course of criminal behaviour. 
 
• CCTV allows for the effective deployment of security staff/police officers towards 
areas where suspicious behaviour is occurring. They then act as a visible 
presence deterring potential offenders. They may also apprehend actual 
offenders red handed and disable their criminal behaviour. 
 
• The publicity given to CCTV and to its usage in catching offenders is received by 
potential offenders who avoid the increased risk they believe to be associated with 
committing car crimes in car parks. The perceived risks of offending exceed the 
perceived benefits and offending either ceases or is displaced by place or offence. 
 
• CCTV and signs indicating that it is in operation symbolise efforts to take crime 
seriously and to reduce it. The potential offender perceives crime to be more 
difficult or risky and is deterred. 
 
• Those car crimes which can be executed in a very short space of time will be less 
reduced than those which take more time, as the offender calculates the time 
taken for police or security officers to come or the probability that panning 
cameras will focus in on him/her. 
 
To the question: How best do you think can CCTV surveillance systems assist in 
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4.3.3  Information gathering 
The responses from participants regarding the value of CCTV is replicated in  
the literature and articulated by Armitage et al (1999: 78), which has been described as 
follows:  
 
• ‘Caught in the act’: perpetrators will be detected, and possibly removed or 
deterred. 
 
• ‘You have been framed’: CCTV deters potential offenders who perceive an 
elevated risk of apprehension. 
 
• ‘Nosy parker’: CCTV may lead more people to feel able to frequent the surveilled 
places. This will increase the extent of natural surveillance by newcomers, which 
may deter potential offenders. 
 
• Effective deployment: CCTV directs security personnel to ambiguous situations, 
which may head off their translation into crime. 
 
• Publicity: CCTV could symbolize efforts to take crime seriously, and the 
perception of those efforts may both energize law-abiding citizens and/or deter 
crime. 
 
• Time for crime: CCTV may be perceived as reducing the time available to commit 
crime, preventing those crimes that require extended time and effort. 
 
• Memory jogging: the presence of CCTV may induce people to take elementary 
security precautions, such as locking their car, by jogging their memory. 
 
• Anticipated shaming: the presence of CCTV may induce people to take 
elementary security precautions, for fear that they will be shamed by being shown 
on CCTV. 
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• Appeal to the cautious: cautious people migrate to the areas with CCTV to shop, 
leave their cars, and so on. Their caution and security mindedness reduce the 
risk.  
 
• Reporting changes: people report (and/or police record) fewer of the crimes that 
occur, either because they wish to show the desirable effects of CCTV or out of a 
belief that: ‘the City Council is doing its best’, and nothing should be done to 
discourage it.  
 
• Cameras can also be used to gather intelligence and to monitor the behaviour 
of known offenders in public places (such as shoplifters in public retail areas). 
Camera operators often come to know the faces of local offenders, and the 
cameras become a way to monitor their movements in a less intrusive manner 
than deploying plainclothes police officers. For example, officers in one city 
were able to gather intelligence on the behaviour of individuals selling stolen 
goods. This intelligence was gathered remotely by CCTV cameras and enabled 
police to interdict in an organised and coordinated manner (Welsh et al, 2008: 
37). 
 
The findings reveal that the majority of people questioned thought that the most 
important reason to install these cameras was to make people feel safe and put 
catching people who commit a crime as the most important, regarded the deterrence 
factor as the most important and. thought that these cameras were installed to spy on 
people. This is consistent with public CCTV schemes that are frequently installed to 
reassure the public that crime is being prevented (McCahill & Norris, 2002: 23 & 56; 
Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 18 & 20); Ratcliffe, 2006: 45 & 65). In any situation monitored by 
the CCTV operators, which will potential result in the commission (trigger) of a crime, 
they will ask the nearest Mobile Patrol Vehicle (MPV) to rush to the identified place 
immediately. The CCTV operators are private security officers who have already been 
taught on how to operate the system by security colleges but with standard operating 
procedures (SOP) mainly for the system. From the literature consulted (above listed), 
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it is clear that CCTV surveillance systems by design can be an effective tool in overall 
crime prevention initiatives. However, the system cannot be a ‘stand-alone’ one but 
must be supported by other elements, such as police action. Furthermore, there must 
be rules and regulations, policies and guidelines to follow by the enforcers and also 
by the public. 
 
To the question: If “public space” (streets/entrance to neighbourhood) (as opposed to 
private/business/commercial property) has been indicated above what was the 
motivation/reason provided for its (CCTV Camera Surveillance System) installation in 
such public areas? Public areas / residential areas, these are target areas for criminals 
to commit criminal activity/ social disorder. CCTV surveillance systems as alluded 
earlier is used as a situational crime prevention strategy (SCP). SCP seeks to 
influence the offender’s decision or ability to commit crimes at particular places and 
times by way of particularly designed measures. Situational prevention comprises a 
range of measures that highlight the importance of targeting very specific forms of 
crime in certain circumstances (Clarke 1997: 78). This involves identifying, 
manipulating and controlling the situational or environmental factors associated with 
certain types of crime (. It is also based upon assumptions regarding the nature of 
offending and of offenders (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 60). Underlying the situational 
approach are four key elements, including:  
 
• increasing the effort involved in offending; 
 
• increasing the risk associated with offending; 
 
• reducing the rewards that come from committing a crime; 
 
• reducing situational factors that influence the propensity of an individual to 
offend; and 
 
• removing excuses for offending behaviour (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 60). 
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4.3.4  Residents’ attitudes towards CCTV  
In this section of this chapter residents’ attitudes towards CCTV and their beliefs about 
how CCTV works was described. It provides new insights into the views of those living 
in residential areas where CCTV is to be installed. The following aspects were found:  
 
• Eighty-two per cent were happy or very happy with the installation of CCTV, 
which is similar to the level of support found in face-to-face interviews with 
CCTV Operators and CPFs members. 
 
• Those who had been victimised and who felt unsafe were significantly more 
likely to support CCTV although absolute differences were very small. 
 
Individuals appeared confused about the capabilities of CCTV. However, this did not 
be deter them in their support for CCTV and their perceptions as to what they thought 
CCTV could do. Approximately 80 per cent of the sample agreed that with CCTV on 
the estate, the level of crime would get lower. Sixty-three per cent were positive CCTV 
would reduce the number of people hanging around; 80 per cent thought that crime 
would be minimised or reduced; 68 per cent believed people would report more 
incidents; 56 per cent that the police would respond more quickly as a result of the 
cameras being installed.In this section, a number of themes were revealed which are 
discussed below. However, the two major themes that emerged were the issues of 
support for CCTV installation in their area, and privacy. The general argument is that 
the area will benefit from a positive economic impact when people feel safer. The 
findings are mixed but generally show there is some reduced level of fear of crime 
among people in CCTV areas, but only among people who were aware they were in 
an area under surveillance. One of the principal aims of the study was to measure the 
level of support for the installation of CCTV cameras in residential areas amongst 
those individuals with no prior knowledge and experience of CCTV in their area. CCTV 
in other public settings such as city and town centres, public housing communities, 
and transportation facilities evokes more resistance on the basis of threats to privacy 
and other civil liberties, and is associated with a larger number of social harms, 
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including the reinforcement of the notion of a fortress society and the social exclusion 
of marginalised populations (Lyon, 2011:34). Indeed, it is often these settings that are 
at the center of the debate over how best to strike a balance between the potential 
crime reduction benefits and social costs associated with CCTV. 
 
The extent to which CCTV is perceived to be an invasion of privacy may influence the 
degree to which residents support such systems. Around 17 percent of all respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that the introduction of CCTV would be an invasion 
of people’s privacy and this proportion varied between 12 percent and 23 percent 
across the nine target areas (see Interviewees A1, A2 & A3, 2018). 
 
To the question: Do you have any concerns about issues of ‘invasion of privacy’ with 
the installation of CCTV cameras in your neighbourhood? – the following: 
 
As in the case of support for CCTV, given that a low number of people that expressed 
the view that CCTV invades privacy, similar arguments apply to the comparison of 
these groups with other variables.  
 
Around 17 per cent of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the 
introduction of CCTV would be an invasion of people’s privacy, and this proportion 
varied between 12 per cent and 23 per cent across the nine target areas. 
 
Analysis of the different survey samples showed an acceptable degree of similarity 
between the residential surveys on most socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics (CPFs communities). This similarity meant that the results from these 
could be meaningfully reported as a whole and levels of variation of the particular 
variable under consideration would be reported when necessary. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the similarity, given that residential areas 
are not ‘public space’ in the same way as city centres. The areas in which the systems 
are installed tend to be highly localised. In most areas respondents have been 
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consulted or informed about the proposed CCTV system prior to its installation. As 
was mentioned above, bids had to show evidence of this consultation process and to 
demonstrate support among residents. Of those supporting CCTV, 11 per cent felt that 
it was an invasion of privacy. 
 
One of the IT applications in policing has been CCTV. Police departments had started 
to use CCTV systems in the early 1990s (Armitage, 2002: 34). As surveillance 
technology, CCTV assist police in order to provide social control and maintain order, 
prevent and catch criminals (Goold, 2006: 17; Kruegle, 2007: 45). CCTV cameras have 
been commonly used in order to decrease crimes, such as theft, crimes against 
personnel and assets and terrorism (Kruegle, 2007: 45). Specifically, 9/11 terrorist 
attacks have forced governments to invest in surveillance technology in order to 
protect their citizens against such dreadful attacks. In order to prevent future similar 
attacks, law enforcement agencies have started to extensively use surveillance 
systems, especially CCTV, to monitor human activities at airports, seaports, borders, 
and crowded city streets (Goold, 2006: 5). 
 
As the use of CCTV in South Africa grows, companies are faced with difficult choices 
in terms of what they can and cannot legally do with their cameras and the footage 
they take. When is your footage admissible in court, when will it be deemed illegal? A 
security policy is the essential basis on which an effective and comprehensive security 
program can be developed. The importance of this critical component of the overall 
security system, however, is often overlooked. A security policy is the primary way in 
which management’s expectations for security are translated into specific and 
measurable goals and objectives. It is crucial to take a top down approach based on 
a well-stated policy in order to develop an effective security system. On the contrary, 
if there is not a security policy defining and communicating those decisions, then they 
will be made by the individuals designing, installing and maintaining security systems. 




© Unisa 2019 
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: STREET SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
(ANNEXURE I) 
The street survey questionnaire was designed in three sections, namely: 
 
• personal information including, race, gender and profession; 
• experience of CCTV surveillance systems; and  
• questions related to operations of CCTV in their areas (or of where they were 
responding to the survey questions). 
 
The survey questionnaire was used to help the researcher to collect additional 
information and public perceptions/opinions about CCTV in order to complete the 
study of evaluating the use of CCTV surveillance cameras for crime control and 
prevention.  
 
The Street Survey Questionnaire was administered to 50 respondents stopped 
randomly with the request to voluntarily answer the survey questions in public streets 
in and around the Johannesburg Central CBD (that included Rivonia, Joubert, Alice, 
5th Street, Pybus, Wolmarans, Melle, Biccard and Jeppe) and the Sandton CBD. In 
the Pretoria Central CBD (mainly in the Sammy Marks Square and Church Square 
bounded by Mandela Drive, Bosman, Bloed and Church Streets). These areas have 
had CCTV cameras installed on streetlight poles and selected high buildings for many 
years. A total of 50 participants were evenly split (25/25) between Johannesburg and 
Pretoria. 
 
During the surveys, participants were informed about the process as much as possible 
to help them understand the survey focus, to give them a sense of control, and to allow 
them to make an informed decision to continue with participating in the survey. The 
results confirmed that survey participants experienced the use of CCTV operation in 
their daily lives. 
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To address the research questions in more detail, several areas related to crime 
prevention and control were identified for the survey. Note that some of the tables 
below have condensed categories. This was done to indicate that categories which 
were sparsely populated were combined to ensure that the analysis of the effect of 
these category properties related to perceptions of CCTV investigated in the overall 
analyses and led to unbiased results. 
 
Gender 










Table 1.20 and Figure 4.20 indicate that the majority of the sampled 50 respondents, 
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Comparisons of these racial groups’ attitudes towards CCTV surveillance systems 
based on their ethnicity was not done. 
 
To the question: What value do you think CCTV surveillance operations can provide 
to crime prevention initiatives in local areas? – the following data from the responses, 
namely: 51.6 percent thought they were very effective; 41.6 percent thought they were 
reasonably effective; 6.8% thought they were reasonably ineffective. This is displayed 
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Of the respondents, 68.9% thought there was a moderate decrease, 29.3% thought 
there was no change, 1.2% thought there was a drastic decrease and 0.6% thought 
there was a moderate increase.  
 
To the question: Do you have any concerns about issues of ‘invasion of privacy’ with 
the installation of CCTV cameras in your neighbourhoods? 
 




Of the respondents, 67 percent disagreed; 18 percent strongly disagreed; eight percent 
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4.4.1 Analysis of street survey questionnaires 
The extent to which CCTV is perceived to be an invasion of privacy may influence the 
degree to which residents support such systems. Around 17 per cent of all respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that the introduction of CCTV would be an invasion 
of people’s privacy, and this proportion varied between 12 per cent and 23 per cent 
across the target areas. The belief that CCTV is an invasion of privacy is influenced 
by the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent. Previous studies have 
found that younger men are more likely to feel that CCTV is an invasion of privacy 
(Ditton 2000: 710) and this relationship holds for the current study. There are several 
possible explanations for the similarity, given that residential areas are not ‘public 
space’ in the same way as city centres. As in the case of support for CCTV, given that 
there is a low number of people expressing the view that CCTV invades privacy, similar 
arguments apply to the comparison of these groups with other variables. Statistical 
differences can be found, though they do not correspond to large numbers of people 
in the sample. installed tend to be highly localised. In most areas respondents have 
been consulted or informed about the proposed CCTV system prior to its installation. 
As was mentioned above, bids had to show evidence of this consultation process and 
to demonstrate support among residents. Of those supporting CCTV, 11 per cent felt 
that it was an invasion of privacy. Respondents were generally of the opinion that their 
area was safe (70.97%), that crime has decreased over the past five years 
(67.74+13.13%) and that statistics were fairly to definitely in touch with public opinion  
 
The respondents were asked whether they were aware of the CCTV installed in the area 
where they were being questioned.  
 
Of the respondents, 82 percent stated that they knew the location of cameras; and ten 
percent did not know.  
 
Asked if they would support further installations: eight percent stated that they would not 
support the installation of additional cameras.  
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4.4.2 Deductions 
From the data of the street survey: in general, respondents believed CCTV 
surveillance systems had at least a slight crime deterrence effect. This was statistically 
significant with stronger support on the issues of:  
 
• crimes against public administration; 
• state and administration of justice;  
• crimes impacting on freedom of movement (i.e. feelings of being safe but crimes 
that impact on walking around) than crimes against property.  
 
Overall, results from the analysis suggest that the introduction of the cameras were 
associated with a reduction in all crime in the target areas surrounding CCTV 
installation sites. The most common reason given for the installation of CCTV in town 
centres is to combat what is loosely defined as “anti-social behaviour” (also known as 
“disorder offenses” or “petty” street crime. 
  
This reduction was largely due to a decline in petty street crime offences, since the 
frequency of serious crimes around each camera location in the two CBDs was 
generally too low to detect a measurable impact on serious crime alone. A further 
cause of the low number of serious offences within the radius view of each camera 
was that most often serious crimes, such as murder, occur inside buildings or in areas 
not clearly viewed (videoed) by CCTV cameras (Leggett, 2004: 72). 
 
Farrington (2009: 45) supports the idea that CCTV can be most effective at preventing 
certain types of crime at certain types of places (e.g. open car parks (not under cover). 
Crimes that occur in public on streets should therefore be subject to some deterrent 
effects of CCTV cameras in place.  
 
Generally, most responses were similar in nature for the more specific questions.  
All the participants said that they thought that CCTV had had a positive impact on 
reducing crime in the CBD area (where the survey was conducted). 
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More than 50 percent of the respondents agreed on the usage of CCTV for crime 
prevention and control as one participant said: “Crime prevention and control” 
(Respondent T2, 2018). 
 
To the question: “In the last two years have you been a victim of crime (personally 
experienced a crime situation) in this CBD/public street area?”, all of the participants 
answered “yes”. Even though fear of crime is a debatable concept in the criminal 
justice literature, there is no consensus about the definition and how to measure the 
construct. Studies on the link between crime and fear use unidimensional definitions 
of the concepts and generally do not differentiate between types of crime and kinds of 
fear (Norris & Armstrong, 1999: 12).  
 
To the question: Knowing there is a CCTV surveillance system in this CBD/public 
street area, do you feel safer when coming into this CBD/city centre/public street area? 
The majority said “yes” they felt safer coming to the area during the daytime but “no” 
to at night (i.e. they seldom, if ever, came into the area at night). Those who said “yes” 
were asked whether CCTV had “come to your aid/assistance or was of any help”. 
Many answered no and, when asked for a reason, one response was: “Didn’t come to 
my assistance… [it was] out of order” (Respondent T3, 2018). 
 
There is an extensive literature on fear of crime and the underlying theories of fear of 
crime can be grouped in three different camps Karakus et al (2010: 175): the 
victimization model, disorder model and community concern/social control model. 
According to the proponents of the victimisation model, fear of crime is caused by the 
actual crime rates in the community or individuals hearing about crime happening 
around them. Studies on disorder model argue that physical and spatial disorder and 
incivility in the neighborhood make people unsafe and they begin to think about being 
victim of crime. Individuals see the physical and structural decay in the neighborhood 
as the signals of crime and they become frightened. Related to the disorder model, 
community concern/social control model explains the fear of crime as a result of 
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deterioration in the social fabric of community. When social control tools are eroded 
and members of community start to have loose neighborhood relationship. However, 
there are some other feelings, such as anxiety, worry or concern about crime which 
are related to fear but the distinction between these feelings have not been resolved 
in the literature as yet (Gray, Jackson & Farrall, 2011: 67). Another important aspect 
of CCTV is that law enforcement officials are quickly deployed to the incident scene 
and investigations are conducted according to the data recorded by the system 
(Brown, 1995: 48-50). The theory behind using CCTV in crime fighting by the police is 
precisely summarised by Armitage (2002: 56). These are deterrence, efficient 
deployment, self-discipline, presence of a capable guardian, and detection. For the 
deterrence, if there is a camera in a place, a potential offender calculates the cost and 
benefit of committing a crime and decides not to commit or go to other suitable places. 
Secondly, CCTV system helps the police to deploy their human resources and other 
resources wisely by paying adequate attention on the right time to a spot when police 
assistance is needed. CCTV system also brings self-discipline not only to offenders, 
but also to victims. In the presence of CCTV cameras in place, victims become alert 
against crimes. Therefore, they try to reduce the risk of being a prey of a criminal by 
taking personal precautions against crimes. For the offenders, CCTV cameras give the 
sense of being watched all the time and they try to control their own behavior in order 
not to be caught in misbehavior. According to Routine Activity Theory presented by 
Cohen and Felson (1979: 588-608), there should be convergence in space and time 
of likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians. CCTV 
cameras prevent the convergence of these three elements by providing a capable 
guardian all the time. Finally, CCTV cameras help the police to detect offenders by 
recording images of offences taking place. These records play important role in 
arresting, sentencing and incarcerating of the criminals. Thus, criminals are caught 
and cannot commit new crimes and the justice is served for the society. CCTV is also 
seen as a fear reduction strategy (Lee, 2007: 78) and offered as a capable guardian 
(Piza, 2014: 63). Nevertheless, the role of CCTV in reducing fear of crime is 
questionable (Smith, 2008: 12). Norris and Armstrong, (1999: 85) found that CCTV had 
a significant impact on reducing fear of crime in the boroughs of London. In addition, 
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some researchers did pre/post surveys to evaluate the level of fear of crime among 
public; they noted positive effect of CCTV on the reduction of fear of crime Phillips, 
(1999: 75). Furthermore, Brown (1995: 45) indicated that CCTV is an effective tool in 
reducing fear of crime among public in the case study of Birmingham, UK. On the other 
hand, Gill and Spriggs (2005) surveyed people to see the effect of CCTV on fear of 
crime. They found that even though there was a decrease in fear of crime in public 
when compared to before and after CCTV installation, this reduction could not be 
attributed to CCTV. Regarding our study, some scholars (Armitage, 2002: 90; Fletcher, 
2011: 60) used RAT theory to explain the relationship between fear of crime and 
CCTV.  
 
One of the reasons given for saying “not at nighttime” was:  
 
“It’s Catch 22 situation given the challenges of load shedding [electricity 
blackouts by ESKOM], CCTV surveillance needs to be connected to a 
[constant] source of power to function” (Respondent T9, 2018). 
 
However, when asked whether, in their experience, CCTV footage influence crime, 
one respondent said that in his personal experience it had as he Determine conviction 
or not based on footage evidence: “opened a case after being mugged in CBD [at] Eloff 
Street, yes” (Respondent K, 2018). 
 
To the question: Who do you think funds the operations of this CBD/public street area 
CCTV surveillance system? The general response was along the lines of:  
 
“Government agencies [such as the] SAPS and government authorities [town 
council/municipality]. In private sector it is funded by community associations” 
(Interviewee T20, 2018). 
 
All respondents were in support of the extension of public CCTV camera installations 
to: i) Other CBDs in this metropolitan area and linked to a Central Control Room; ii) 
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the suburbs; and iii) the townships. The research about the benefit of CCTV systems 
in crime-fighting is incomplete, confusing, and inconsistent (Dempsey and Forst, 2012: 
73). A group of researchers (Carli, 2009;70; Squires, 2003: 56; Phillips, 1999: 82) 
argue that CCTV systems are necessary tool for the police in decreasing crime rates, 
responding crimes in a timely manner and maintaining order and providing social 
control. On the contrary another group of researchers (Armitage, 2002: 64; Deisman, 
2003: 51; Gill and Spriggs, (2005: 85) claim that there is no significant data proving 
the benefit of CCTV in crime fighting. According to Deisman (2003: 90), the effect of 
CCTV on crime is variable and unpredictable. The deterrence effects of CCTV also 
change according to type of a crime, location of a crime, and time of a crime. Similarly, 
Welsh and Farrington (2008: 15) did an extensive systematic review to assess the 
effects of closed-circuit television surveillance on crime. They concluded that CCTV 
has a modest but significant desirable effect on reducing crime in car parks, especially 
vehicle crimes and it is more effective in reducing crime in the U.K. than in other 
countries. 
 
To the question whether they had any suggestions or recommendations for improving 
the current CCTV surveillance system in the CBD, one respondent answered:  
 
“Most CCTV infrastructure is monitored by outsourced private security 
companies. This has created tension in the industry. These companies 
sometimes mistreat their employees, which later affect performance because 
they spend most their time resolving matters at CCMA”13 (Respondent WE34, 
2018). 
 
Another stated that:  
 
“Certainly so, due to cost with the CCTV surveillance technology, some 
companies are still making use of analogue software with its limited capacities. 
 
13 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) is an independent dispute 
resolution body established in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (LRA).  
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Advise companies [that they] must migrate digital technology, it has better 
properties/features” (Respondent WQ7, 2018). 
 
While the street survey responses were similar to some of the information obtained 
from the two sets of face-to-face interviews, some results were inconsistent with the 
findings of the qualitative research conducted in the period prior to the street surveys. 
Furthermore, the pragmatic use of these several sources of information for this 
research study by necessity triangulated the data, thereby building a coherent 
justification for the analytical framework (Creswell, 2003: 196). Besides, there is limited 
research about the role of CCTV in preventing ongoing criminal activity and arresting 
the suspects (Bekkers & Moody, 2011: 458-460). However, there is a majority support 
from public regarding deployment of CCTV cameras in the public places because 
CCTV increases safety feelings of citizens and decreases fear of crime and 
victimization. Even though there are some concerns about profiling and the breach of 
privacy (Lyon, 2011: 23), people generally support the use of security cameras in 
crime fighting. Armitage (2002: 70) reviews the studies about the evaluation of CCTV 
systems in the literature and concludes that there are several methodological 
problems in the studies due to several reasons. These are: inadequate pre and post 
CCTV time periods in which data are collected, no account taken of seasonal 
variations, no control areas for comparison, little discussion of displacement or 
diffusion of benefits, unspecified sample size, and lack of independent evaluation. 
Thus, there should be methodically sound empirical studies in the literature in order to 
know to what extent the surveillance plays role in crime prevention and crime 
reduction.  
 
There are fears that CCTV surveillance may come increasingly to be seen as a method 
of controlling public order(Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 67) .Such fears centre on the 
increasing sophistication of the technology coupled with the lack of a regulatory 
framework to monitor the collection, storage and use of information Pattern recognition 
systems make it possible to match video images of a person’s face with a computer 
database while communications and corroborative software facilitate both the sharing 
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and the centralisation of such data (Gill, 2006: 35). The coalescence of these 
technological threads enables the identification of an individual and the monitoring of 
that individual’s activities on a scale only previously envisaged in the literature of 
science fiction. Both the police and many commercial organisations have an interest 
in pursuing the possibilities since potential applications range from the investigation of 
crime to sophisticated direct marketing techniques (Tilly,1997: 45). Within the UK there 
is no law of privacy to prevent the abuse of CCTV surveillance and this in turn leads 
on to the second of the legal issues, namely: the legal regulation of CCTV (Pawson & 
Tilley,1997: 45; Gill & Spriggs, 2005: 67; Gill & Turbin, 1998: 23, 1999: 32) 
 
4.4.3  Street survey findings: Some conclusions 
The extant literature raises a number of questions about the growth of CCTV computer 
enhanced surveillance technology. Referring to deployment decisions for first 
generation system. Groombridge and Murji (1994a & 1994b) argue for minimum 
technology use matched to a specific goal supported by the public. The main purpose 
for full color, night vision, tilt, zoom, pan, and videotaped systems must be crime 
detection (Groombridge & Murji, 1994a: 286). As computer enhanced surveillance is 
not always needed to meet the target goal, second generation applications will also 
not always be required and should not be installed simply because they are available. 
System selection and deployment should be steered by a rule of minimum technology 
needed to meet a specific application goal rather than installing the most technological 
capable system affordable. The deployment of every CCTV system increases the 
psychological sense of being constantly watched and applications should be cautious, 
not automatic. The above theory is supported the theory of situational crime prevention 
strategy as postulated by (Cohen & Clarke, 1994:36). The following aspects were 
found: 
 
Eighty-two per cent were happy or very happy with the installation of CCTV, which is 
similar to the level of support found in face to face interviews with CCTV Operators 
and CPFs members. 
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Those who had been victimised and who felt unsafe were significantly more likely to 
support CCTV although absolute differences were very small. Individuals appeared 
confused about the capabilities of CCTV. However, this did not be deter them in their 
support for CCTV and their perceptions as to what they thought CCTV could do. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the sample agreed that with CCTV on the estate, the 
level of crime would get lower. Sixty-three per cent were positive CCTV would reduce 
the number of people hanging around; 80 per cent thought that crime would be 
minimised or reduced; 68 per cent believed people would report more incidents; 56 
per cent that the police would respond more quickly as a result of the cameras being 
installed. 
 
4.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS  
As the use of CCTV in South Africa grows, companies are faced with difficult choices 
in terms of what they can and cannot legally do with their cameras and the footage 
they take. When is your footage admissible in court, when will it be deemed illegal? A 
security policy is the essential basis on which an effective and comprehensive security 
program can be developed. The importance of this critical component of the overall 
security system, however, is often overlooked. A security policy is the primary way in 
which management’s expectations for security are translated into specific and 
measurable goals and objectives. It is crucial to take a top down approach based on 
a well-stated policy in order to develop an effective security system. On the contrary, 
if there is not a security policy defining and communicating those decisions, then they 
will be made by the individuals designing, installing and maintaining security systems. 
This will result in a disparate and less than optimal security system being 
implemented. 
 
The above results both support and build upon the lessons of evaluations by other 
research hers (Welsh & Farrington 2009: 45). CCTV is associated with significant 
reduction in crime. However, whereas Welsh and Farrington (2009: 47) found that car 
parks were the only settings where CCTV was associated with major effects in crime 
decrease, this qualitative review, however, found evidence of significant crime 
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decrease within other settings most notably residential areas, Business commerce and 
Railway lines.Certainly levels of support for CCTV are high, although it was not clear 
that respondents were fully informed about how it functioned. This finding mirrors that 
for residential areas. The postimplementation survey shed light on whether new CCTV 
provision will change these levels of support the findings of Caplan et al (2011: 258-
263) and Ratcliffe et al (2009: 65) have significant implications for CCTV policy and 
practice. The varied effect of individual cameras within singular systems suggests 
cameras may have differed on certain factors that influence effectiveness. As well as 
any changes in perception, the post-implementation survey will be interesting for what 
it tells us about changes in behaviour in response to new CCTV provision. Of particular 
importance is the continued need for CCTV to be narrowly targeted on vehicle, robbery 
and property crimes and not to be deployed as a stand-alone crime prevention 
measure. This finding is aligned to CCTV effect may be related to specific place-based 
characteristics of target areas. Just as certain crimes are conducive to certain 
environments, specific crime prevention tactics (e.g. CCTV) may be more effective at 
certain places than others Eck (2002: 702). As CCTV surveillance continues to expand 
its reach in both public and private space and evolve with new technology, policy will 
benefit from high quality evaluations of outcomes and implementation. The results of 
the analysis also demonstrated evidence of significant crime reductions within other 
settings, particularly residential areas. CCTV schemes incorporating active monitoring 
generated larger effect sizes than did passive systems. Schemes deploying multiple 
interventions alongside CCTV generated larger effect sizes than did schemes 
deploying single or no other interventions alongside CCTV. CCTV is a type of 
situational crime prevention (SCP) strategy in which levels of formal surveillance are 
increased within a target area (Cornish & Clarke, 2003: 72; Welsh & Farrington, 2009: 
717). SCP is focused on preventing crime by reducing the number of criminal 
opportunities and increasing the perceived risk of offending through modification of the 
physical environment (Clarke, 1995: 183). The situational prevention of crime is mainly 
rooted in the rational choice perspective, in which crime is considered to be “purposive 
behavior designed to meet the offender's commonplace needs” (Clarke, 1997: 9-10). 
As per the rational choice perspective, offenders consider several “choice structuring 
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properties”, which include the potential rewards and inherent risks involved in the 
commission of a particular crime. The primary aim of CCTV is considered to be the 
triggering of a perceptual mechanism that impacts an offender's choice structuring 
properties in a manner that persuades them to abstain from crime (Ratcliffe, (2006: 
52). More recently, Alexandrie (2017: 216-219) reviewed seven randomised and 
natural experiments of CCTV, finding crime reductions of between 24 percent and 28 
percent in public streets and urban subway stations, but no effect in parking facilities 
or suburban subway stations. The findings of Alexandrie (2017: 215) diverged 
somewhat from those of Welsh and Farrington (2009: 70). Smaller effect sizes 
associated with quasi‐experiments, varying study settings (i.e., countries), and 
differing integration with police practices as contextual factors may explain this 
difference. Recent research findings show support for Alexandrie’s (2017: 220) 
argument that integration with police practices may determine the effects of CCTV (La 
Vigne et al, 2011: 29; Piza, 2012: 56; Caplan & Kennedy, 2010: 20). The small number 
of studies used by Alexandrie (2017: 200) however, represents a small proportion of 
the knowledge base on CCTV. 
 
Lastly, the findings of this research study’s qualitative evaluation echo those of Welsh 
and Farrington (2009: 45) in terms of the 34 UK CCTV projects they reviewed, which 
demonstrated a statistically significant reduction of approximately ten percent in crime 
in the experimental areas compared to control areas. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS  
There is anecdotal evidence of the value of CCTV in prosecuting offenders. According 
to Gill and Hemming (2006: 36) “offenders are not put off by the presence of cameras. 
The decision-making processes determining where and why cameras are to be 
installed and whether political pressure is a motivating factor should also be routinely 
examined. Finally, these findings remind us of just how closely public area CCTV 
surveillance has come to resemble Jeremy Bentham’s original idea of the Panopticon. 
Although in the wake of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish there has been a tendency for 
criminologists and sociologists to see surveillance technologies, such as CCTV in terms 
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of social control, it is important to remember that for Bentham one of the great virtues of 
his panoptic prison was that it exposed prison guards as well as prisoners to outside 
scrutiny.  
 
Overall, it might be concluded that public area CCTV reduces crime in some 
circumstances. In light of the mixed results and potential social costs, future CCTV 
schemes should be carefully implemented in different settings and should employ high 
quality evaluation designs with long follow-up periods.  
 
4.7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations, based on the findings from this research study, the 
information gleaned from the literature review and from general observations made 
when visiting and examining the locations selected for the study, are made:  
 
1. Firstly, the researcher recommends that other researchers build upon the state of 
the research presented in this study by seeking opportunities to maximise the rigour 
of CCTV methodology.  
 
2. Careful consideration needs to be given as to what exactly constitutes the success 
of a CCTV surveillance system.  
 
3. Appropriate data needs to be gathered and interpreted as an integral part of any 
determination of success or otherwise (evidence-based policy and service). 
 
4. An appropriate evaluation mechanism needs to be drawn up to review and 
determine the impact and effectiveness of existing and future schemes. 
 
5. The use of CCTV in an area should be highlighted and publicised so as to inform 
the public and act as a deterrent to criminal behaviour. 
 
183 
© Unisa 2019 
6. All existing CCTV systems should be immediately examined and assessed to 
determine if they are fit for purpose and effective in their primary objectives. 
 
7. The use of CCTV surveillance is based on Rational Choice Theory. It is expected 
that offenders will be less likely to commit a crime if they know they are being 
watched and have a greater risk of being apprehended (La Vigne et al, 2011: 60). 
 
8. Public safety agencies may invest in CCTV for several reasons, such as to assist 
in the detection and retroactive investigation of crime or promote increased use of 
public spaces (Gill & Spriggs, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2006).  
 
9. In as much as the promise of public surveillance cameras as a crime prevention 
and control tool is a powerful motivator for those investing in the technology, it is 
important to view it in the context of a larger community policing framework. 
Surveillance cameras alone are a not a silver bullet, but simply another crime 
control and investigative tool. That tool should be employed along with other 
policing strategies, such as community-oriented problem-solving strategies and 
intelligence-led policing.  
 
10. Further, it is important for jurisdictions to understand that public surveillance 
technology is only as good as the way it is employed. If it is employed minimally 
or is not well-integrated into other policing functions, it is unlikely to yield a 
significant impact on crime.  
 
4.8 FUTURE RESEARCH  
This research study only covered the evaluation of Closed-Circuit-Television (CCTV) 
f\or crime control and prevention from selected areas. Further research can work on 
the technical configuration of the system and legislation aspect in context to have 
binding law to complete police investigation and private security operations. Additional 
to that, enhancement work can be done to work on the risk management and mitigation 
plan to improve the efficiency of CCTV system and the organisations involved. The 
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effectiveness of the implementation of CCTV depends on the study being done to 
make sure that the process will bring success in future. None of the organisations will 
invest in something that cannot be sure the rate of success. Even though the study is 
being done, the criminal nowadays also become smarter. When they know the area 
was under CCTV surveillance, especially if they can see the camera, they will try as 
best as they can to avoid their faces from being caught by the camera. Even some of 
the criminal was wearing a mask to make sure that they cannot be recognised from 
the images of Closed-Circuit-Television (CCTV).  
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Annexure D:  Request permission to do research letter [DRAFT] 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
[Company address]  
 




RE:  REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH FOR AN MTECH 
DISSERTATION 
 
Mr Sheperd Moyo, (UNISA Student Number: 36945323), is currently a Masters student at the 
University of South Africa (UNISA), busy with his research studies for a Masters’ degree 
(MTech in Security Management). The title of his research topic is: EVALUATING THE USE 
OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES FROM JOHANNESBURG AND TSHWANE, GAUTENG 
 
Mr Moyo has obtained ethical clearance from the UNISA College of Law Research Ethics 
Review Committee (#ref: ST69/2017) to proceed with his fieldwork research (see attached 
letter dated: 28 November 2017). 
 
Accordingly, we would like to request permission for him to undertake fieldwork research and 
conduct interviews with your organisations/company’s personnel, particularly those working in 
your control room and involved in the CCTV surveillance operations therein.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The primary aim and purpose of this study is to evaluate the use of CCTV Surveillance for 
better crime control and prevention. At the broadest level, the aim of this review is to give a 
clear sense of what can reliably be believed to be true about the effects of CCTV surveillance 
systems on crime reduction/prevention based on the existing evidence, to link these findings 
to a wider set of questions and considerations at the level of policy, and to highlight 
outstanding issues and areas where further research is needed. Accordingly, the purpose of 
the research is an exploratory study that intends to explore what is happening on the ground in 
terms of the topic; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess the phenomena in a 
new light. It is hoped to add value to the existing body of knowledge, particularly since there is 
very little in-depth research information known about the phenomena in South Africa. On the 
other hand, the exploratory study aims to find out the causal relationships between variables. 
The present study to undertake several site case studies as part of the research and 
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methodological approach. Case studies to be selected to evaluate the use of CCTV 
surveillance systems for crime control and prevention in selected policing precincts in 
Johannesburg and Tshwane (Pretoria) in the Gauteng Province. It is hoped the resulting 
research findings will lead to the formulation of a Best Practices Model for the use of CCTV 
Surveillance Systems in local community crime prevention and reduction initiatives in assisting 
both communities and police in combatting crime. In addition, use of CCTV surveillance in 




The one-on-one interviews will be based on a Schedule of Interview Questions (see attached). 
Broadly the Schedule of Interview Questions will revolve around the primary research 
questions, inter alia:  
 
• Tell me about your experiences with public CCTV surveillance? 
 
• What in your opinion has been the impact of CCTV surveillance systems installation in 
your area on crime prevention and control? 
 
• What do you think has been the impact that CCTV has on crime in general? 
 
• What is your opinion of the impact of public CCTV surveillance regarding the privacy rights 
of individuals? 
 
• How do you think can CCTV video footage be used as a surveillance technique in crime 
prevention and control? 
 
• In what way do you think CCTV video footage be admitted as evidence in court? 
 
• In what way do you think CCTV surveillance systems can be integrated into overall crime 
prevention initiatives and Community Policing? 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF COLLECTED RESEARCH INFORMATION 
All the information that is received from the participants/respondents will be treated with the 
utmost confidentially (i.e. respondents will remain anonymous and no reference will be made 
to their identity or to the organisation for which they work). Neither organisation nor names of 
individual respondents/participants will be used in the resulting research report (i.e. identities 
will remain unknown and protected).  
 
Participation in the research interviews/survey questionnaire will also be on a voluntary basis 
(informed consent). 
 
The final dissertation (research report) once accepted will be placed in the UNISA library and 
therefore in the public domain and can be accessed by interested parties.  
 
Attached for your information, is a detailed research proposal and a draft set of interview 
questions. 
 
If any confirmation or other information is needed, Mr Moyo can be directly contacted at the 
following: Tel:  012 433 9477 / Cell:  082 316427 / Email: Emoyos2@unisa.ac.za. 
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Alternatively, Prof AdeV Minnaar, Mr Moyo’s study supervisor, can also be directly contacted 
(see below for contact details). 
 
Once permission is granted to Mr Moyo to commence his field research with members of your 
organisation/company, please inform him accordingly. Mr Moyo will then be in touch directly 
with you or a representative of your organisation/company for the scheduling of any interviews 





AdeV Minnaar  
Postgraduate Supervisor 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, University of South Africa  
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UNISA College of Law ethics clearance reference number: ST69/2017 
 
Dear Prospective Participant 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT: EVALUATING THE USE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 
FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION: SELECTED CASE STUDIES FROM 
JOHANNESBURG AND TSHWANE, GAUTENG 
 
My name is Sheperd Moyo, (UNISA Student Number: 36945323), and I am currently doing 
research in the Department of Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, in 
the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA), for a Masters’ degree (MTech in 
Security Management). 
 
My study supervisor is Prof Anthony Minnaar (Research Professor in Criminal Justice 
Studies in the Department of Criminology & Security Science at UNISA.) 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in Mr Moyo’s research study project titled: Evaluating 
the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention: Selected case studies 
Johannesburg and Tshwane, Gauteng. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The primary aim and purpose of this study is to evaluate the use of CCTV Surveillance for 
better crime control and prevention. At the broadest level, the aim of this research study is to 
give a clear sense of what can reliably be believed to be true about the effects of CCTV 
surveillance systems on crime reduction/prevention based on the existing evidence, to link 
these findings to a wider set of questions and considerations at the level of policy, and to 
highlight outstanding issues and areas where further research is needed. Accordingly, the 
purpose of the research is an exploratory study that intends to explore what is happening on 
the ground in terms of the topic; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess the 
phenomena in a new light. It is hoped to add value to the existing body of knowledge, 
particularly since there is very little in-depth research information known about the phenomena 
in South Africa. On the other hand, the exploratory study aims to find out the causal 
relationships between variables. The present study to undertake several site case studies as 
part of the research and methodological approach. Three case studies to be selected to 
evaluate the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention in selected 
policing precincts in Johannesburg, Gauteng Province. 
 
It is hoped the resulting research findings will lead to the formulation of a Best Practices Model 
for the use of CCTV Surveillance Systems in local community crime prevention and reduction 
initiatives in assisting both communities and police in combatting crime. In addition, the use of 
CCTV surveillance in private security control rooms to assist in rapid response to crimes in 
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WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
You have been identified as a suitable participant given your work position/experience in your 
company related to either the management/supervision of CCTV surveillance systems or 
involved as an operator of these security systems in your company’s control room/or as a first 
responder to CCTV surveillance alerts to a crime in progress. 
Your company, upon my research permission request, has recommended/referred you to me 
and provided me with your contact information for that purpose.  
 
In the course of my research study I intend to interview a minimum of thirty persons related 
to your work position as relating to CCTV surveillance systems operations at other companies 
in the selected research site areas.  
 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY? 
Your participation in this research study will be via a one-on-one semi-structured interview in 
order to gain valuable information from you as a participant. The interview will further serve to 
gain insight and in-depth detailed information from all participants’ in terms of their respective 
fields of expertise. The interview should not last longer than +45 minutes and will be held at a 
time and venue according to the participant’s convenience. The interview will be voice 
recorded (with the participant’s permission) and notes will be written during the interview. 
 
Broadly the Schedule of Interview Questions will revolve around the primary research 
questions, inter alia:  
 
• Tell me about your experiences with public CCTV surveillance? 
 
• What in your opinion has been the impact of CCTV surveillance systems  installation in 
your area on crime prevention and control? 
 
• What do you think has been the impact that CCTV has on crime in general? 
 
• What is your opinion of the impact of public CCTV surveillance regarding the privacy 
rights of individuals? 
 
• How do you think CCTV video footage can be used as a surveillance technique in crime 
prevention and control? 
 
• In what way do you think CCTV video footage can be admitted as evidence in court? 
 
• In what way do you think CCTV surveillance systems can be integrated into overall crime 
prevention initiatives and Community Policing? 
 
CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED TO 
PARTICIPATE? 
Your participation is completely voluntary, and you are under no obligation to consent to 
participation. You are also at liberty to withdraw from the study at any stage of the interview 
without giving a reason. Not agreeing to participate or withdrawal during the interview itself will 
have no negative repercussions (penalties or work sanctions) on you as an interviewee or 
employee of the company, since participation is voluntary.  
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If you do agree to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to 
sign a written consent form. Moreover, also providing permission to voice record your 
interview. 
 
ANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES IF YOU PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH 
PROJECT? 
The researcher does not foresee any negative consequences to you personally in participating 
in this research study. In addition, all information (responses) provided by you to him during 
the interview will be regarded as confidential. The researcher will not disclose any 
respondents’ names or contact details unless permission to do so is given by you. 
 
WILL THE INFORMATION THAT YOU CONVEY TO THE RESEARCHER AND MY 
IDENTITY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
The confidentiality of all information provided by you as a participant/interviewee of this study 
will be protected and kept confidential by the following steps taken by the researcher:  
 
• All the identities of participants will not to be shared with any other persons with no 
exception. 
 
• Anonymity of the participants to be maintained through the removal of any identifying 
characteristics. 
 
• All interview information received by the researcher will be transcribed and viewed only 
by him. 
 
• The information received from any respondent/interviewee will be electronically stored 
(password protected) by the researcher.  
 
• The findings of the research will be documented in the form of an academic dissertation 
with all respondents only identified by a sequential number allocated to each.  
 
Your name will not be recorded anywhere in the research report and no one, apart from the 
researcher, will know about your involvement in this research since all your responses 
(answers) to the interview questions will be given a code number and you will be referred to 
in this way in the data, the resulting dissertation or other research reporting methods, such as 
conference proceedings or journal articles or any publications, by this identifier number.  
No one else besides myself as the primary researcher will have access to the research 
information/data collected in the interviews. (Your answers will be reviewed by people 
responsible for making sure that the research was done properly (i.e. members of the 
Research Ethics Review Committee and supervisor, Prof Minnaar).  
 
HOW WILL THE RESEARCHER(s) PROTECT THE SECURITY OF DATA? 
All documentation pertaining to this research study will be kept in a locked office or at 
researcher’s home (residence adequately protected by means of security measures).  
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PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY? 
No monetary payment, inducements, or incentives will be offered by the researcher for your 
participation in this study. Neither will any intimidatory actions be used by the researcher to 
force or entice you to participate.  
 
HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICS APPROVAL? 
This study has received written approval from the Research Ethics Review Committee of the 
College of Law at the University of South Africa. A copy of the approval letter can be obtained 
from the researcher if you so wish. 
 
HOW WILL I BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS/RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH? 
If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Mr Moyo on cell: 
082 316427. The findings will also be accessible in the submitted final dissertation stored 
electronically in the University of South Africa’s Library database of all UNISA dissertations 
and theses. 
 
Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect 
of this study, please contact him on the above cellphone number, direct telephone office 
number: 012 433 9477 or email him at: emoyos2@unisa.ac.za. 
 
Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may 
contact Prof Minnaar, his supervisor at cell: 083 8949485 or via email at: 
aminnaar@unisa.ac.za. Contact the research ethics chairperson of the College of Law 
Research Ethics Review Committee, Prof D. Govender (email: Govend1@unisa.ac.za; Tel: 
012 433 9582) if you have any ethical concerns. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study.  
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Annexure F:  Proforma Informed Consent Form 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH STUDY: 
 
EVALUATING THE USE OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR CRIME 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION: SELECTED CASE STUDIES FROM 
JOHANNESBURG AND TSHWANE, GAUTENG 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
I, ____________________________, (participant’s name), confirm that the person 
asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, 
procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.  
 
I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the 
information sheet covering letter.  
 
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in 
the study.  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without penalty (if applicable). 
 
I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, 
journal publications and/or conference proceedings, but that my participation will be 
kept confidential unless otherwise specified.  
 
I agree to the voice recording of the interview (delete if no consent to voice recording 
of interview) [strikethrough and initial by interviewee and researcher].  
 
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
 
Research respondent/Participant Name & Surname: (Please print) 
  
Participant’s signature:  
 
Date:  
Researcher: Mr Sheperd Moyo  
UNISA Student No. 36945323  
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SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTROL ROOMS: CCTV SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT TITLE:  
Evaluating the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention: 




Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. You do not need to 
identify yourself and, similarly, the researcher will uphold your anonymity in that 
there will be no possibility of any respondent being identified or linked in any way in 
the research findings by name or otherwise in the final research report (nor the 
company/organisation for which you work).  
Where required, please indicate your answer with a cross (X) in the appropriate box 
or write a response in the space provided. 
 
SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
 
Question 1:   Gender 
Gender  (X) 
Male  
Female  
Question 2:   Age 
Age  
(X) 
Age  (X) 
20-24 years old  25-29  
30-34   35-39  
40-44  45-49  
50-54  55-59  
60+    
 
Question 3:  Highest educational qualification 
 
Highest educational qualification  (X) 
Standard 8/Grade 10  
Standard 9/Grade 11  
Standard 10/Grade 12  
Certificate Level NQF 3-4  
Certificate Level NQF 5  
1-year Diploma   
3-year Diploma  
BA degree  
BTech   
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Advanced Diploma  
Hons/Postgraduate Diploma  
Masters  
Doctoral  




Question 4:  Have you undergone any other specialised training/shortcourse(s) 





Question 5:  How many years of work experience do you have in the private security 
industry? 
 
Years of work experience in PSI  (X) 
Less than 1 year  
1 year   
2 years   
3 years   
4 years   
5 years  
6-9 years  
10 years  
11-15 years  
More than 15 years  
 
Question 6:   How many years of work experience do you have in your current position? 
 
Years of experience in current post  (X) 
Less than 1 year  
1 year   
2 years   
3 years   
4 years   
5 years  
6-9 years  
10 years  
11-15 years  
More than 15 years  
 
Question 7:  What is your current work position (within the domain of a control room 
CCTV surveillance operations)? 
 
Position  (X) 
Site Manager  
Supervisor  
Team leader  
217 
© Unisa 2019 
Member of response team  
Control Room Operator  





SECTION B: CCTV SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS 
 
Question 8:  The CCTV surveillance operations in this control room are currently 
installed at which sites (indicate all sites not just primary)? 
 
CCTV installed site  (X) 
1. Shopping centre/mall  
2. Residential neighbourhood  
3. Central Business District (CBD)  
4. Gated neighbourhood  
5.  (Private) Security estate  
6. Business premises  
7. Factory/industrial site  
8. Along highways  
9. On public streets  




Question 9:   If No 1 (shopping centre/mall) selected above describe CCTV installation 
at this site? 
 
Shopping centre/mall  (X) 
1. In open-air shopping centre car park  
2. Underground parking/parkade  
3. Inside mall along walkways/passages  
4. Inside shops  
5. At entrances to shopping centre  




Question 10:  If No 2 (residential neighbourhood) selected above describe CCTV 
installation at this site? 
 
Residential neighbourhood  (X) 
1. At entrance access roads  
2. Along residential streets  
3. At crossroads/corners of streets 
inside residential area 
 
4. On masts on private property of 
selected residents’ properties 
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Question 11:  If No 3 (Central Business District (CBD)) selected above describe CCTV 
installation at this site? 
 
Central Business District (CBD)  (X) 
1. On street corner masts  
2. Mounted on selected buildings  
3. Along pedestrian walkways  
4. Inside buildings  




Question 12:  If No 4 (gated neighbourhood) selected above describe CCTV installation 
at this site? 
 
Gated neighbourhood  (X) 
1. At boomgate access-controlled entrance  
2. At entrance access roads  
3. Along residential streets  
4. At crossroads/corners of streets inside security estate  
5. On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties  




Question 13:  If No 5 (private security estate) selected above describe CCTV installation 
at this site? 
 
Private security estate  (X) 
1. At boomgate access-controlled entrance  
2. At entrance access roads  
3. Along security estate roads  
4. Along perimeter walls (at intervals)  
5. On masts on private property of selected residents’ properties  




Question 14:  If No 6 (business premises) selected above describe CCTV installation at 
this site? 
 
Business premises  (X) 
1. Along perimeter fencing/wall  
2. At access-controlled entrance  
3. Over vehicle parking area  
4. Mounted on business premises’ building   
5. Inside business premises  
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Question 15:  If No 7 (factory/industrial site) selected above describe CCTV installation 
at this site? 
 
Factory/industrial site  (X) 
1. Along perimeter fencing/wall  
2. At access-controlled entrance  
3. Over vehicle parking area  
4. Mounted on factory building   
5. Inside factory building  




Question 16:  What operational processes are followed in the Control Room for CCTV 
















Question 19:  Does your company co-operate with the SAPS in responding to 
incidents? 
 
Yes  No  
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Question 23:  What value do you think CCTV surveillance operations can provide to 











Question 25:  Has any CCTV footage from CCTV surveillance operations in this 
Control Room been used to solve (leading to arrest of 
perpetrator/successful prosecution) a crime? 
 
Yes  No  
 





Question 27:  If yes to Q25, how often (number) in the last (indicate selected time 
period with an ‘X’) has that occurred (indicate number of cases):  
 
Period of time ‘X’  (Estimated) Number of cases 
Previous six months   
12 months   
Two years   
Three years   
Four years   
Five years   
 
Question 28:  If yes to Q25, list (in order of priority by number of incidents) for what 
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Question 29:  In the listed cases above were any of the perpetrators arrested? 
 
Yes  No  
 
Question 30:  If yes, how many (in the time periods below) arrests were made? 
 
Period of time ‘X’  (Estimated) Number of cases 
Six months   
12 months   
Two years   
Three years   
Four years   
Five years   
 
Question 31:  In any of the above were there any successful prosecutions? 
 
Yes   No 
 
Question 32:  If yes, how many successful prosecutions occurred (in the time periods 
below) 
 
Period of time ‘X’  (Estimated) Number of cases 
Six months   
12 months   
Two years   
Three years   
Four years   
Five years   
 
Question 33:  On what activity/action was success most dependent? (e.g. utilisation 
of CCTV footage of an incident (for identification purposes; evidentiary 
use in court); rapid response and arrest; further crime investigation)? 
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Question 34:  If yes to any of Qs 25-29 for what type of crimes has it assisted most 
successfully to either solve/successfully prosecute (list below types of 








Question 35:  In your opinion does the utilisation of CCTV surveillance have any 
value/ impact/effect on crime prevention initiatives? 
 
Yes  No  
 










Question 38:  In your opinion how can the utilisation of CCTV surveillance be 





Question 39:  Is there any additional relevant information you want to provide with 







THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PATIENCE IN PARTICIPATING  
IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
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Annexure H:  Schedule of Interview Questions: CPFs and Residential Areas:  
 CCTV Surveillance Operations 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTERVIEW SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
CPFs & RESIDENTIAL AREAS: CCTV SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT TITLE:  
Evaluating the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention: 
Selected areas in Johannesburg and Tshwane, Gauteng 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This interview survey questionnaire is aimed at determining your knowledge and 
attitudes/opinion about CCTV surveillance camera operations in your CPF residential area.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS:  
You are requested to answer each question and reflect your true reaction when doing 
so. Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. You do not need 
to identify yourself and, similarly, the researcher will uphold your anonymity in that 
there will be no possibility of any respondent being identified or linked in any way in 
the research findings by name or otherwise in the final research report (nor the 
company/organisation for which you work). 
 
Where required, please indicate your answer with a cross (X) in the appropriate box 
or write a response in the space provided. 
  
Do not dwell too long on each question and please complete ALL questions.  
 
NB: There are no wrong answers. 
 
 
SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
 
Question 1:   Gender 
 
Gender  (X)   (X) 
Male  Female  
Question 2:   Age 
 
Age  (X) Age  (X) Age  (X) 
20-24 years 
old 
 25-29  30-34  
35-39  40-44  45-49  
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Question 3:  Highest educational qualification 
 
Highest educational qualification  (X)   (X) 
Standard 8/Grade 10  BA degree  
Standard 9/Grade 11  BTech   
Standard 10/Grade 12  Advanced Diploma  
Certificate Level NQF 3-4  Hons/Postgraduate Diploma  
Certificate Level NQF 5  Masters  
1-year Diploma   Doctoral  




SECTION B: CCTV SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS 
 
Question 4:  When were CCTV surveillance cameras installed in your 





Question 5:  Where in your neighbourhood/residential area have CCTV surveillance 
cameras been installed? (indicate all sites not just primary)? 
 
CCTV installed site  (X) 
1. Shopping centre/mall  
2. Central Business District (CBD)  
3. Business premises  
4. Factory/industrial site  
5. Residential neighbourhood entrance  
6. Gated neighbourhood  
7. (Private) Security estate  
8. On private residential property  
9. On public streets  
10. Along highways  




Question 6:  If ‘public space’ (streets/entrance to neighbourhood) (as opposed to on 
private/business/commercial property) has been indicated above what 
was the motivation/reason provided for its (CCTV Camera Surveillance 





Question 7:  If installed in ‘public space’ (streets/entrance to neighbourhood) who was 
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Question 8:  Were you in agreement with the decision to install? 
 
Yes  No  
 










Question 11:  Do you have any concerns about issues of ‘invasion of privacy’ with the 
installation of CCTV cameras in your neighbourhood? 
 
Yes  No  
 
 










Question 14:  How is it currently funded? (Residents private security company 
contract/Private Security Company/Not-for-Profit Co./Business Levy, or 
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Question 17:  Do you know how many cameras have been installed in the ‘public 















Question 20:  Who is the primary (first) responder to a CCTV activation/observation of 
























Question 24:  What do you think are the crime reduction/prevention value/benefits of 
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Question 25:  Can you think of any ways of improving the use and utilising of the 





Question 26:  After installation of the CCTV system in your neighbourhood did you feel 
safer and more secure? 
 
Yes  No  
 





Question 28:  To the best of your knowledge, did the installation of CCTV surveillance 





Question 29:  If yes, what crimes were detected with the assistance of the CCTV 










Question 30:  If yes, what were those successes emanating from the detection of those 






Question 31:  Can you quantify any of those successes over the past:  
 
No of years No of successes  No of 
successes 
12 months  One year  
Two years  Three years  
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Question 32:  In your opinion how can the utilisation of CCTV surveillance camera 





Question 33:  Is there any additional relevant information you want to provide with 






THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PATIENCE IN PARTICIPATING 
IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
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Annexure I:  Street Survey Questionnaire 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY SHEET 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT TITLE: 
 
Evaluating the use of CCTV surveillance systems for crime control and prevention: 
Selected areas in Johannesburg and Tshwane, Gauteng 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
STREET SURVEY: CBD/OPEN STREET CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS PUBLIC 
AWARENESS 
 
Researcher’s initials  Questionnaire 
No. 
 Date  TIME  
CBD (X) PTA JHB Other:  Comments:  
   
Public street area (x)     
 
Bibliographic Info (Don’t ask Qs 1 & 3 - fill in after interview) 
 
1. Gender? Male Female 2. Age? <20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60> 
        
3. Race? 
 
Black Asian (Indian) Coloured White 
    
4. Are you a resident of or a visitor 
to this city? 
 
Resident Visitor If a visitor abort 
interview   
5. South African/Non-South African 
(Foreigner)? [but still a resident of 
this city] 
South African Non-SA resident 
  
6. Do you live in or close to the CBD 
area or in the suburbs/ a 
township/out-of-town (rural)? 
CBD Suburbs Township Rural 
    
7. Do you know about or are aware that a CCTV 
surveillance system (security cameras) has been 
implemented (installed) in this CBD//public street 
area? 
Yes No If ‘No’ skip 
to A1   
8. If yes (Q7), do you know when (year) it was installed in this 
CBD//public street area? [guess] 
 
8(a) Do you know how many cameras are currently installed in this 
CBD/city centre/public street area? [Try and get an estimate in 
numbers from respondent] 
Yes No Num 
   
9. Have you ever seen any of these cameras (i.e. identified them as 
cameras and where they are sited - do you know what the 
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10. Are there any signs in this CBD/public street area indicating that 
CCTV cameras have been installed and/or the public is under camera 
surveillance? 
  
11. Do you know where the CCTV Operations Control Room for this 
CBD/public street area system is sited?  




Building and/or street name:  
12. What do you think was/is the main reason for the installation of CCTV surveillance 
in this CBD/public street area? 
 
 
13. In the last two years have you been a victim of crime (personally 
experienced a crime situation) in this CBD//public street area? 
Yes No 
  
14. If yes, did the CCTV surveillance came to your aid/assistance or was of any help? 
[reporting of; response to; use as digital evidence in court] 
 
 
15. Do you think the CCTV surveillance system has had 
any impact on reducing crime in this CBD area? 
Yes No If ‘No’ go to 
Q16 but skip 
Q17 
  




If yes, against which crimes do you think the CCTV surveillance system has had 




without a weapon) 
Smash & grab 






      
Rape/sexual 
assault  
Vandalism Theft out of 
vehicles 
Theft of vehicles Vehicle 
hijacking 
Prostitution 
      
Assault GBH Murder Attempted murder Other: (specify) 
   
17. Knowing there is a CCTV surveillance system (cameras installed) in this CBD/public 
street area, do you feel safer when coming into this CBD/city centre/public street 
area? 
i) During the daytime? Yes No ii) At night? Yes No 
    
18. If no to either i) or ii) please give reasons for your feelings of being unsafe in this 
CBD/public street area 
 
19. Would you approve of the CCTV surveillance system in this CBD/public street area 
being expanded to:  
i) Other CBDs in this metropolitan area and linked to a Central 
Control Room?  
Yes No 
  
ii) To the suburbs? Yes No iii) To the townships? Yes No 
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iv) Other (specify):  
 
20. Who do you think funds (pays for/comes off their budget) the operations of this 
CBD/public street area CCTV surveillance system? [Taxpayers is not the correct 
answer – probe for actual agency/dept.] 
 
21. Who do you think operates the actual system? [Private co./ municipality/ 
police/combination of?] 
22. Besides crime reduction can you think of any other uses for this CBD CCTV 
surveillance system? 
 
23.  What are your thoughts on CCTV as a tool for crime prevention and control? 
 
24. Do you have any suggestions/recommendations for improving of the current 
CCTV surveillance system in this CBD? 
 
25. Can you describe an experience you have had where the footage from CCTV 
influenced crime? 
 




Thank you for your time and co-operation in participating in this research survey 
 
 
 
 
